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THE YEAR IN C-SPAN ARCHIVES RESEARCH
Robert X. Browning, Series Editor
The C-SPAN Archives, located adjacent to Purdue University, is the home of 
the online C-SPAN Video Library, which has copied all of C-SPAN’s television 
content since 1987. Extensive indexing, captioning, and other enhanced online 
features provide researchers, policy analysts, students, teachers, and public offi-
cials with an unparalleled chronological and internally cross-referenced record 
for deeper study. The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research presents the finest 
interdisciplinary research utilizing tools of the C-SPAN Video Library. Each vol-
ume highlights recent scholarship and comprises leading experts and emerging 
voices in political science, journalism, psychology, computer science, commu-
nication, and a variety of other disciplines. Developed in partnership with the 
Brian Lamb School of Communication and with support from the C-SPAN 
Education Foundation, this series is guided by the ideal that all experimental 
outcomes, including those from our American experiment, can be best im-
proved by directed study driving richer engagement and better understanding.
Other titles in this series
The C-SPAN Archives: An Interdisciplinary Resource for Discovery, 
Learning, and Engagement
Exploring the C-SPAN Archives: Advancing the Research Agenda
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ast summer I had the pleasure of working at the British National Archives 
just outside of London. With the River Thames nearby and swans swimming 
in a small stream out front, I entered a highly regarded archive where vis-
itors are greeted with a large banner encouraging them to “explore 1,000 years 
of history.” I was there to study the correspondence between Harry Truman and 
Winston Churchill in the lead-up to the Potsdam Conference held in July 1945. 
The National Archives lived up to its reputation. Not only were the top secret 
telegrams between Truman and Churchill, along with pages of notes and com-
ments, preserved, but so were the handwritten envelopes in which the telegrams 
were delivered to Churchill. If something was missing from a folder, even an 
envelope, it was duly noted on the folder front.
This kind of comprehensive, meticulous archive is not just important to re-
searchers. It is invaluable to the citizens of a country, allowing them to see for 
themselves how their government works.
The C-SPAN Archives offers us this same level of completeness and care. 
As the brainchild of Robert X. Browning, the Archives was founded in 1987 to 
create a record of public debate. Since that time it has grown to be an archive 
of the entire federal government, with over 262,000 hours of content accessible 
in its online Video Library. The C-SPAN Archives offers us an inclusive public 
record of American politics and American politicians. It is an open book to a 
world of historic videos, verbatim transcripts, Supreme Court oral arguments, 
Speaker of the House press conferences, and presidential remarks made at the 
White House and at campaign rallies. No other video archive offers this level of 
detail combined with easy accessibility.
The record the C-SPAN Archives offers is critical for our understanding of 
where we are in the evolution of American democracy—in this current age of in-
formation pitted against disinformation, the definitions of which are important 
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to grasp when considering the essential value of the Archives. Information is 
facts provided about someone or something. Disinformation is false or mislead-
ing communication that is spread deliberately to deceive. Never before have 
Americans been more challenged to monitor and understand the differences 
between these two types of communication. Fortunately for us the Archives 
provides the information so that we can discern what is truly disinformation. I 
frequently use the Video Library for this very purpose—to go back to the original 
transcript of what was said to compare it to what may be a completely different 
statement posted on Twitter or made during a press briefing just moments later.
This current volume of The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, The Evolution 
of Political Rhetoric, represents a remarkable array of works examining the rheto-
ric of politicians and activists and adds invaluably to our understanding of what 
is information and what is disinformation. The chapters offer fresh analyses 
of committee hearings, which include debates on highly contentious Supreme 
Court nominations and impeachments, and an important look at how gender 
influences desirable floor time for members of the House of Representatives and 
White House press briefings. We also learn about politicians in action—from 
their campaign announcements to their videos posted on Twitter. The book al-
lows us to consider how politicians framed Wall Street in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis and how activists worked on the issue of overpopulation 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In this critical time in American politics, the C-SPAN Archives is more im-
portant than ever. Its chronicle of information keeps us all one step ahead of 
those who offer falsehoods as though they are truths. This volume is essential 
to helping us understand and not lose sight of the difference between the two.
Lyn Ragsdale




he 2019 Center for C-SPAN Scholarship & Engagement (CCSE) research 
conference produced nine papers that use the C-SPAN Archives innova-
tively to explore important questions in communication, political science, 
and history. With each annual conference, the authors push the boundaries of 
new ideas and new technology, revealing new findings and techniques to ana-
lyze video, text, and data entries from the C-SPAN Video Library. This year was 
no exception.
With a theme of Looking Forward–Looking Back: Understanding Change in 
Policy and Process, these nine authors looked at the recent Supreme Court nomi-
nations, presidential impeachment, 2008 Wall Street crisis, presidential campaign 
announcements, gender differences in questions at White House news confer-
ences, zero population growth rhetoric, women versus men speaking time in 
the House of Representatives, and the Twitter framing of the For the People Act 
of 2019. What unites all the pieces, besides their use of C-SPAN video, is the ti-
tle of this volume, The Evolution of Political Rhetoric.
It is the rhetoric of senators questioning Supreme Court nominees Clarence 
Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh, as well as their accusers in their confirmation hear-
ings nearly 30 years apart that brings insights into time and change. Presidential 
impeachment is clearly a timely topic, and one chapter looks back at the House 
rhetoric as members grapple with what is an impeachable offense.
The papers in section two of the book focus on rhetoric surrounding the ma-
jor Wall Street Crisis of 2008, an important topic, but not a common one for so-
cial science. Interestingly we also find in this section that presidential campaign 
announcements we now take for granted since there were so many presiden-
tial candidates in 2020 have received very little analysis. How these candidates 
presented themselves creates a fascinating rhetorical analysis. Finally, we learn 
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how men and women approach their questioning in White House news confer-
ences in different ways.
Finally, a historian uses the C-SPAN Video Library to examine how the rhet-
oric for zero population growth, a key element of the early environmental move-
ment, emerged in early video programs. Data on how many times videos have 
been viewed allow two authors to analyze the differences between the exposure 
that male and female representatives receive for their floor speeches. A key piece 
of legislation for the 116th Democratic congressional majority was the For the 
People Act of 2019. It sought far-reaching reforms in elections, voting age, and 
gerrymandering. How members framed such an important piece of legislation 
is the subject of the last paper in this volume.
The Center for C-SPAN Scholarship & Engagement in the Brian Lamb School 
of Communication at Purdue University was created to foster research, teach-
ing, and Engagement using the C-SPAN Archives. This annual research confer-
ence and resulting Purdue University Press volume represents a key element of 
our research effort. This volume certainly does not disappoint through the cre-
ativity, imagination, and research approaches of the authors.
One additional feature of this year’s conference was research presentations 
by three Purdue undergraduate students — Andie Slomka, Jordan Dirks, and 
Gracen Stanczykiewicz — who competed in the CCSE and Lamb School under-
graduate research competition. Each presented a 5-minute overview of a com-
munication topic they researched using the C-SPAN Video Library. These three 
presentations had been selected from ten refereed presentations by students who 
entered the competition. This feature, which will be continued again this year, 
introduces undergraduate students to research and exposes them to a profes-
sional conference where they present their research. These students demonstrate 
through their outside-of-class initiative that there is much that can be learned 
from the C-SPAN Archives at all levels. It is an extension of our classroom ef-




ith every research conference sponsored by the Purdue University Center 
for Scholarship & Engagement (CCSE) and each resulting volume, there 
are so many people to thank. Each played an important role in making 
it all happen. Connie Doebele, managing director of CCSE, is so critical in her 
mastery of details and contributions to the elements of the conference. Without 
her, the conference would not be a success. Marifran Mattson, professor of com-
munication and head of the Brian Lamb School of Communication, which 
sponsors CCSE, is a key supporter and idea person throughout the entire pro-
cess, from planning through execution. Donna Wiremen and Rachel Ravellette 
assisted with many details of the program and behind-the-scenes work. Connie 
was assisted by the work of visiting scholar Peter Watkins and undergraduate 
students Manuel Arauz Ramirez, Andie Smolka, and Kaleigh Karageorge.
My communications colleagues, Professors Diana Zulli and William Bart 
Collins, helped review the submissions. Political science colleagues, Professors 
Jay McCann and Rosalee Clawson, served as discussants and commentators at 
the conference, as did Janel Jett, an accomplished graduate student in political 
science. Cherie Drake Maestas, professor and head of political science, lends 
support to the CCSE activities throughout the year. David Reingold, the Justin 
Morrill Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, is also an ardent supporter of the 
conference and the activities of the CCSE. Fara Stalker and Heather Holley from 
CCSE’s Business Office helped with all the financial details.
Communications Professor Josh Boyd conceived of the CCSE and Lamb 
School undergraduate research competition and moderated the impressive pre-
sentations of Andie Smolka, Jordan Dirks, and Gracen Stanczykiewicz, who won 
the competition in the spring and presented their research at the conference.
The C-SPAN Education Foundation once again provided the grants to the par-
ticipants that enabled them to conduct the research and attend the conference. 
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PART 1
A Look at C-SPAN 
Programming With All Its 
“Madisonian Passion”
James A. McCann, Discussant
I
n any high school or college civics class in the United States, the first few lec-
tures of a semester are sure to focus on the formal architecture of American 
governing institutions — how leaders are chosen, which branch has which par-
ticular rights and responsibilities, and how the three branches check and balance 
each other. No understanding of policymaking and representation in the United 
States would be complete without an appreciation of these powers and dynamics.
Introductory textbooks on American politics, however, tend at times to cover 
the guidelines of the U.S. Constitution as if one were detailing the workings of 
an assembly line or supply chain (. . . if the president has not signed a congres-
sional bill within 10 days, excluding Sundays, it still becomes a law provided that 
Congress has not adjourned, but if Congress has adjourned, the bill has been pocket 
vetoed . . .). Such treatments can make the practice of politics seem formulaic 
and sterile, which, I suspect, leaves many students uninspired and unengaged.
But if one actually witnesses what checking and balancing looks like in “real 
life” — the polarizing reactions within Congress over various presidential actions, 
for example, or the rancorous disagreements over the qualifications of one or 
another nominee for the federal bench — one cannot help but be reminded of 
James Madison’s classic characterization of human nature in politics as laid out 
in Federalist No. 10. An individual’s reason was said to be inherently subjective 
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and connected to his or her “self-love.” Opinions and passions consequently 
“will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to 
which the latter will attach themselves.” With its complete and unedited cover-
age of congressional debates and presidential activities, C-SPAN programming 
can make politics come alive, with all of its “Madisonian passion” on display.
As political scientists, our task is to follow in Madison’s footsteps by consid-
ering how representative institutions perform, and what the central dimensions 
of conflict between the branches tell us about the health of American democ-
racy. The three chapters in Part 1 all contribute important insights in this regard. 
The first two focus on Supreme Court confirmations: Nadia E. Brown, Sarah 
Gershon, and Lauren Hanson-Figueroa’s “More Than Partisans: The Role of 
Identity in the Justice Kavanaugh Hearings” and Joseph Sery’s “Competing and 
Recurring Narratives: Crafting Credibility in the Confirmation Hill-Thomas 
and Ford-Kavanaugh Hearings.” The third considers the dynamics of impeach-
ment: Matthew L. Bergbower and Robert Van Sickel’s “Partisanship Over Prin-
ciple: The ‘Logic’ of Congressional Impeachment Inquiries.”
In their analysis of the Senate hearings on the Kavanaugh nomination, Nadia 
Brown and her collaborators question the conventional wisdom about the behav-
ior of senators. Conventional accounts hold that disagreements over Kavanaugh’s 
fitness for the Supreme Court were all about partisanship. The final vote on the 
floor of the Senate certainly demonstrated a deep partisan divide, with only one 
Democratic senator breaking ranks to support the nominee. Brown and col-
leagues do not question the salience of partisan identities in this context. But 
they suggest that partisanship was not the only relevant identity in play during 
the hearings.
With the #MeToo movement in the backdrop, the chapter contends that gen-
der identities were also key to understanding the discourse and positioning sur-
rounding the hearings. As the authors state, “cultural meanings were not lost 
on the Senators.” A systematic compilation of comments raised at the hearings 
shows that Democrats were twice as likely as Republicans to bring up issues of 
character and credibility when commenting on Brett Kavanaugh. For their part, 
Republican senators were much more inclined to write off criticism of Kavanaugh 
as “just politics,” while being careful not to indict — at least not directly — the 
character of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, who had accused the judge of sexual as-
sault when they were both teenagers. Democrats were also much more likely 
than Republicans to bring up specific facts, particularly the events recalled from 
that encounter that had taken place several decades earlier.
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Overall, the authors posit that the hearings gave senators an opportunity 
to advance certain representational styles that are linked to gender identi-
ties. Democrats supported Blasey Ford and opposed Kavanaugh. This is not 
front-page news. What this chapter shows is that the ways in which opposi-
tion or support was given spoke to longstanding identity groupings within the 
major parties. A natural extension of this work would be to compare the com-
munication styles and representational roles that were on display during the 
Kavanaugh hearings to similarly divisive Senate confirmation hearings from 
the pre-#MeToo era. The most relevant point of comparison would be the 1991 
confirmation hearing for Clarence Thomas. The thesis that Brown and her col-
leagues put forward would lead us to expect significant differences in the way 
senators referred to gender during their debates.
In his chapter on crafting credibility, Joseph Sery offers this sort of com-
parison between the Thomas and Kavanaugh hearings, though without focus-
ing on the kinds of gendered roles and identifications that Brown, Gershon, 
and Hanson-Figueroa consider. Sery instead examines the dynamics of 
self-presentation for the main protagonists: Clarence Thomas, Anita Hill, Brett 
Kavanaugh, and Christine Blasey Ford. The theoretical grounding for this piece 
is the narrative paradigm, which holds that individuals who are exposed to com-
plex scenarios with crosscutting themes actively seek to construct a coherent 
storyline. We are storytellers at heart, Sery writes. In both 1991 and 2018, there 
were dueling narratives — Hill versus Thomas, and Blasey Ford versus Kavanaugh. 
To be compelling, the details of a narrative need to fit together well (what Sery 
refers to as “narrative probability”), and the narrative should resonate with the 
everyday experiences of the audience receiving these messages (which Sery la-
bels “narrative fidelity”).
Drawing from C-SPAN coverage of the Thomas hearings, Sery notes that 
Anita Hill portrayed herself as a responsible civil servant subjected to inappro-
priate sexually charged comments and overtures. Defenders of Thomas in the 
Senate pushed back against this narrative, questioning the credibility of Hill’s rec-
ollections. This, Sery suggests, was sufficient to advance Thomas’s narrative — that 
is, that he was being targeted unfairly by activists and was subject to a “high-tech 
lynching” through the mass media.
Sery then sees history repeating itself in the contrasting narratives that Blasey 
Ford and Kavanaugh presented 27 years later. Without overtly charging that 
Blasey Ford was lying, several Republican senators questioned her version of 
events, poking holes in the narrative. Kavanaugh’s narrative — that the events 
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Blasey Ford described never happened — was a cleaner storyline. Sery credits 
the Republican senators who rose to his defense as being instrumental in solid-
ifying this narrative, while at the same time not being perceived as demeaning 
Blasey Ford, since an independent (female) attorney questioned her recollec-
tions in a respectful manner.
“Competing and Recurring Narratives” offers an engaging and persuasive case 
about the importance of narratives in political settings, where many competing 
considerations and values are in play and the stakes are high. Sery provides much 
thick description of these two monumentally significant confirmation hearings. 
Future research could fruitfully build on the approach that Sery takes, assess-
ing dueling narratives in other highly contentious areas — for example, Senate 
hearings on controversial cabinet appointments. Ultimately, as more cases of 
crafting credibility are considered, one might approach a general theory of nar-
rative dynamics.
The third chapter, Matthew Bergbower and Robert Van Sickel’s “Partisanship 
Over Principle,” examines another key dimension of interbranch checking and 
balancing — the evolution of congressional efforts to impeach President Trump. 
Focusing in particular on hearings and debates within the House Judiciary 
Committee, the authors examine not only successful cases of congressional 
impeachment — Nixon and Clinton — but also attempts to forward a bill of im-
peachment bill against Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, two chief 
executives who are not often brought up when impeachments are discussed.
The authors rightfully note that the Constitution is extraordinarily vague on 
the grounds for impeachment. This means that lawmakers have very wide dis-
cretion to interpret what is or is not an impeachable offense. Through a system-
atic inventory of statements from the Judiciary Committee, the chapter shows 
how growing partisan polarization in recent decades has shifted the standards for 
impeachment. In the 1970s when the impeachment of Richard Nixon was under 
consideration, there was an appreciable level of bipartisanship. Fast-forward to 
the Clinton years, and the authors find little to no bipartisanship. Impeachment 
has seemingly become, in short, less of tool that the legislative branch can em-
ploy to discipline an executive who has violated his oath of office and the pub-
lic trust, and more of a display of partisanship.
This trend brings with it sobering implications for governance. In the final 
section of the chapter, Bergbower and Van Sickel discuss the implications of their 
findings for the Trump administration. At the time of their writing, the trial of 
Donald Trump in the Senate had just begun. In retrospect, the authors’ central 
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thesis was well borne out in this case. President Trump was fully acquitted on 
an all-but-uniform party-line vote, with little fresh evidence being presented at 
the Senate trial, and even less deliberation. Much further work is needed to ex-
amine whether partisanship within Congress has truly undermined the origi-
nal rationale for impeachment proceedings. If partisanship within the Senate 
now trumps more impartial judgments about what constitutes “high crimes and 
misdemeanors,” then it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the requisite 
supermajority to convict in the Senate could ever be attained. Might this turn 




The Role of Identity in the Justice Kavanaugh Hearings
Nadia E. Brown, Sarah Gershon, and Lauren Hanson-Figueroa
D
uring the #MeToo era,1 claims against Judge Brett Kavanaugh were 
taken more seriously than those against Judge Clarence Thomas in 1991. 
However, the outcome remained the same. Two men who were publicly 
accused of sexual harassment and misconduct are currently sitting on the high-
est bench in the land. Both justices were nominated to the Court by Republican 
presidents and confirmed by a majority of Republican senators. During the nom-
ination, Professor Christine Blasey Ford accused a 17-year-old Brett Kavanaugh 
of attempting to rape her at a drunken house party in 1982 when she was 15, 
whereas Anita Hill accused Clarence Thomas of repeated sexual harassment and 
inappropriate behavior while she worked for him in the Department of Justice’s 
Civil Rights division in the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission in the 
early 1980s. Similarly, despite a span of almost 30 years, the GOP senators who 
questioned both Anita Hill and Blasey Ford consisted only of men.
However, unlike 1991, there were noticeable gendered differences in Justice 
Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearings. In Blasey Ford’s case, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee includes four women — all of whom are Democrats in part because 
of the backlash to the all-male 1991 panel. Sex crimes prosecutor Rachel Mitchell 
was hired by the Republican majority Judiciary Committee to cross-examine 
Blasey Ford. Political elites are aware of this legitimizing impact of having women 
in the room. As such, attorney Mitchell conducted the questioning of Blasey Ford 
for the Republican members of the Judiciary Committee. Having a woman ad-
dress issues of sexual harassment and assault helped to legitimize the procedural 
process of the Kavanaugh hearing for the majority.
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We argue that these cultural meanings were not lost on the senators who 
questioned Kavanaugh. While women are not the only victims of sexual assault, 
the issue is often implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) connected with gender. 
For example, in her opening remarks during Blasey Ford’s testimony, Senator 
Feinstein (D-CA; Figure 1.1) stated:
There’s been a great deal of public discussion about the #MeToo movement 
today versus the Year of the Woman almost 27 years ago. But while young 
women are standing up and saying “No more,” our institutions have not pro-
gressed in how they treat women who come forward. Too often, women’s 
memories and credibility come under assault. In essence, they are put on 
trial and forced to defend themselves, and often revictimized in the process. 
(CSPAN, 2018, 0:19:27)
As Senator Feinstein’s statement illustrates, this debate was perceived as speaking 
to a broader discussion in the U.S. about women’s experiences.
While much of what we know about public opinion and sexual harassment is 
focused on voters, our study explores the differences among political elites’ view 
of sexual harassment and misconduct through the lens of the 2018 Kavanaugh 
hearings. While a great deal of research in gender politics focuses on whether 
women represent women’s interests in their congressional behavior, only four fe-
male senators — all Democrats — participated in this inquiry. As such, this event 
allows us to examine the representational styles of these (primarily male) sen-
ators on an issue associated with women against the backdrop of the #MeToo 
FIGURE 1.1 Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) remarks at Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing.
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movement. In this context, the Democrats and Republicans were likely facing dif-
ferent gendered constraints. The Democrats — long associated with women and 
women’s issues — must illustrate their expertise and sensitivity on this issue 
and their commitment to addressing it on a national level. Republicans, on the 
other hand, must navigate this issue that they are likely assumed to lack exper-
tise with. Furthermore, unlike other partisan debates over gendered issues the 
GOP engages on in Congress (Brown & Gershon, 2017), there were no female 
Republican members on this committee to contribute to the discussion — how-
ever, they included a female prosecutor, Rachel Mitchell. This situation was likely 
made more toxic for Republicans because the accused was nominated by a mem-
ber of their own party, and by a president who was also accused of and caught 
on tape bragging about sexual assault. Thus, this 2018 Kavanaugh hearing is dis-
tinctive in both the content and the national context under which it was held. 
As such, this case allows for a unique examination of the ways in which the par-
ties represent women’s interests in their messaging.
We explore messaging on this gendered hearing by using the C-SPAN Video 
Library recordings of the hearings to examine the senators’ questioning of 
Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford. These hearings — in the midst of a national discus-
sion of sexual harassment and assault — provide critical insight into the ways in 
which elected officials view this nationally salient issue and the action they took 
when confronted with it during Kavanaugh’s confirmation. Given the contin-
ued prominence of this event, senators’ remarks may have shaped voter attitudes 
about both this particular case and the national discussion surrounding sexual 
misconduct. As our analysis reveals, Democrats and Republicans took decidedly 
different approaches to this gendered issue. We conclude by considering the im-
plications of our findings for the ongoing national discussion on sexual assault.
SENATE HEARINGS AND COMMUNICATION
Senate hearings — such as the investigation into Blasey Ford’s allegations — draw 
significant public attention. Nielson estimated that over 20 million people 
watched the hearing on network news alone (which does not account for those 
watching online or in groups) (Bauder, 2018). Undoubtedly, countless more 
read coverage of the hearings in the press. Given the national attention to this 
hearing, Senate messaging during it serves not only to investigate the claims be-
fore the committee but also to frame the debate over Blasey Ford’s allegations 
to Americans. As such, senators’ comments during this hearing serve a critical 
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symbolic function: informing their constituencies both in their states and na-
tionally about this case — what it was about, how they were acting on voters’ be-
half, and what they might do about similar cases in the future.
Scholars have long identified the crucial role of communication — from elites 
to voters — in the representational process (e.g., Evans & Hayden, 2017; Fenno, 
1978; Fridkin & Kenney, 2014; Grimmer, 2013). Generally, representational mes-
sages serve to educate voters, allowing them to hold elected officials account-
able at the polls, as well as to enhance trust and support (Eulau & Karps, 1977). 
Messaging during congressional hearings and floor debates serves to inform vot-
ers of the activities of government and to illustrate the differences among elected 
officials’ beliefs about contemporary political issues (Brown & Gershon, 2017). 
By examining congressional hearings, Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) find 
that diversity in Congress leads to keeping minority interests on the legislative 
agenda. Therefore, given the national attention to the Kavanaugh case, senators’ 
remarks during the hearings clearly illustrate their representational style on gen-
dered issues like sexual assault and misconduct.
Generally, the literature on communication and women’s interests focuses on 
the extent to which candidates and elected officials discuss issues explicitly and 
implicitly connected with gender (e.g., abortion, domestic violence, birth con-
trol) as well as so-called female issues — subjects women are expected to pos-
sess special expertise in such as children and families (see, e.g., Dolan, 2005; 
Kahn, 1996; Windett, 2014). Generally, this research finds that women tend to 
talk about these issues more frequently than their male colleagues (Fridkin & 
Woodall, 2005; Gershon, 2008; Kahn, 1996). Furthermore, Democrats are typ-
ically found to mention women’s issues and interests at a higher rate than their 
Republican peers (Dolan, 2005). Additionally, Republicans and Democrats may 
speak about gendered issues in different ways.
In our own research (Brown & Gershon, 2017) on the 2012 debate over the 
reauthorization of Violence Against Women Act, we found that when Republicans 
and Democrats discuss gendered issues the framework of their discussion varies 
a great deal, with Democrats more frequently emphasizing marginalized com-
munities in their remarks and Republicans focusing on the broad impact of the 
law for all women. Thus, the research indicates that the parties likely will dif-
fer in the extent to which they will speak about issues affecting women and that 
when called upon to do so during congressional debate, they will differ substan-
tively in the approach they take to the issue. This research would suggest what 
we might expect to find in the Kavanaugh hearings.
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IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE SYMBOLISM OF THE KAVANAUGH HEARINGS
Democratic theorists contend that the exclusion of underrepresented groups 
from the legislative process renders political institutions illegitimate (Dovi, 2007; 
Mansbridge, 1999). Having descriptive representatives — meaning, elected of-
ficials who look like or share the experiences of underrepresented groups — is 
crucial in decision-making bodies. Indeed, Atkeson and Carrillo (2007) contend 
that regime stability and the acceptance (or rejection) of democratic political in-
stitutions are beholden to the inclusion of descriptive representors.
Citizens are more likely perceive a government’s action as legitimate, fair, or 
correct when there are underrepresented members of society in decision-making 
positions. In their study of all-male panels, Clayton et al. (2019) examine sub-
stantive legitimacy — meaning, the content of the decision reached and proce-
dural legitimacy (trust in representative institutions and the perceived fairness 
of decision-making procedures) — to find that both men and women prefer in-
clusion as a measure of legitimacy. Specifically, they find that when a mem-
ber of a marginalized group is included in the deliberative process, citizens 
have greater inherent trust in decisions and change their perception only when 
the group’s rights are rescinded. Citizens also confer greater legitimacy to the 
decision-making process when women political elites are present. They find that 
women’s presence legitimizes anti-feminist outcomes for men. Additionally, the 
presence of women political elites signals to citizens the legitimacy of demo-
cratic procedures (Clayton et al., 2019).
With regard to sexual assault, voter expectations are likely to be partisan. 
Research by Masuoka et al. (2018) posits an intersectional impact of party and 
gender on mass political behavior to political elites. Their partisan gender the-
ory suggests that partisanship and gender influence voter choices and attitudes 
when wrongdoings are gendered, such as sexual harassment. Gender and party 
identification are the chief identities that animate one’s response to learning of a 
political candidate’s sexual improprieties. Sexual harassment, an abuse of power, 
is more likely experienced by women (Fitzgerald et al., 1997). Thus, a gendered 
and partisan understanding of sexual harassment is necessary to fully under-
stand political elites’ views of the Kavanaugh hearings.
We may expect senators to react to these expectations in unique ways through 
their messaging. Given the limited diversity on the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in 2018, particularly among Republicans, senators may seek to legitimize their 
actions in a few ways. Given the likelihood that Democratic voters may perceive 
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Kavanaugh’s actions as especially troubling, Democratic senators are under 
pressure to illustrate their rejection of assault and support for women in their 
remarks. As a result, Democrats — long associated with greater support for wom-
en’s issues (Dolan, 1998) — should be expected to highlight their strengths and 
speak specifically to the challenges women face with regard to sexual miscon-
duct and highlight the pervasiveness of the problem in our society. Conversely, 
Republicans are likely to stay away from discussions of gender and abuse, which 
voters may not expect them to competently handle — especially since there are 
no female Republicans on the committee to speak on this issue.
DATA AND METHODS
On September 27, 2018, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony from 
Supreme Court nominee Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford about her allegations that 
Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her while the two were teenagers at a house party 
in Maryland the 1980s. To examine the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings, par-
ticularly Blasey Ford’s testimony of sexual assault, we utilized one video from 
the C-SPAN Video Library. These videos provide a unique opportunity to learn 
about the ways that senators sought to frame sexual assault and harassment, 
frame partisan politics, and question Kavanaugh’s fitness for serving on the Su-
preme Court. The C-SPAN Video Library recording of the hearing captures the 
stylized real-time discussion and procedures for confirming a justice to the Su-
preme Court, something that is less examined in the realm of legislative studies. 
Here, we are able to discern the ideological signals members of Congress send to 
voters through their public questioning of Blasey Ford and Kavanaugh. We also 
analyzed the written transcript of the hearings on The Washington Post’s website.2
CONTENT ANALYSIS
Using both quantitative and qualitative content analysis, we examined the sub-
stance of the questions and responses of the senators, Kavanaugh, Blasey Ford, 
and attorney Rachel Mitchell during the hearing. In our content analysis, we 
examine discussion in each speaking segment, meaning each individual time 
a senator spoke. These segments varied widely in length and content. Some 
included brief questions, lasting only a few seconds, while others lasted over a 
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minute and included a wide variety of remarks. This variance represents both 
the time allotted to each senator to speak as well as their use of the time (e.g., to 
question Blasey Ford or Kavanaugh or to speak broadly on the issues they be-
lieved the hearings centered on). We coded approximately 987 individual seg-
ments during which senators or their prosecutor (Mitchell) spoke during the 
hearing (552 during Blasey Ford’s testimony and 435 during Kavanaugh’s testi-
mony).3 The number of speaking segments per party also varied as well (see Ta-
ble 1.1). Democrats had 347 segments, Republicans had 274, and Mitchell (who 
spoke on behalf of all Republicans during Blasey Ford’s testimony) had 366. The 
number of segments also differed between each of the two hearing sessions, 
with Republicans speaking far more during Kavanaugh’s testimony. During Bla-
sey Ford’s testimony, Republicans — particularly Senator Grassley — engaged in 
some administrative discussion (regarding speaking time, etc.), but GOP mem-
bers largely chose to yield their time to Mitchell, who questioned Blasey Ford 
on their behalf.
In coding the speaking segments, we examined whether senators utilized 
five primary themes in each of their speaking segments:4 character/credibility, 
partisanship/politics, details/facts, sexual assault, and women’s roles/rights.5 
We further examined whether (within these statements) senators discussed the 
following secondary themes: gender, race, victimization, bravery, empathy, al-
coholism, and FBI investigation.6 We coded these segments both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. In the qualitative analysis, we present the frequency with 
which various senators employed these themes in their discussion, examin-
ing the proportion of total speaking segments, including each theme. To con-
duct the qualitative analysis, we organized the legislators and attorney Mitchell’s 
words thematically by context and the legislator’s partisan affiliation once we 
discerned distinct patterns. We disaggregate by party affiliation to demonstrate 
that the ways in which Democrats and Republicans discuss these themes vary 
in significant and meaningful ways.
TABLE 1.1 Speaking Segments
Democrats Republicans Mitchell Total
Blasey Ford testimony 126 126 300 552
Kavanaugh testimony 221 148 66 435
Total 347 274 366 987
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Results
Here we present the results — qualitative and quantitative — for each primary 
theme coded. Secondary themes are discussed throughout the text and are 
included in the Appendix.
Character/Credibility
First, we examine discussions of character in the hearings (results displayed in 
Table 1.2). As the data indicate, there are substantive and significant differences 
in the extent to which the senators discussed character, generally and across the 
hearings. Throughout the entire hearing, Democrats’ remarks included the theme 
of character and credibility more than twice as often as Republicans’. This differ-
ence is even starker in during Blasey Ford’s testimony (likely due in part to so 
few Republicans speaking during this session). During Kavanaugh’s testimony, 
the differences between Democrats and Republicans were substantive but not 
statistically significant in this regard.
Beyond the variance in the quantity of credibility-themed discussion, there 
are substantive qualitative differences in the ways that senators incorporated 
this theme into their remarks. Take for example Mazie Hirono’s (D-HI) clos-
ing statement during her questioning of Blasey Ford. In this statement, Hirono 
asks her colleagues to deeply consider the importance of one’s character in de-
ciding who to confirm to the nation’s highest court. She applauds Blasey Ford 
for being courageous by coming forward with this accusation although she has 
received death threats and her family has been forced to move several times 
in fear for their safety. Our secondary theme of bravery, characterized here by 
Senator Hirono, demonstrates that Democrats viewed Blasey Ford as courageous 
TABLE 1.2 Character/Credibility
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga,b 11.2 4.4 0.0 5.1
Blasey Ford testimonya,b 7.1 0.8 0.0 1.8
Kavanaugh testimonya 13.6 7.4 0.0 9.4
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
bDifferences between Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
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for facing the nation and publicly recounting her experiences a sexual assault 
victim. Hirono stated:
But by coming forward, you have inserted the question of character into this 
nomination, and hopefully, back into American life, and rightly so. We should 
be made to face the question of who it is we are putting in positions of power 
and decision-making in this country. We should look the question square in 
the face: does character matter? (C-SPAN, 2018, 2:27:01)
Quantitatively, we found this theme of bravery repeated throughout the hearings, 
particularly by Democrats, who included it more frequently in their speaking 
segments than their Republican colleagues (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
Senator Hirono also ties Kavanaugh’s accused behavior to that of President 
Trump’s allegations of sexual assault. Noting that “the president admits on tape to 
assaulting women. . . . He nominates and stands behind a man who stands cred-
ibly accused of a horrible act” She distinctly questions both the president’s and 
Kavanaugh’s moral fitness for their positions. For Hirono, this character flaw is a 
deep one that strikes at the heart of what she sees as American compliancy with 
sexual harassment, particularly by powerful men. As the only Asian American 
woman on the Judiciary Committee, Mazie Hirono appealed to a higher pur-
pose. Her questioning of Kavanaugh’s character is tied to a public outrage at the 
lack of respect for one another. Hirono shared that Americans are inspired by 
Blasey Ford’s courage:
All over this country shows [Blasey Ford shows] us that we’re not alone, you’re 
not alone; that women and men all across America are disgusted and sick and 
tired of the way basic human decency has been driven from our public life. 
(C-SPAN, 2018, 2:27:40)
In sum, Hirono states that if the accusations of Kavanaugh’s immoral behavior 
of sexual harassment are indeed factual, then his character failings are another 
reason Americans lack trust in our political institutions.
Unlike Mazie Hirono, who sought to valorize Blasey Ford’s character, Senator 
Ted Cruz (R-TX) utilized discussion of Kavanaugh’s character to bolster sympa-
thy for his candidacy for a justice position on the Supreme Court. Cruz’s open-
ing statement to Kavanaugh was to laud his years of service on the bench and 
to describe this hearing as an injustice to the confirmation process. Cruz noted 
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that both Blasey Ford and Kavanaugh were treated poorly by both the Senate 
Democrats and the media. He uses emotional appeals to signal empathy for 
Kavanaugh. Cruz held:
I will say watching your mother’s pained face has been heart-wrenching as 
she’s seen her son’s character dragged through the mud after not only your 
lifetime of public service but her lifetime of public service as well. (C-SPAN, 
2018, 2:38:13)
Here Cruz maintains that Kavanaugh has been done a disservice by Blasey Ford’s 
accusations and that his good character has been tainted because of this. For 
Cruz, Kavanaugh and his family are subjected to unwarranted character attacks. 
In sum, Senator Cruz displays a heightened level of empathy for Kavanaugh and 
his family because of the suffering they endured as a result of the sexual assault 
allegations. In contrast to the secondary theme of bravery, empathy was empha-
sized at similar rates among Republicans and Democrats (included in about 3% 
of their speaking segments).
While both Senators Hirono and Cruz aim to center Kavanaugh’s character by 
evoking the emotions of empathy and bravery during their remarks at his confir-
mation hearing, they do so with markedly different motivations. Hirono’s com-
ments call in to question Kavanaugh’s moral aptitude for the position, whereas 
Cruz seeks to solicit emotional reactions to damage caused through poorly sub-
stantiated claims of sexual harassment. Both senators are appealing to different 
views of the allegations but also to the importance of selecting a justice of good 
character to the bench.
Partisanship/Politics
Next, we examine discussions of partisanship and political motivations in the 
hearings (results displayed in Table 1.3). In contrast to some of the other themes 
discussed, partisanship was a prominent theme for all groups across the entire 
hearing, but at significantly different levels. Democrats discussed partisanship in 
slightly more of their speaking segments than Republicans during Blasey Ford’s 
testimony, but these differences are not statistically significant. Republicans em-
ployed this theme in a greater proportion of their speaking segments (compared 
with Democrats and attorney Mitchell) during Kavanaugh’s testimony, where 
they discussed partisanship at more than twice the rate of Democrats (almost 
34% of speaking segments, compared with 14% among Democrats).
TABLE 1.3 Partisanship/Politics
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga,b 15.9 24.9 8.2 15.5
Blasey Ford testimonya 19.0 14.3 8.3 12.2
Kavanaugh testimonya,b 14.0 33.8 7.6 19.7
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
bDifferences between Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
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that both Blasey Ford and Kavanaugh were treated poorly by both the Senate 
Democrats and the media. He uses emotional appeals to signal empathy for 
Kavanaugh. Cruz held:
I will say watching your mother’s pained face has been heart-wrenching as 
she’s seen her son’s character dragged through the mud after not only your 
lifetime of public service but her lifetime of public service as well. (C-SPAN, 
2018, 2:38:13)
Here Cruz maintains that Kavanaugh has been done a disservice by Blasey Ford’s 
accusations and that his good character has been tainted because of this. For 
Cruz, Kavanaugh and his family are subjected to unwarranted character attacks. 
In sum, Senator Cruz displays a heightened level of empathy for Kavanaugh and 
his family because of the suffering they endured as a result of the sexual assault 
allegations. In contrast to the secondary theme of bravery, empathy was empha-
sized at similar rates among Republicans and Democrats (included in about 3% 
of their speaking segments).
While both Senators Hirono and Cruz aim to center Kavanaugh’s character by 
evoking the emotions of empathy and bravery during their remarks at his confir-
mation hearing, they do so with markedly different motivations. Hirono’s com-
ments call in to question Kavanaugh’s moral aptitude for the position, whereas 
Cruz seeks to solicit emotional reactions to damage caused through poorly sub-
stantiated claims of sexual harassment. Both senators are appealing to different 
views of the allegations but also to the importance of selecting a justice of good 
character to the bench.
Partisanship/Politics
Next, we examine discussions of partisanship and political motivations in the 
hearings (results displayed in Table 1.3). In contrast to some of the other themes 
discussed, partisanship was a prominent theme for all groups across the entire 
hearing, but at significantly different levels. Democrats discussed partisanship in 
slightly more of their speaking segments than Republicans during Blasey Ford’s 
testimony, but these differences are not statistically significant. Republicans em-
ployed this theme in a greater proportion of their speaking segments (compared 
with Democrats and attorney Mitchell) during Kavanaugh’s testimony, where 
they discussed partisanship at more than twice the rate of Democrats (almost 
34% of speaking segments, compared with 14% among Democrats).
TABLE 1.3 Partisanship/Politics
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga,b 15.9 24.9 8.2 15.5
Blasey Ford testimonya 19.0 14.3 8.3 12.2
Kavanaugh testimonya,b 14.0 33.8 7.6 19.7
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
bDifferences between Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
Given the heightened partisan nature of this confirmation hearing, it is un-
surprising that senators would demonstrate deep ideological divisions. This is 
to be expected. Both sides routinely admonish the other for playing politics 
during the hearing to benefit their political party. Partisans heavily debated the 
FBI’s role in investigating the allegations of sexual assault. This came up in over 
15% of Democrats’ speaking segments and almost 8% of Republicans’ segments 
(see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The Democrats called for more thorough in-
vestigations of Blasey Ford’s accusations, whereas the Republicans decried that 
the additional investigations were unnecessary and that it is the Senate’s duty to 
come up with a final decision based on the report. Indeed, Chairman Grassley 
(R-IA) exhorted:
Contrary to what the public has been led to believe, the FBI doesn’t perform 
any credibility assessments or verify the truth of any events in these back-
ground investigations. . . . The FBI provided us with the allegations. Now it’s 
up to the Senate to assess their credibility. Which brings us to this very time. 
(C-SPAN, 2018, 0:10:24)
Our secondary theme of the FBI’s investigation is readily seen in how Dem-
ocrats such as ranking member Dianne Feinstein expressed outrage that the 
Republican-led Senate did not call for a fuller FBI investigation of Blasey Ford’s 
accusations. She called for the three women who alleged that Kavanaugh had 
inappropriate sexual content with them to be interviewed by the FBI. Senator 
Feinstein stated:
Each of these stories are troubling on their own and each of these allegations 
should be investigated by the FBI. All three women have said they would like 
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the FBI to investigate; please do so. All three have said they have other wit-
nesses and evidence to corroborate their accounts. And yet Republicans con-
tinue to blindly push forward. (C-SPAN, 2018, 0:26:07)
Adding fuel to this partisan fodder, Chairman Chuck Grassley utilized a 
quote from Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) from Clarence Thomas’s hearing to indi-
cate that additional FBI investigations would be unnecessary. Grassley surmised:
If Senator — Senate Democrats hope for the FBI to draw any conclusions on 
this matter, I’m going to remind you what Joe Biden said. Now, I said this my 
statement, but maybe — maybe people aren’t listening when I say, and maybe 
they won’t even hear this. Joe Biden, quote, “The next person who refers to an 
FBI report as being worth anything obviously doesn’t understand anything. 
The FBI explicitly does not — does not, in this or any other case, reach a con-
clusion. Period. They say ‘He said, she said, and they said.’ Period. So, when 
people wave an FBI report before you,” or even bring it up now as something 
prospectively — I’m not — that wasn’t in his quote, “understand they do not, 
they do not, they do not reach conclusions. They do not make recommenda-
tions.” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:44:32)
Here we see Democrats and Republicans talking past one another while accus-
ing each side of woefully misusing or intentionally utilizing the FBI for partisan 
purposes. While the FBI was in the forefront of the procedural battle, senators 
evenly sought to play up the humanistic aspects of the hearings.
For example, Democratic and Republican senators uniformly apologized to 
Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford for the way that members of the opposing party 
treated them or the process. For instance, Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) apologized 
to Blasey Ford and demonstrated our secondary theme of empathy by stating, 
“I’m sorry for what this has done to you and your family. No one, no one should 
face harassment, death threats and disparaging comments by cheap-shot poli-
ticians simply for telling the truth” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:19:06). Conversely, Thom 
Tillis (R-NC) directed his apology toward Kavanaugh:
And I apologize for what you’re going through right now. I can’t imagine it. I’ve 
gone through a campaign and had a lot of smears, but it pales in comparison 
to what you’ve had to deal with. . . . We’ve had members take it on themselves 
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to release committee confidential documents instead of respecting the pro-
cess. (C-SPAN, 2018, 2:27:02)
Both sides of the aisle accuse the other of playing politics while damaging the 
reputation — or safety — of Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford.
When Republican senators questioned Kavanaugh, they often did so with 
some deference. For example, Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE) asked:
Was that a fun time for you? When people — Senators could ask questions that 
are awkward or uncomfortable about potential alcoholism, potential gambling 
addiction, credit card debt, if your buddies floated you money to buy baseball 
tickets — did you enjoy that time we spent in here late one night? (C-SPAN, 
2018, 2:06:29)
The approach to fact-finding for this case greatly varied by who asked the ques-
tions and is clearly seen in how Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford responded to the 
questions.
Details/Facts
As the data in Table 1.4 reveal, fact-based statements comprised a substantive 
proportion of the senators’ speeches, as well as over 80% of attorney Mitchell’s 
remarks. Furthermore, differences in the use of this theme were significant across 
all three groups and between Democrats and Republicans. For example, during 
Kavanaugh’s testimony, over half of Democrats’ speaking segments included dis-
cussion of the facts of the case at hand, compared with around 20% of Republi-
can remarks. While this difference is sizable, it may be due in part to Mitchell’s 
TABLE 1.4 Details/Facts
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga,b 50.4 15.3 84.7 53.0
Blasey Ford testimonya,b 43.7 10.3 87.0 58.8
Kavanaugh testimonya,b 54.3 19.6 74.2 46.0
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
bDifferences between Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
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questioning on behalf of several Republicans, as well as her overwhelming focus 
on the details and facts in her questions (as opposed to senators’ use of a vari-
ety of themes). As discussed in the qualitative analysis below, the ways in which 
Democrats, Republicans, and Mitchell used this theme varied substantively.
Republican and Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee sought 
to use facts and details to support their case, either that Blasey Ford was credi-
bly accusing Kavanaugh of sexual assault or that Kavanaugh was being unduly 
faulted for this behavior. However, Democrats were much more likely to ap-
peal to scientific studies and written testimony from experts to help argue their 
case. Conversely, Republicans, through Mitchell, were partial to asking Blasey 
Ford to recall details from the night in question. When Democrats questioned 
Kavanaugh on the facts of the alleged sexual assault they were met with hostile 
responses that often did not produce a yes or no answer. Taken as a whole, the 
fact-finding aspects of the hearing had severely partisan overtones.
Mitchell, counsel for Senate Judiciary Committee, questioned Blasey Ford. 
Mitchell is an Arizona prosecutor specializing in sex crimes. To be clear, Blasey 
Ford was not on trial during the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings. Mitchell used 
a methodical approach in her questioning of Blasey Ford. For instance, she be-
gins her questioning of by being sympathetic, stating, “I know this is stressful, 
and so I would like to set forth some guidelines that maybe will alleviate that a 
little bit” (C-SPAN, 2018, 0:51:03). It is clear in what follows that Mitchell will 
ask Blasey Ford about specific details of the night in question. For example, she 
says, “If I ask you a question that you don’t understand, please ask me to clarify 
it or ask it in a different way” (C-SPAN, 2018, 0:51:11). From there, Mitchell asks 
Blasey Ford to recall details of the house party in the 1980s where she claims to 
have been sexually assaulted by Kavanaugh. The questioning also includes clari-
fying information on who Blasey Ford contacted, from Congress members, ther-
apists, lawyers, friends, and family to The Washington Post regarding the assault. 
For instance, Mitchell asks:
When you were interviewed by The Washington Post, you said that there were 
four boys present at the party. And then in your polygraph statement, you said 
there were four boys and two girls. When you say “two girls,” was that you and 
another or was that two other girls? (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:12:57)
These types of clarifying questions were typical of Mitchell’s inquiry of Blasey 
Ford.
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In response, Blasey Ford would answer to the best of her ability — often not-
ing that victims of sexual assault do not have a clear memory of the details of 
their attack but instead remember key information related to the attack itself. 
For instance, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) asked Blasey Ford to state what 
she recalls from the party rather than asking her about things she might not re-
member. Similarly, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) empathetically questioned 
Blasey Ford by first stating:
You know, experts have written about how it’s common for sexual assault sur-
vivors to remember some facts about the experience very sharply and very 
clearly, but not others, and that has to do with the survival mode that we go 
into in experiencing trauma. Is that your experience, and is that something 
you can help the layperson understand? (C-SPAN, 2018, 2:02:11)
As a rejoinder, Blasey Ford noted:
Yes. I was definitely experiencing the fight-or-flight mode; is that what you’re 
referring to? Yes. So, I was definitely experiencing the surge of adrenaline and 
cortisol and norepinephrine and — credit that a little bit for my ability to get 
out of the situation. (C-SPAN, 2018, 2:02:31)
While Mitchell probed Blasey Ford about potential inconsistencies in her 
story, the Democrats took a much more empathetic approach to their questioning 
of Blasey Ford by asking her to recount details of the event while also acknowl-
edging the inherent memory lapses of victims who have experienced sexual as-
sault. When questioning Kavanaugh about the details surrounding the night 
of the alleged sexual assault, Mitchell also took a similar methodical approach. 
She asked: “Dr. Ford described an incident where you were grinding your gen-
itals on her. Have you ever ground or rubbed your genitals against Dr. Ford?” 
(C-SPAN, 2018, 1:00:52). Then: “Dr. Ford described an incident where you cov-
ered her mouth with your hand. Have you ever covered Dr. Ford’s mouth with 
your hand?” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:00:59).
Democratic senators sought to paint Kavanaugh’s memory of the facts and de-
tails of the night in question as unreliable due to his heavy consumption of alco-
hol. Our secondary theme of alcoholism is clearly a narrative used by Democrats 
to discredit Kavanaugh’s ability to recount the facts surrounding the alleged 
sexual assault. For instance, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) asked, “If the 
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vomiting that you reference in the Ralph Club reference [in your yearbook] re-
lated to the consumption of alcohol?” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:29:10). Pushing a bit 
further because Kavanaugh did not directly respond to his question, Senator 
Whitehouse asked Kavanaugh to explain ralphing. From there Kavanaugh sated 
that he enjoys beer, but he did not define the term “ralphing.” Within this same 
line of reasoning, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) questioned the veracity of 
Kavanaugh’s claims because of his drinking:
OK. Drinking is one thing, but the concern is about truthfulness, and in your 
written testimony, you said sometimes you had too many drinks. Was there 
ever a time when you drank so much that you couldn’t remember what hap-
pened, or part of what happened the night before? . . . So, you’re saying there’s 
never been a case where you drank so much that you didn’t remember what 
happened the night before, or part of what happened. (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:42:50)
In providing context to her questions, Senator Klobuchar (D-MN) noted that her 
90-year-old father is an alcoholic and still attends AA meetings. Here, Klobuchar 
is bringing a personal connection to her understanding of how alcohol con-
sumption can lead one to have significant lapses in both judgment and memory. 
Broadly speaking, alcoholism was mentioned more frequently by Democrats 
(in 11% of their speaking segments compared with less than 1% of Republican 
remarks; see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
Sexual Assault
Table 1.5 reports the proportion of speaking segments in which senators em-
ployed themes centering on sexual assault. Unsurprisingly, the senators on the 
Judiciary Committee spoke quite differently about sexual assault. As we antici-
pated, Democrats employ this theme significantly more frequently than Repub-
licans across the entire hearing. These partisan differences are particularly large 
during Blasey Ford’s testimony, with over 27% of all Democrats’ speaking seg-
ments including this theme, compared with less than 2% among Republicans. 
As the qualitative analysis reveals, there are also substantive differences in the 
ways that senators discussed assault during this hearing.
While both groups of partisans routinely denounced sexual violence and 
expressed sympathy for Blasey Ford’s experience, the undertone of the sena-
tors’ comments and questions around assault were markedly different. Take for 
TABLE 1.5 Sexual Assault
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga,b 23.1 6.2 8.7 13.0
Blasey Ford testimonya,b 27.8 1.6 4.3 9.0
Kavanaugh testimonya,b 20.4 10.1 28.8 18.2
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
bDifferences between Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
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vomiting that you reference in the Ralph Club reference [in your yearbook] re-
lated to the consumption of alcohol?” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:29:10). Pushing a bit 
further because Kavanaugh did not directly respond to his question, Senator 
Whitehouse asked Kavanaugh to explain ralphing. From there Kavanaugh sated 
that he enjoys beer, but he did not define the term “ralphing.” Within this same 
line of reasoning, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) questioned the veracity of 
Kavanaugh’s claims because of his drinking:
OK. Drinking is one thing, but the concern is about truthfulness, and in your 
written testimony, you said sometimes you had too many drinks. Was there 
ever a time when you drank so much that you couldn’t remember what hap-
pened, or part of what happened the night before? . . . So, you’re saying there’s 
never been a case where you drank so much that you didn’t remember what 
happened the night before, or part of what happened. (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:42:50)
In providing context to her questions, Senator Klobuchar (D-MN) noted that her 
90-year-old father is an alcoholic and still attends AA meetings. Here, Klobuchar 
is bringing a personal connection to her understanding of how alcohol con-
sumption can lead one to have significant lapses in both judgment and memory. 
Broadly speaking, alcoholism was mentioned more frequently by Democrats 
(in 11% of their speaking segments compared with less than 1% of Republican 
remarks; see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
Sexual Assault
Table 1.5 reports the proportion of speaking segments in which senators em-
ployed themes centering on sexual assault. Unsurprisingly, the senators on the 
Judiciary Committee spoke quite differently about sexual assault. As we antici-
pated, Democrats employ this theme significantly more frequently than Repub-
licans across the entire hearing. These partisan differences are particularly large 
during Blasey Ford’s testimony, with over 27% of all Democrats’ speaking seg-
ments including this theme, compared with less than 2% among Republicans. 
As the qualitative analysis reveals, there are also substantive differences in the 
ways that senators discussed assault during this hearing.
While both groups of partisans routinely denounced sexual violence and 
expressed sympathy for Blasey Ford’s experience, the undertone of the sena-
tors’ comments and questions around assault were markedly different. Take for 
TABLE 1.5 Sexual Assault
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga,b 23.1 6.2 8.7 13.0
Blasey Ford testimonya,b 27.8 1.6 4.3 9.0
Kavanaugh testimonya,b 20.4 10.1 28.8 18.2
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
bDifferences between Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
instance Senator Cory Booker’s (D-NJ) questioning of Kavanaugh. Booker, the 
only Black man on the Judiciary Committee states:
So sir, let’s just be clear. In other words, your — your — you have problems with 
the senators that are up here and how we conducted it; but you’re not say-
ing in any way that she is a political pawn, political operative. You have sym-
pathy for her. She is talking about a sexual assault. Is that correct? (C-SPAN, 
2018, 2:33:53)
To that Kavanaugh replies: “I said all allegations should be taken seriously, should 
listen to both sides . . .” (C-SPAN, 2018, 2:34:08). This short interaction neatly 
portrays how both sides uniformly treated Blasey Ford’s allegations. Because 
Blasey Ford appeared as a credible victim, it was difficult for senators on either 
side to paint her as a political operative.7 Relatedly, the current #MeToo mo-
ment made it outright difficult for either party to outright dismiss Blasey Ford’s 
accusations. Therefore, partisans were reluctant to paint general allegations of 
sexual assault as unworthy of investigation.
The nuance lies in how partisans approached their understanding and discus-
sion of sexual assault. Republicans were more likely to call into question Blasey 
Ford’s accusations as a specific instance of sexual violence. Democrats, on the 
other hand, were more apt to discuss a culture of sexual violence and its impact 
by using her experience as an example. For instance, Republicans such as Orrin 
Hatch (R-UT) framed the hearing in this way:
We’re talking today about Judge Kavanaugh’s conduct in high school — and 
even then, and as a freshman in college, I guess, as well. Serious allegations 
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have been raised. If Judge Kavanaugh committed sexual assault, he should 
not serve on the Supreme Court; I think we’d all agree with that. (C-SPAN, 
2018, 1:50:03)
Or, as Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) noted in his statement on Kavanaugh:
Of course, the — the sexual assault that Dr. Ford claims that you’ve denied. Then 
the claims of Ms. Ramirez, that not even The New York Times would report 
because it couldn’t corroborate it. And then Stormy Daniels’ lawyer released 
a bombshell, accusing you of gang rape. All of those are crimes, are they not? 
(C-SPAN, 2018, 1:34:00)
For Republicans, these hearings were more than an opportunity to examine 
whether Kavanaugh was worthy of a seat on the Supreme Court. This was a way 
of adjudicating a criminal accusation. Senator Cornyn continues:
So this is not a job interview. You’ve been accused of a crime. If you have lied 
to the committee and the investigators, that is a crime in and of itself, cor-
rect? . . . Some of my colleagues across the aisle say, “Well, the burden is not 
on the accuser because this is a job interview,” the burden is on you. . . . I’ve 
told my [Democratic] colleagues, if we were in court, half of them would be 
in contempt of court. But you have been accused of a crime, and I believe 
fundamental notions of fair play and justice and our constitutional system 
require that if somebody’s going to make that accusation against you, then 
they need to come forward with some corroboration, not just allegations. But 
this is your chance to tell your story, and I hope you have a chance to tell us 
everything you want to tell us. But the burden is not on you to disprove the 
allegations made. The burden under our system, when you accuse somebody 
of criminal conduct, is on the person making the accusation. Now, I under-
stand we’re not — this isn’t a trial, like I said, but I just wanted to make sure 
that we understood. It’s hard to reconstruct what happened 36 years ago, and 
I appreciate what you said about Dr. Ford, that perhaps she has had an inci-
dent at some point in her life, and you are sympathetic to that, and . . . But 
your reputation is on the line, and I hope people understand the gravity of 
the charges made against you, and what a fair process looks like. (C-SPAN, 
2018, 1:34:32)
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We have included this lengthy quote by Senator Cornyn because it uniquely 
presents how Republicans viewed this hearing. Discussions of sexual assault 
should not be abstract — instead, allegations of this nature require due process 
that the Republicans believed was not afforded to Kavanaugh by the Democrats 
and media. There was also a tremendous amount of concern about Kavanaugh’s 
reputation. Senators Cruz, Grassley, Cornyn, Hatch, Graham, Crapo, and Tillis, 
all Republicans, uniformly expressed dismay over what they characterized as 
the irreparable damage done to Kavanaugh’s reputation because of Blasey Ford’s 
accusations against him. In this light, Kavanaugh is painted as a victim. Indeed, 
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) pointily states, “She’s as much of a victim as 
you are,” to Kavanaugh (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:24:46). For Republicans, this Senate 
hearing was a “sham” — in the words of Senator Graham — and only served to 
smear Kavanaugh’s good name. The allegations of sexual assault, while generally 
serious, should be fully investigated through a criminal court. The accusations 
by Blasey Ford, however, are uniformly dismissed by GOP senators. In sum, 
this quote by Graham may be the clearest indicator of the several themes that 
Republican senators harnessed in their partisan articulation of the challenges to 
Kavanaugh’s confirmation. Here we see our secondary theme of victimization 
in which Kavanaugh is painted an undue martyr of the #MeToo movement. 
Additionally, the perceived lack of due process is a direct challenge to Kavanaugh’s 
character and credibility, which is a primary theme throughout the hearings.
Conversely, Democrats are both concerned with the statements made by 
Blasey Ford and about the culture of sexual violence in the nation. Their com-
ments reflect an understanding that the sexual assault experienced by Blasey 
Ford is a symptom of a wider cultural problem that places mostly women and 
girls in a vulnerable position. Democratic senators submitted academic scholar-
ship or letters from survivors of sexual violence and their support organizations. 
For example, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) asked the following of Chairman 
Grassley (R-IA):
I’d like to ask unanimous consent to submit for the record five articles, includ-
ing one titled “Why Sexual Assault Memories Stick,” and one entitled “Why 
Didn’t Kavanaugh Accuser Come Forward Earlier? Police Often Ignore Sexual 
Assault Allegations.” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:58:29)
Similarly, Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) asked:
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Mr. Chairman, I’d just like to introduce for the record, seven letters by the 
Lambda Legal; from Mormon Women for Ethical Government; youth-led or-
ganizations around this country; the International Unions Bricklayers, Allied 
Craftworkers; a letter from 295 survivors of sexual violence in support of 
Dr. Ford; and a letter from 1,600 men to campaign in support of Dr. Ford; 
and those who want to assert men and women that are survivors of sexual vi-
olence are not opportunists, do not have political axes to grind, but are com-
ing forward with courage and with heart to speak their truth and try to end 
the scourge of sexual assault and violence in our country. (C-SPAN, 2:36:22)
Both Coons and Booker are appealing to other authorities who are experts on 
sexual violence. This is done in a manner to recognize that Blasey Ford’s accusa-
tions are larger than allegations made by one person against a would-be Supreme 
Court justice. Rather, her experiences are part and parcel of a culture of sexual 
violence that is being uncovered in the current #MeToo era. Broadening the 
discussion enabled Democrats to showcase the seriousness of sexual violence 
and the importance of taking accusations seriously. To do so would give Blasey 
Ford’s testimony increased legitimacy and demonstrate a belief in victims (who 
are often women) who make these claims.
Women’s Roles/Rights
Finally, we examine the extent to which senators employed women-focused 
themes in their discussion. The data in Table 1.6 reveal that Democrats em-
ployed the theme of women (roles/rights) more frequently compared with Re-
publicans. However, this theme is used in a mere 2% of Democrats’ statements 
and the differences between Republican and Democratic senators in this regard 
are not statistically significant.
While overt discussions about women as a group were largely absent from 
both Democratic and Republican senators’ testimony, the partisans did employ 
different frames in how they mobilized this gendered subset of the American 
population. Women and girls who knew Kavanaugh were mobilized to advo-
cate for his strong moral character, all asserting their confidence in his inno-
cence. The deployment of women in this way demonstrates multiple themes 
of character, credibility, assault, and details/facts. Here, Republicans are trying 
to make a connection that in order for Kavanaugh to be a sexual predator, he 
must have exhibited inappropriate sexual conduct with other women during 
this time. Because he has women friends, mentees, and colleagues that speak 
TABLE 1.6 Women’s Roles/Rights
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
Blasey Ford testimonya 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.5
Kavanaugh testimony 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.9
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
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Mr. Chairman, I’d just like to introduce for the record, seven letters by the 
Lambda Legal; from Mormon Women for Ethical Government; youth-led or-
ganizations around this country; the International Unions Bricklayers, Allied 
Craftworkers; a letter from 295 survivors of sexual violence in support of 
Dr. Ford; and a letter from 1,600 men to campaign in support of Dr. Ford; 
and those who want to assert men and women that are survivors of sexual vi-
olence are not opportunists, do not have political axes to grind, but are com-
ing forward with courage and with heart to speak their truth and try to end 
the scourge of sexual assault and violence in our country. (C-SPAN, 2:36:22)
Both Coons and Booker are appealing to other authorities who are experts on 
sexual violence. This is done in a manner to recognize that Blasey Ford’s accusa-
tions are larger than allegations made by one person against a would-be Supreme 
Court justice. Rather, her experiences are part and parcel of a culture of sexual 
violence that is being uncovered in the current #MeToo era. Broadening the 
discussion enabled Democrats to showcase the seriousness of sexual violence 
and the importance of taking accusations seriously. To do so would give Blasey 
Ford’s testimony increased legitimacy and demonstrate a belief in victims (who 
are often women) who make these claims.
Women’s Roles/Rights
Finally, we examine the extent to which senators employed women-focused 
themes in their discussion. The data in Table 1.6 reveal that Democrats em-
ployed the theme of women (roles/rights) more frequently compared with Re-
publicans. However, this theme is used in a mere 2% of Democrats’ statements 
and the differences between Republican and Democratic senators in this regard 
are not statistically significant.
While overt discussions about women as a group were largely absent from 
both Democratic and Republican senators’ testimony, the partisans did employ 
different frames in how they mobilized this gendered subset of the American 
population. Women and girls who knew Kavanaugh were mobilized to advo-
cate for his strong moral character, all asserting their confidence in his inno-
cence. The deployment of women in this way demonstrates multiple themes 
of character, credibility, assault, and details/facts. Here, Republicans are trying 
to make a connection that in order for Kavanaugh to be a sexual predator, he 
must have exhibited inappropriate sexual conduct with other women during 
this time. Because he has women friends, mentees, and colleagues that speak 
TABLE 1.6 Women’s Roles/Rights
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Full hearinga 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
Blasey Ford testimonya 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.5
Kavanaugh testimony 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.9
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments.
aDifferences between all 3 groups are statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
highly of him, the Republicans conclude that it is impossible that Kavanaugh 
could have sexually assaulted Blasey Ford. Indeed, Lindsey Graham makes that 
direct connection by comparing Kavanaugh to the comedian Bill Cosby, who is 
currently sentenced to 3 to 10 years in a Pennsylvania prison for drugging and 
raping women over a 40-year period. Infuriated, Graham stated:
You’re supposed to be Bill Cosby when you’re a junior and senior in high 
school. And all of a sudden, you got over it. It’s been my understanding that 
if you drug women and rape them for two years in high school, you probably 
don’t stop. (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:25:43)
To be sure, Kavanaugh was not accused of drugging Blasey Ford so this com-
parison to Bill Cosby is more incendiary than factual. Senator Graham may be 
trying to solicit outrage and awe in an attempt to sway partisan indignation.
Republicans sought to show that Kavanaugh respects women, which would 
imply that he could not sexually assault them. Respect for women was implied 
through his friendships and mentoring and professional relationships with women. 
For example, attorney Mitchell questioned:
Prior to your nomination for Supreme Court, you’ve talked about all of the 
female clerks you’ve had, and the women that you’ve worked with. I’m not 
just talking about them; I’m talking about globally. Have you ever been ac-
cused, either formally or informally, of unwanted sexual behavior? (C-SPAN, 
2018, 1:14:48)
Similarly, Lindsey Graham (R-SC) connected Kavanaugh’s nonsexual and profes-
sional relationships with women as an indicator that he could not have sexually 
assaulted Blasey Ford. Graham stated: “You have interacted with professional 
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women all your life, not one accusation” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:25:39). Likewise, 
Chairman Grassley (R-IA) introduced a letter signed by Kavanaugh’s female 
friends, which was intended to demonstrate that because he was friends with 
women, Kavanaugh could not possibly have assaulted Blasey Ford over 30 years 
ago. Grassley noted:
I have a letter here from 65 women who knew Judge Kavanaugh between the 
years ’79 and ’83 — the years he attended Georgetown Prep High School. These 
women wrote to the committee because they know Judge Kavanaugh and they 
know that the allegations raised by Dr. Ford are completely, totally inconsis-
tent with his character. These 65 women know him through social events and 
church, many have remained close friends with him — here’s what they say 
partly quoting the letter. “Through the more than 35 years we’ve known him, 
Brett has stood out for his friendship, character and integrity. He has always 
treated women with decency and respect. That was true in high school and it 
remains true to this day.” In closing they wrote, “Judge Kavanaugh, has always 
been a good person,” so without objection I put it in the record. (C-SPAN, 
2018, 2:01:06)
Directly to this point, Senator Kamala Harris (D-CA) does not argue that hav-
ing women friends does not correlate one-to-one with whether a person could 
commit sexual assault. Instead she pointedly asks Kavanaugh, “Ok. And then, 
do you agree that it is possible for men to both be friends with some women, 
and treat other women badly?” (C-SPAN, 2018, 2:51:56).
Perhaps the incisive difference between Democrats’ and Republicans’ discus-
sion of women was the acknowledgment (or lack thereof) of the #MeToo move-
ment. Only Democrats placed discussions of Blasey Ford’s alleged sexual assault 
within a larger context of #MeToo. Within this frame, Democrats see women 
as a sociopolitical group that is asking for a specific form of representation and 
advocacy. For instance, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) prefaced her open-
ing remarks by acknowledging that Blasey Ford wanted to come forward, al-
beit confidentially, to make accusations of sexual assault public “because [of] 
how women are treated in the United States, with this kind of concern, is really 
wanting a lot of reform” (C-SPAN, 2018, 0:16:28). The need to classify women 
as a special group is followed by Senator Feinstein’s appeal to experts who note 
that “sexual violence is a serious problem and one that largely goes unseen. In 
the United States it’s estimated by the Centers for Disease Control one in three 
women and one in six men will experience some form of sexual violence in their 
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lifetime” (C-SPAN, 2018, 0:18:16). While men and individuals who identify as 
nonbinary also experience sexual assault, Senator Feinstein frames sexual vi-
olence as a women’s issue. In turn she views this crime as distinctly gendered.
Only Democratic Senators Feinstein (D-CA) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) di-
rectly reference #MeToo during the hearings. Feinstein does so in her compar-
ison to Clarence Thomas’s confirmation hearings in which Anita Hill testified 
that Thomas sexually harassed her. Here, Feinstein invokes our themes of vic-
timization, empathy, and assault to demonstrate that much has not changed in 
American politics since Anita Hill’s accusations of sexual harassment nearly 30 
years ago. However, she notes that women are change agents who are pushing 
back against unjust treatment by publicly making allegations against powerful 
men like Kavanaugh. For Feinstein, the institutions that are supposed to rep-
resent women have remained static while the culture has not. These claims are 
made to demonstrate Blasey Ford’s bravery, and that of the women who helped 
to propel the #MeToo movement into the national spotlight.
Similarly, Senator Leahy expressed empathy to Blasey Ford and other sur-
vivors of sexual violence. He praised them for coming forward and noted that 
Blasey Ford is an example to other victims who may be too frightened to do so. 
Senator Leahy announced that “bravery is contagious. Indeed, that’s the driv-
ing force behind the #MeToo movement. And you sharing your story is going 
to have a lasting, positive impact on so many survivors in our country. We owe 
you a debt of gratitude for that, Doctor” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:08:35). Furthermore, 
Senator Leahy noted that he hears from “so many in my own state of Vermont, 
there are millions of victims and survivors out there who have been inspired by 
your courage” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:08:29). The connection that Senator Leahy made 
to his constituents and the #MeToo movement illustrates that he is attempting to 
relate to women voters. This rhetorical move demonstrates that Leahy is aware of 
his public audience — both inside and outside of Washington — who is watching 
this hearing and deciding how to vote in the 2018 midterm election. Democrats 
are aware that they need to signal to women voters that they are heard, respected, 
and valued by this party.
Within this vein, Senator Leahy (D-VT) recalls Anita Hill’s testimony and the 
importance of believing women. Nearly 30 years after Clarence Thomas’s con-
firmation hearings, Leahy lamented that the Judiciary Committee was on the 
wrong side of history. The American public has now come to recognize sexual 
harassment as a legitimate form of discrimination that is often gender-based. 
In turn, Senator Leahy appeals to his colleagues on the Judiciary Committee 
and implores them to believe women who are victims of sexual harassment 
30 PART 1 A Look at C-SPAN Programming With All Its “Madisonian Passion”
and assault. He said, “Chairman, you and I were both here 27 years ago. At that 
time, the Senate failed Anita Hill. I said I believed her” (C-SPAN, 2018, 1:08:02). 
Indeed, Anita Hill was referenced several times as senators made comparisons 
to Blasey Ford’s treatment by either the FBI, the hearing process, or the partisan 
nature of the accusations. However, Senator Leahy’s comments are the most di-
rect as he expresses his understanding of the hearing process to do (un)justice 
to women who’ve made allegations against judicial nominees.
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the ways that Democratic and Republican senators navi-
gated a gendered issue to demonstrate partisan handling of sexual assault in the 
era of #MeToo. The Brett Kavanaugh confirmation hearing in 2018 provided in-
sights into the substantive differences among the parties in their discussion of 
sexual assault. The data clearly indicate that Democrats largely viewed this alle-
gation as part of a broader moment in American history surrounding the treat-
ment of women. Their discussion, which more often evoked themes of sexual 
assault — including victims of assault across the country — was in stark contrast to 
the Republicans’ focus on the facts of this singular instance (particularly through 
attorney Rachel Mitchell’s questions) as well as partisan politics in their remarks. 
Our analysis forcefully demonstrates that partisans utilized political communi-
cation to signal party support for #MeToo and for due process. Furthermore, the 
hearings provided senators with a way to package their party’s stance on gen-
dered issues and for the three Democratic presidential hopefuls — Cory Booker 
(D-NJ), Kamala Harris (D-CA), and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) — an opportunity 
to demonstrate their leadership on sexual assault. With millions of Americans 
tuned into these hearings, senators were able to showcase their views on #Me-
Too and how they would approach gendered topics in the future.
Given the extant literature, we expected to find gender differences, both 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively, in how senators questioned Blasey Ford 
and Kavanaugh. However, given the paltry number of women and people of 
color on the Judiciary Committee, we did not see these differences. In our 
analysis of the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (Brown 
& Gershon, 2017) we found these intersectional differences and, as such, at-
tempted to develop a coding scheme around raced/gendered themes. However, 
we were not able to do so. Perhaps our findings may be due to the limited di-
versity in the Senate.
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Given the limited diversity present on the Judiciary Committee — particu-
larly among Republicans — this case offers limited insight into how different sen-
ators might approach this topic. In the future, we plan to explore racial identity 
through a content analysis of the Hill/Thomas hearings — in particular, paying 
attention to whether the frames were similar in both instances, as well as the 
extent to which they offer praise and express empathy for Hill and Thomas. 
Unlike the Hill/Thomas hearings, the Blasey Ford/Kavanaugh hearings afforded 
us a gendered analysis, albeit limited in scope, because of the four women serv-
ing on the Judiciary Committee. Future research should explore this compari-
son. We believe that a raced/gendered comparison will be insightful given the 
varying identities of the accused and accuser. An intersectional analysis will be 
necessary in this enterprise.
Lastly, we know that the hearings influenced the 2018 midterm elections. The 
Democrats flipped the House of Representatives, sending Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) 
to reclaim the role of Speaker. Furthermore, the 116th Congress has the highest 
number of women — a record 117 (elected or appointed) — of which more than 
a third won their seats for the first time. The overwhelming majority of these 
gains for women were made by Democrats. The Year of the Woman in the new 
millennium hearkens back to 1992’s Year of the Woman, where women also ran 
for office in large numbers and helped to change social policies. Bolstered by 
President Trump’s anti-woman rhetoric and an upheaval of traditional politics, 
the women who sought and won election in 2018 are well poised to have suc-
cessful campaigns in 2020 given today’s similar national and cultural politics. 
While there has been backlash to the #MeToo movement and some of the ac-
cused have found limited redemption, the nation’s attitude toward sexual miscon-
duct, harassment, and violence has been forever changed. Americans are more 
aware of these issues than at any time in the past. Therefore, we expect #MeToo 
to play a role in the 2020 elections.
NOTES
 1. Started by Tarana Burke in 2007 to stand with young women of color who 
survived sexual assault, the #MeToo campaign was intended to let women 
know that they were not alone. Today the phrase is a viral awareness campaign 
on social media that has inspired others to share their stories, stand in soli-
darity with survivors, and challenge a culture of pervasive sexual assault and 
harassment.
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APPENDIX: THEMATIC CODING
We examined whether senators utilized five primary themes in their discus-
sion: character/credibility, partisanship/politics, details/facts, sexual assault, and 
women’s roles/rights. We further examined whether (within these statements) 
senators discussed the following secondary themes: gender, race, victimization, 
bravery, empathy, alcoholism, and FBI investigation.8 Below we include a short 
discussion of these themes as well as sample hearing excerpts from the hearing 
that illustrates each theme.
Primary Themes
1. Character/Credibility: Discussion of the morality, character, and credibility of 
Christine Blasey Ford and Brett Kavanaugh.
Senator Blumenthal during Blasey Ford’s testimony: “Let me tell you why I be-
lieve you: not only because of the prior consistent statements and the poly-
graph tests and your request for an FBI investigation and your urging that this 
committee hear from other witnesses who could corroborate or dispute your 
story, but also, you have been very honest about what you cannot remember.”
Secondary theme coded: FBI investigation
2. Partisanship/Politics: Discussion of partisan politics and politically motivat-
ed behavior.
Senator Hatch during Kavanaugh’s testimony: “But the circus atmosphere that 
has been created since my Democratic colleagues first leaked Dr. Ford’s al-
legations to the media two weeks ago — after sitting on them for six weeks, I 
might add — has brought out the worst in our politics.”
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3. Details/Facts: These include discussion revolving around the facts that are known 
or being sought, as well as Blasey Ford’s and Kavanaugh’s knowledge of time-
lines, procedures, and so forth.
Senator Lee during Kavanaugh’s testimony: “It’s also correct that you yourself 
do not control the FBI or when it conducts an investigation, you are a nom-
inee, you’re not tasked with the job of deciding who, when, whether or how 
[to] conduct an investigation.”
Secondary theme coded: FBI investigation
4. Sexual Assault: These include discussion revolving around particular claims 
of assault as well as the impact of assault broadly.
Senator Klobuchar during Blasey Ford’s testimony: “Sexual violence is a serious 
problem and one that largely goes unseen. In the United States it’s estimated by 
the Centers for Disease Control one in three women and one in six men will 
experience some form of sexual violence in their lifetime. According to the 
Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, 60 percent of sexual assaults go unre-
ported. In addition, when survivors do report their assaults, it’s often years later 
due to the trauma they suffered and fearing their stories will not be believed.”
5. Women’s Roles/Rights: These include discussion centered on women’s experi-
ences and beliefs about women.
Senator Feinstein during Blasey Ford’s testimony: “There’s been a great deal of 
public discussion about the #MeToo movement today versus the Year of the 
Woman almost 27 years ago. But while young women are standing up and say-
ing “No more,” our institutions have not progressed in how they treat women 
who come forward. Too often, women’s memories and credibility come un-
der assault. In essence, they are put on trial and forced to defend themselves, 
and often revictimized in the process.”
Secondary Themes
1. Gender: Any explicit mentions of gender.
Senator Booker during Blasey Ford’s testimony: “But there are dark elements that 
allow unconscionable levels of — unacceptable levels of sexual assault and ha-
rassment that are [a]ffecting girls and boys, and [a]ffecting men and women.”
2. Race: Any explicit mentions of race or ethnicity.
This theme did not present itself explicitly in the hearing.
3. Victimization: Explicit mentions of victims or victimization.
Senator Grassley during Blasey Ford’s testimony: “That is why the senators on 
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this side of the dais believe an expert who has deep experience and training 
in interviewing victims of sexual assault and investigating sexual assault al-
leged — allegations should be asking questions.”
4. Bravery: Explicit mentions of bravery, courage, or synonyms of these words.
Senator Leahy during Blasey Ford’s testimony: “Bravery is contagious. Indeed, 
that’s the driving force behind the MeToo movement. And you sharing your 
story is going to have a lasting, positive impact on so many survivors in our 
country. We owe you a debt of gratitude for that, Doctor.”
5. Empathy: Expressions of empathy toward others (most commonly Blasey Ford 
and Kavanaugh).
Senator Flake during Kavanaugh’s testimony: “I am sorry for what’s happened 
to you and your family, as I’m sorry for what has happened to hers.”
6. Alcoholism: Mentions of alcoholism as well as discussions of drinking prob-
lems and drinking to excess.
Senator Whitehouse during Kavanaugh’s testimony: “Should we draw any con-
clusion that a loss of recollection associated with alcohol was involved in you 
not knowing who won the games that you attended?”
7. FBI investigation: Explicit discussion of FBI investigations of Blasey Ford’s or 
others’ claims of Kavanaugh’s sexual misconduct.
Senator Klobuchar during Kavanaugh’s testimony: “Why don’t you just ask the 
president? Mrs. — Dr. Ford can’t do this. We clearly haven’t been able to do 
this. But just ask the president to reopen the FBI investigation.”
TABLE A.1 Secondary Themes
Democrats (%) Republicans (%) Mitchell (%) Total (%)
Gender 2.9 0.7 0.0 1.2
Race 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Victimization 4.3 1.5 1.0 2.3
Bravery 3.7 0.7 0.0 1.5
Empathy 3.2 3.3 1.0 2.3
Alcoholism 11.0 0.7 2.7 5.0
FBI investigation 15.6 7.7 0.5 7.7
Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of all speaking segments including the various themes. 
Speaking segments may include multiple themes.
CHAPTER 2
COMPETING AND RECURRING NARRATIVES




udges have always been at least somewhat political, but they were nonethe-
less viewed as striving for neutrality and constrained by the Constitution 
to a greater extent than their counterparts in the executive and legisla-
tive branches. Their perceived detachment certainly benefits the judiciary as 
American citizens have long considered the courts the least ideological of the 
three branches of government and vested significant faith in their power to re-
main unbiased. Yet, for the last 40 years such faith has been tested and strained. 
While this is evident in some of the most critical landmark decisions that have 
divided politicians and public opinion, the judicial confirmation process is a 
particularly apt representation of the distinct change in the judiciary and the 
legislative procedure that confirms them. Whereas the confirmation process 
used to be a formality, rarely drew much attention, and was completed in a short 
timeframe, it is now a key site for vociferous political clash, endless dissection 
from the news media, and diverging public opinion.
This chapter will address the significant shift that has taken place in con-
firmation hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee. In particular, I 
will offer a comparative analysis of two of the most divisive and controversial 
nominees, Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh, and the two women who 
levied accusations of sexual harassment and assault, Anita Hill and Christine 
Blasey Ford. Specifically, I will articulate the ways in which the four figures rhe-
torically constructed their credibility with a media circus surrounding them. 
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Separated by nearly 30 years, their hearings were affected by the social and 
cultural norms of their time but faced a similar problem of legitimacy as com-
peting narratives clashed in their attempt to frame the situation. Both Thomas 
and Kavanaugh had to articulate why they were valid, reasonable, morally 
upstanding judges worthy of the highest court. Hill and Blasey Ford had to 
convince the Judiciary Committee and broader American public that their ac-
cusations were genuine and their interest in testifying sincere. Surrounding 
each of these figures was a chorus of politicians and pundits dissecting every 
moment, which served to fuel the already substantial spectacle of these hear-
ings. Ultimately, the results were the same — Thomas and Kavanaugh were con-
firmed amidst the controversy — but each crafted their credibility in distinct 
ways, and tracing their narratives informs the ways in which Senate process 
and policy have changed over time.
Drawing on Walter Fisher’s “narrative paradigm,” this chapter confronts the 
various ways in which in each rhetor navigated the competing (if not incom-
patible) audiences involved, the diverse tactics utilized to construct a credible 
persona amidst uncertainty, and the issues of coherence and fidelity in their nar-
ratives. In order to do so, I will first provide an overview of the narrative para-
digm and its place within the rhetorical scholarship on credibility. Importantly, 
the project expands the narrative paradigm to illuminate not just the construc-
tion of a single narrative, nor the idea of competing narratives, but also the ways 
in which narratives transcend a particular moment as recurring themes and dis-
cursive shifts emerge in similar rhetorical situations. The two subsequent sec-
tions focus on the similarities and differences that distinguish first, the accusers’ 
narratives, and second, the defenders’ narratives. Utilizing the C-SPAN Video 
Library, particular attention is given to the individual testimonies as opposed 
to the discourse surrounding their testimonies. Each section will draw attention 
to the similar rhetorical challenges, opportunities, and strategies the individu-
als faced in their respective situations and transition to the important differ-
ences that make their narratives distinct. The chapter concludes by stepping 
back from the individual narratives of those involved to discuss the changing 
dynamic in the nomination and confirmation process largely impacted by defin-
ing moments like the Thomas and Kavanaugh confirmation hearings. Important 
to note, what follows is not an exhaustive list of every aspect of narrative found 
in these hearings; rather, I draw attention to what I believe are the most promi-
nent rhetorical problems and possibilities faced by the four individuals involved.
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CREDIBILITY AND THE ROLE OF NARRATIVE
Credibility has always been a cornerstone of the rhetorical tradition with Ar-
istotle (ca. 350–335 B.C.E./1991) going so far as to claim ethos — the character 
and credibility of a speaker — as the most effective mode of persuasion. Con-
temporary readings of Aristotle’s seminal work expand upon the centrality of a 
speaker’s credibility, situating it as both a central form of argumentation (Far-
rell, 1995) and a necessary requirement in the process of rhetorical invention 
(Garver, 1994). While many scholars throughout the rhetorical tradition artic-
ulated their distinct views on credibility, Kenneth Burke (1969) is arguably the 
most widely recognized voice since Aristotle. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke 
draws from the burgeoning scholarship of sociology and psychology as he re-
establishes credibility for the modern age. Expanding the scope of rhetoric be-
yond persuasion, Burke situates “identification” as rhetoric’s north star. More 
importantly, Burkean identification is impossible if the audience does not trust 
the rhetor or finds their motives suspect. There are certainly examples of cul-
tivating credibility through nefarious means, which Burke (1967) notes in the 
practice of scapegoating reflected in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” but it is 
nonetheless a necessary and unavoidable aspect of “consubstantiality” — that is, 
attaining reciprocal recognition with the audience.
These theoretical contributions by no means constitute the breadth of schol-
arship in the area. Others have complemented, expanded, or challenged these 
foundational texts, including Delia’s (1976) examination of credibility through 
a constructivist lens; Infante et al.’s (1983) investigation of different approaches 
to credibility; Hyde’s (2004) edited volume that incorporates everything from 
aesthetics to religion to human-computer interaction; McClosky and Zaller’s 
(1984) articulation of the distinctly American qualities of ethos; and so many 
more. Credibility touches virtually every discipline as each have their own ar-
ray of standards and practices that evolve over time. Yet, if we are to take heed 
of McKeon’s (1987) characterization of rhetoric as the “architectonic art,” then 
they all draw upon the rhetorical tradition in one way or another. There is an 
abundance of scholarship exploring all the intricacies of credibility, but one par-
ticular element is crucial in the construction and deconstruction of credibility 
throughout the testimonies of Thomas, Hill, Kavanaugh, and Blasey Ford: the 
narratives they each establish in order to cultivate a consubstantial relationship 
with their respective audiences.
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Much like the scholarship on credibility, there are many contributions to 
a rhetorical understanding of narrative. These works examine such topics as the 
rhetorical function of literature (Booth, 1983), the relationship between narra-
tive and epistemology (Danto, 1985), the ability to constitute and reconstitute 
audiences through narrative (Charland, 1987), and narrative’s presence in the 
rhetoric of popular culture (Brummett, 1994). While these works provide a ro-
bust understanding of the scope and influence of narrative, one particular the-
ory will serve as the cornerstone of this chapter. Fisher’s (1984, 1985, 1987, 1989) 
“narrative paradigm” provides a compelling rhetorical framework to understand 
the various strategies used to create, maintain, and undermine the credibility of 
four persons involved in the aforementioned Supreme Court confirmations. In 
his theory, Fisher challenges the “rational world paradigm,” which he posits as 
the dominant yet misguided worldview that underscores all manner of assump-
tions about human agency and our ability to reason effectively. Akin to the clas-
sical economic perspective of human agency (“homo economicus”), the rational 
world paradigm is guided by five reigning axioms (Fisher, 1984). First, humans 
are rational beings. Second, judgments are made based on the arguments for or 
against a position. Third, one’s rhetorical situation (for example, a court of law 
or legislative body) determines the framework of arguments used. Fourth, the 
success or failure of an argument is determined by its quality, including sound-
ness and validity. Fifth, our world is objective, and it can be fully comprehended 
through the lens of rational analysis. In many ways, this is the legacy of the Age 
of Reason and the Enlightenment: humans are creatures apart from the natural 
world in their ability to reason through it. Within rhetoric, this ideal is captured 
in classic notions of the public sphere where citizens discuss and deliberate mat-
ters of public concern in a space where the best argument wins the day (Arendt, 
1998; Habermas, 1962/1991). While scholars acknowledge the idealization of 
such a conception of the public sphere and the capacity of citizens to fulfill the 
lofty expectations demanded, there nonetheless persists an aspirational yearn-
ing for democratic deliberation undergirded by the rational world paradigm.
Fisher (1984) argues that human reasoning is not so tidy. In his view, we are 
essentially storytellers and our reasoning is impacted by a number of contextual 
factors including “history, culture, biography, and character” (p. 3), all of which 
impact each other in a myriad of ways. Not only does the rhetorical situation 
frame the basis on which arguments are built, but also the medium used and the 
genre of discourse employed (i.e., technical vs. artistic). Good reasons are the do-
main of not solely rational argumentation but also the various commitments that 
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tacitly frame our respective worldviews. This is not to say that everything is en-
tirely subjective as Fisher is no solipsist. The grounds for our judgments, how-
ever, are much more relaxed than the rational world paradigm demands. We still 
evaluate the quality of stories presented before us; some stories are more believ-
able than others. Rather than rational deliberation serving as the cornerstone of 
judgment, Fisher follows Burke (1969) in arguing that the crux of judgment is 
identification. Importantly, the narrative paradigm does not suggest logic and 
rational argumentation are inconsequential to our decision-making process; in-
stead, it is “a dialectical synthesis of two strands in the history of rhetoric: the ar-
gumentative, persuasive theme and the literary, aesthetic theme” (Fisher 1984, 
p. 2). In short, logical reasoning is only part of the story.
Fisher (1984) argues that identification and our judgments are built on two 
pillars: “narrative coherence” (also referred to as “narrative probability”) and 
“narrative fidelity.” By narrative coherence, Fisher means the degree to which the 
story is coherent and the extent to which all the pieces hang together. Is the sto-
ryteller leaving out important details or manipulating any facts? Does the story 
have internal consistency such that all of the pieces fit together? Are there con-
tradictions that disrupt the story and make it more difficult to believe? Much 
like one can be taken out of a film when the characters act in a way that does not 
make sense given the story being told, so too do we question rhetors in a sim-
ilar fashion. Narrative fidelity addresses the degree to which stories “ring true 
with the stories [the audience members] know to be true in their lives” (p. 8). 
To what extent does a story seem legitimate based on the values and history of 
the audience? How would we act if we were in a similar situation? Whether a 
work of fiction or a public controversy, we try to square the values of those in-
volved with our own. Both of these aspects of narrative — coherence and fi-
delity — are central issues in the public drama that engulfed the testimonies of 
Thomas, Hill, Kavanaugh, and Blasey Ford. Moreover, tracing the evolution 
of narratives emerging from similar rhetorical situations offers a glimpse into 
the ways in which narrative coherence and fidelity change or remain the same 
given the various contextual nuances and sociocultural shifts.
Fisher is not without his detractors, some of whom take issue with the sweep-
ing nature of his theory and its undermining of the classical rhetorical tradition. 
Warnick (1987) notes that Fisher’s characterization of what constitutes a “good” 
or “bad” story suffers from a misunderstanding between the ethical dimension 
of a narrative and its impact or effectiveness. As a result, one may judge a nar-
rative as “bad” in the ethical sense despite it being profoundly effective, as in 
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Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Rowland (1987, 1989) also takes issue with Fisher’s con-
ception of the narrative paradigm, but rather than focus on its application and 
the labels used to describe a particular narrative, he challenges the very core of 
Fisher’s argument: it is not a paradigm. Rowland argues that Fisher’s scope is too 
broad in its attempt to frame all human communication as inherently narrative 
in form. Instead, he posits that narrative is one type of discourse among many.
While these criticisms hold some validity, one need not completely subscribe 
to every aspect of Fisher’s argument to find the theory a useful and insightful rhe-
torical lens through which to examine the ways in which credibility is created, 
maintained, and challenged. It is particularly useful in a legal setting, wherein 
there are competing narratives vying for attention and legitimacy while negoti-
ating multiple audiences. Due to a lack of hard, undeniable evidence, the testi-
monies of Thomas, Hill, Kavanaugh, and Blasey Ford rely almost entirely on the 
narratives they construct. The issues of narrative coherence and fidelity are cen-
tral to their credibility as they must navigate multiple audiences and the clash-
ing, often incompatible narratives given by their counterparts. Moreover, turning 
to Fisher’s conception of narrative complements the already robust scholarship 
on narrative/storytelling, legal studies, and rhetoric (Brooks & Gerwitz, 1996; 
Jackson, 1988; Levinson & Mailloux, 1988; Minow et al., 1993; Olson, 2014; 
Sarat & Kearns, 1996) and draws attention to the often-overlooked confirma-
tion process. In addition, a focus on narrative adds another scholarly angle to 
the robust rhetorical scholarship on the Thomas and Hill testimonies (Asenas 
& Abram, 2018; Beasley, 1994; Hart, 1994; Lipari, 1994; Regan, 1994) and grow-
ing attention given to the Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford testimonies (Raymond 
et al., 2019). The following sections treat the accusers and the defenders sepa-
rately as a way to address their respective similarities and differences regarding 
narrative coherence and fidelity. Given the breadth and depth of their testimo-
nies, attention will be given to those aspects of coherence and fidelity that are 
most central to each narrative.
ACCUSERS’ NARRATIVES: ANITA HILL AND CHRISTINE BLASEY FORD
The initial, and perhaps most vital, narrative challenge facing both Hill and Bla-
sey Ford was their need to reconstruct the events that precipitated their accu-
sations. As an aspect of their narrative coherence, Hill and Blasey Ford needed 
to convince multiple audiences, primarily the senators judging the veracity of 
their stories, who would soon vote on whether or not to confirm the nominees, 
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as well as the American public watching the spectacle play out. Both testimonies 
needed to carefully detail the events that took place. This task was made all the 
more challenging by the fact that the events occurred years ago. While Hill was 
reconstructing events that took place roughly 10 years prior to the hearing, Bla-
sey Ford had to reach back over 30 years. Not only did each woman face a sim-
ilar challenge in crafting a coherent narrative that could hang together amidst 
scrutiny, but they both used their opening statements to map out the details of 
their respective experiences.
After outlining biographical information, Hill transitioned to her time work-
ing with Clarence Thomas, first at the Department of Education, then later at 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (C-SPAN, 1991b). Hill noted 
how her working relationship with Thomas was initially positive, but 3 months 
into working at the Department of Education problems with Thomas’s behav-
ior began to emerge. Claiming she denied a social relationship with Thomas de-
spite his dogged pursuit, she then documented the various things Thomas had 
supposedly said and done in their workplace. According to Hill, Thomas began 
discussing pornography and various sex acts apropos of nothing. Importantly, 
she noted her unsuccessful attempts to stop this behavior despite being “ex-
tremely uncomfortable talking about sex with him at all, and particularly in such 
a graphic way” (1991b). This narrative turn is a key aspect of her coherence be-
cause it challenged Thomas’s claim that these accusations are new and imagined, 
if not outright fabricated (C-SPAN, 1991a).
Hill continued, documenting an array of other instances of harassment, most 
infamously a time at the EEOC wherein Thomas supposedly joked about a pubic 
hair on a can of Coca-Cola (C-SPAN, 1991b). Noting how she feared reprisal, 
in an attempt to both advance her narrative coherence and preempt questions 
about why she remained working with Thomas for so long, Hill then detailed 
how she left the EEOC for a position at Oral Roberts University. Hill’s narrative 
is reminiscent of an individual attempting to escape a domestic abuse situation 
by calling attention to the fear and anxiety she constantly felt, the power of the 
figure imposed on her, and the justification for not reporting the events as they 
occurred. For many audience members, particularly those who have been in an 
abusive relationship, this was an important dimension of her narrative coher-
ence because it echoed similar narratives of harassment and abuse. For others, 
as we will see, this aspect of the narrative was a major source of doubt.
Blasey Ford similarly utilized a detailed narrative in an attempt to convince 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and American public about the events in her ac-
cusation. While the rhetorical situation surrounding Blasey Ford is different — in 
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part because of the legacy of the Hill testimony, the changing demographics of the 
Senate generally and Judiciary Committee specifically, and the shifts in American 
public culture concerning harassment and sexual assault — she also had a signifi-
cant rhetorical challenge in that she needed to recreate events that occurred over 
30 years ago. Like Hill, Blasey Ford’s most poignant articulation occurred during 
her opening statement. In an interesting rhetorical turn, Blasey Ford began by 
addressing what she did not recall (C-SPAN, 2018b). Acknowledging the po-
tential weak points in her narrative coherence, Blasey Ford acknowledged the 
limitations of her testimony while simultaneously arguing that the important 
details, the ones that should matter in a hearing like this, have been “seared into 
her memory” (C-SPAN, 2018b). Her strategy may have been in response to the 
Hill testimony wherein senators continuously called attention to what Hill did 
not recollect, then used those gaps as a way to undermine her entire testimony.
As Blasey Ford addressed the aspects of the day leading up to the party where 
she claimed the attempted assault took place, she strove to be as detailed as pos-
sible. She noted the events of the day, including swimming at the Columbia 
Country Club, attending a party with specific individuals including Kavanaugh 
and Mark Judge, and the narrow staircase that led to the room where she was as-
saulted (C-SPAN, 2018b). Her recollection of the assault was vivid as she noted 
that Kavanaugh and Judge were in the room with her, how Kavanaugh put his 
hand over her mouth to silence her screams, how both jumped on the bed after 
her, and their laughter throughout the assault. Blasey Ford’s testimony attempted 
to accomplish at least two things. First, she stressed the lasting trauma the expe-
rience has left on her, which also aided her narrative fidelity as a survivor of sex-
ual assault. Second, she provided places and times where she had given voice to 
her experience, all of which were before the nomination of Kavanaugh. Again, 
like Hill, these rhetorical turns would prove effective for those who have endured 
a similar experience or those who are well versed in the reasons victims remain 
silent but serve as a point of contention for those who have not and are not.
Although both women shared similar elements in their narrative coher-
ence, the differing rhetorical situations led to a significant departure, particu-
larly in the challenges posed by Senate Republicans. For Hill, the main points 
of criticism levied upon her testimony were the supposed inconsistencies from 
her original statements to the FBI and her testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. At the forefront of this criticism was Sen. Specter (R-PA). As the lead 
interrogator for the Republicans, Specter continually called attention to the ad-
ditional elements of her narrative that were introduced during her testimony 
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but not the prior FBI investigation. For example, regarding the infamous “Coke 
incident,” he juxtaposed what Hill had told the FBI and what she was now ad-
dressing in her testimony: “And my question to you, why, if this was such an odd 
episode, was it not included when you talked to the FBI?” (C-SPAN, 1991b). 
Because she did not disclose the incident to the FBI but did so during the hear-
ing, Specter argued that Hill was adding new, fictitious allegations to further 
sully Thomas’s reputation. Notably, the issue is not so much that she was chang-
ing her testimony but that she was adding additional, often salacious elements 
to it. Sen. Specter would later claim that “the testimony of Professor Hill in the 
morning was flat-out perjury” and a “product of fantasy” (C-SPAN, 1991f). Sen. 
Orrin Hatch (R-UT) would pick up on this line of argument in an attempt to 
further discredit Hill. Because Hill did not address everything in her statement 
to the FBI and is recalling previously undisclosed information throughout her 
testimony before the Judiciary Committee, the consistency of her narrative was 
brought into question.
In her response, Hill attempted to reclaim the coherence of her narrative by 
differentiating between what she knew and what she was comfortable revealing 
to the FBI agents interviewing her:
When the FBI investigation took place, I tried to answer their questions as 
directly as I recall. I was very uncomfortable talking to the agent about that, 
these incidents, I am very uncomfortable now, but I feel that it is necessary. 
The FBI agent told me that it was regular procedure to come back and ask for 
more specifics if it was necessary. And so, at that time, I did not provide all of 
the specifics that I could have. (C-SPAN, 1991b)
Hill would later say that the process of the hearing was drawing forth more 
memories that had been previously repressed. Under her interpretation of the 
situation, the omission of certain details was not due to malice or deception; 
rather, she felt uncomfortable with the interview and the details she was asked to 
recount. She was reliving the trauma she had experienced and tried to overcome. 
Moreover, she was under the impression that there would be follow-up inter-
views where she would have the opportunity to go into more detail if necessary. 
These were not the only moments of the Republican attempt to dismantle Hill’s 
credibility, but they nonetheless capture the main challenge to her coherence as 
they negotiated the internal consistency of her narrative while Specter, Hatch, 
and others tried to dismantle it.
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The legacy of Hill’s treatment before the Senate Judiciary Committee no doubt 
influenced the way in which Republicans handled the interrogation of Blasey 
Ford. Most importantly, she was questioned not by the Republican senators but 
by a proxy, attorney Rachel Mitchell, a woman with extensive experience pros-
ecuting sex crimes. One interpretation of her presence stresses her expertise, 
yet there is little doubt that she was also chosen in order to avoid the optics of 
a panel of men questioning the validity of Blasey Ford’s experience. However, 
this did not mean that Blasey Ford was spared questions about her narrative 
coherence. Whereas Hill was challenged on the basis of consistency, which im-
plied and sometimes outright accused her of malicious intent, the criticisms of 
Blasey Ford focused on her memory (C-SPAN, 2018b). Mitchell also inquired 
about specific dates and times, despite Blasey Ford stating in her opening re-
marks that she could not provide such specificity. As the 3-hour testimony came 
to a close, Sen. Grassley (R-IA) called attention to the fact that there were three 
sworn testimonies from people Blasey Ford claimed were at the party who assert 
that they did not remember anything. Notably, these testimonies were not out-
right denials of the allegations, only that the individuals questioned did not re-
member the evening in question.
Both Blasey Ford and her Democratic questioners spent a good amount of 
time reinforcing her narrative coherence in response. Drawing from her exper-
tise in psychology, she addressed the “basic memory functions” that operate in 
moments of trauma like the one she claims to have endured, thus attempting to 
deflect the argument about mistaken identity (C-SPAN, 2018b). At one point, 
Sen. Leahy (D-VT) asked, “What is the strongest memory you have?” to which 
Blasey Ford replied, “Indelible, in the hippocampus is the laughter, the uproari-
ous laughter between the two and they’re having fun at my expense” (C-SPAN, 
2018b). While Sen. Leahy attempted to reinforce the scientific legitimacy of her 
particular memories, Sen. Durbin (D-IL) tried to mitigate the lack of memory 
on some aspects of the day in question: “After spending decades to forget that 
awful night it is no wonder your recollection is less than perfect. A polished liar 
can create a seamless story, but a trauma survivor cannot be expected to remem-
ber every detail” (C-SPAN, 2018b). Other senators would pick up on these two 
threads, such as Sen. Klobuchar (D-MN) citing her own experiences and Sen. 
Coons (D-DE) introducing articles on how memories stick. Acknowledging that 
her recollection of assault was the most vulnerable aspect of her narrative co-
herence, Blasey Ford and the Senate Democrats made a concerted effort to bol-
ster this aspect of her testimony.
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In addition to the reconstruction of events grounding their accusations, Hill 
and Blasey Ford shared another rhetorical obstacle in crafting a truthful narra-
tive that would hang together: the timeline of the accusations. Both offer jus-
tifications as to why they did not come forward at the time, but that did not 
answer the question of “why now?” The day-to-day breakdown in their respec-
tive lead-ups to their testimonies are well documented for Hill (Sisters Testify, 
n.d.; Totenberg, 2018;) and Blasey Ford (Britzky, 2018; Choi, 2018; Desjardins, 
2018) and became a featured argument for the Senate Republicans in both hear-
ings. The details of each of their respective roads to congressional testimony were 
distinct, yet three important issues linked their narratives and posed a rhetorical 
challenge to their stories: (1) both allegations came forward late into the nomi-
nation process; (2) both had given information to Democratic staffers first that 
was not made public immediately; and (3) both went public after the stories of 
their allegations were leaked to the press. The underlying theme in the line of in-
quiry addressing the timeline was to dismantle the narrative coherence of the 
Hill and Blasey Ford testimonies, suggesting their decisions were done out of 
malicious political motivation.
In the Hill testimony, this manifested in various ways. For example, Sen. 
Specter continually asked Hill if her ultimate goal was “a move to request Judge 
Thomas to withdraw his nomination” (C-SPAN, 1991b) and drew attention to 
the various ways in which she could have brought the alleged harassment to the 
attention of her superiors in the Department of Education and EEOC. Sen. Hatch 
similarly raised doubt about Hill’s motivation, calling into question the process 
by which the hearings had unfolded. For their part, Democrats attempted to as-
sist Hill in crafting a coherent narrative on this point but often indulged the idea 
of political motivation to an unhelpful degree, including Sen. Leahy inquiring 
about why Hill did not come forward during previous Thomas appointments 
that involved background investigations and Sen. Biden (D-DE) asking if she was 
“part of some organized effort to determine whether or not Clarence Thomas 
should or should not sit on the bench” (C-SPAN, 1991c). In retrospect, their ef-
forts likely produced more harm than good for Hill’s testimony.
Blasey Ford similarly faced questions about the timeline of allegations and 
the extent to which they reflect an underlying political motivation. In his open-
ing remarks, Sen. Grassley claimed that her testimony aligned with some of his 
Democratic colleagues’ “stated desires to obstruct Kavanaugh’s nomination by 
any means necessary” (C-SPAN, 2018b). While interrogated by Mitchell, Blasey 
Ford was asked who was paying for her legal expenses, implying that she was a 
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tool used to undermine Kavanaugh’s confirmation. Avoiding the image of doubt-
ing Blasey Ford to her face, Senate Republicans took the opportunity to stress the 
political motivation behind the timeline during Kavanaugh’s round of question-
ing (C-SPAN, 2018a). For their part, Senate Democrats came to the aid of Blasey 
Ford, as Sen. Feinstein (D-CA) defended the purported secrecy behind the pro-
cess and Sen. Harris (D-CA) stated, “What you basically said is you reached out 
to your representative in the U.S. Congress hoping that person would inform the 
White House before Judge Kavanaugh had been named. That’s extremely per-
suasive about your motivation” (C-SPAN, 2018b).
Upon close analysis, one will no doubt find other similarities and differences 
between the narrative coherence of Hill and Blasey Ford, but the aforemen-
tioned points stand out due to the central place they hold in their respective 
testimonies. There are also important connections between their narrative fi-
delity as well, some of which interact with and respond to their established co-
herence. To begin, I will focus on their similarities. Recall that narrative fidelity 
concerns the degree to which one’s story rings true with the audience. Two in-
terconnected similarities bear examination. First, and related to their narrative 
coherence regarding the timeline of their accusations coming forward: why re-
main silent for so long? Although Blasey Ford was farther removed from the 
events she argued led to her accusation, Hill was likely in a more difficult rhe-
torical position. Unlike Blasey Ford, Hill did not have the benefit of a previ-
ous confirmation hearing from which she could learn and the public could 
draw comparisons. Throughout Hill’s testimony, there was a recurring theme 
of senators unable to comprehend why she, or anyone, would not come for-
ward immediately. While Hill’s narrative coherence focused on the discrep-
ancies between her statements to the FBI and the Judiciary Committee and 
the motivations that led her to testify in the first place, her narrative fidel-
ity was targeted in her decision to move with Thomas from the Department 
of Education to the EEOC and the contact they had with one another follow-
ing her departure from Washington. After describing the various things that 
Thomas allegedly said in front of Hill, Sen. Specter asked, “How could you al-
low this kind of reprehensible conduct to go on right in the headquarters with-
out doing something about it?” He reiterates this point in his final statement 
of Hill’s testimony: “The critical move from the Department of Education to 
the EEOC is not understandable to me, where you make the statements about 
his offensive conduct” (C-SPAN, 1991b). In his questioning, Sen. DeConcini 
(R-AZ) drove this point home:
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I have a difficult time understanding, and it is obviously because I am not a 
woman and have not had that kind of personal experience, I have a difficult 
time understanding, but how could you tolerate that treatment, even though 
you didn’t have another job? I realize that this is part of the whole problem of 
sexual harassment in the workplace, the fact that women tolerate it. Maybe 
you explained this sufficiently, but if you wouldn’t mind repeating to me what 
went through your mind: Why, No. 1, you would stay there after this happened 
several times; and, No. 2, even though it ceased for a few months, why you 
would proceed on to another job with someone that hadn’t just asked you out 
and pressed you, but had gotten into the explanations and explorations of the 
anatomy with you? (C-SPAN, 1991c)
In addressing Hill’s telephone correspondence with Thomas, Sen. Simpson 
(R-WY) also expressed utter bafflement in her willingness to remain in contact 
with Thomas. These senators tried to place themselves in Hill’s shoes and they 
simply could not comprehend why she, or anyone, would let these acts con-
tinue and why she would continue to work with Thomas. To them, this story 
lacks narrative fidelity because they assume that if they were in her position, 
they would file a complaint, leave the harassing environment, and never want 
to speak to Thomas again.
In an exchange with Sen. Simpson, Hill attempted to explain how such a pat-
tern of judgment was possible: “This response, this kind of response, is not atyp-
ical, and I can’t explain. It takes an expert in psychology to explain how that can 
happen, but it can happen, because it happened to me” (C-SPAN, 1991c). In 
response, Sen. Simpson called her reaction appalling, contradictory, and puz-
zling. The senators’ inability to understand why Hill did not speak up earlier is 
all too common and continues to be a regular trope in blaming the victim. Hill 
attempted to address this later, arguing, “I guess one does have to really un-
derstand something about the nature of sexual harassment. It is very difficult 
for people to come forward with these things, these kinds of things” (C-SPAN, 
1991c). Despite Hill’s best efforts to illuminate her thought process and educate 
the senators on why her reaction is fairly common, many of them were unable 
to break free from the disconnect between her story and how they perceived 
themselves in a similar situation. In short, her story did not ring true in their 
experience and thus lacked narrative fidelity.
The legacy of Hill’s testimony, especially the various ways in which the all-White, 
all-male panel could not comprehend why someone would not come forward 
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when sexually harassed (or assaulted), lingered over Blasey Ford’s testimony and 
may be the key reason why the Republican senators were represented by Mitchell 
as opposed to asking their own questions. Nonetheless, the issue of why Blasey 
Ford remained silent for so long was a crucial aspect of her narrative fidelity. 
Echoing the experience many face after sexual assault, Blasey Ford described 
the impact the assault had on her life:
Brett’s assault on me drastically altered my life. For a very long time, I was too 
afraid and ashamed to tell anyone the details. I did not want to tell my par-
ents that I, at age 15, was in a house without any parents present, drinking 
beer with boys. I tried to convince myself that because Brett did not rape me, 
I should be able to move on and just pretend that it had never happened. Over 
the years, I told very few friends that I had this traumatic experience. I told 
my husband before we were married that I had experienced a sexual assault. 
I had never told the details to anyone until May 2012, during a couples coun-
seling session. The reason this came up in counseling is that my husband and 
I had completed an extensive remodel of our home, and I insisted on a second 
front door, an idea that he and others disagreed with and could not under-
stand. In explaining why I wanted to have a second front door, I described the 
assault in detail. I recall saying that the boy who assaulted me could someday 
be on the U.S. Supreme Court and spoke a bit about his background. My hus-
band recalls that I named my attacker as Brett Kavanaugh. (C-SPAN, 2018b)
Blasey Ford would reiterate the chilling effect that persisted throughout her 
life in response to questions throughout her testimony. Her narrative was also 
reinforced by Sen. Feinstein when she provided statistical data on the number 
of women and men who experience sexual assault in their lifetimes and the per-
centage of those assaults that are never reported, which is widely supported in 
studies and scholarship. Sen. Booker (D-NJ) also noted the inadequate treatment 
of survivors and how that inhibits people from coming forward.
The second significant similarity in their narrative fidelity is connected with 
the first in that both women cited a sense of civic responsibility that brought 
them before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Blasey Ford explicitly made this 
point in her opening remarks: “I am here today not because I want to be. I am 
terrified. I am here because I believe it is my civic duty to tell you what hap-
pened to me while Brett Kavanaugh and I were in high school” (C-SPAN, 2018b). 
The purported disinterest in testifying helped to validate the legitimacy of her 
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statement by underscoring both the sense of civic virtue that many find admira-
ble and the fact that this duty to testify was not going to benefit her. As her testi-
mony stressed, she was placing herself and her family at great risk. Sen. Durbin 
bolstered this point when he claimed, “You had absolutely nothing to gain by 
bringing these facts to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The fact you are testify-
ing here today, terrified though you may be, the fact that you have called for an 
FBI investigation of this incident” (C-SPAN, 2018b). In a clever rhetorical turn, 
Sen. Blumenthal (D-CT) cited Sen. Graham’s (R-SC) description of Blasey Ford’s 
“unexpected courage from a deep and hidden place” one calls upon in order to 
testify against their assailant (C-SPAN, 2018b). While stressing the fact that she 
was not on trial, Sen. Booker similarly acknowledged the civic duty and accom-
panying problems she had faced, which, in his mind, strengthened her testimony.
As has been the case throughout this analysis, Hill’s narrative followed a sim-
ilar pattern but was met with much more skepticism. Her motives were suspect 
at the outset of her testimony, whereas Blasey Ford was afforded more deference 
even if the Republican senators did not believe her allegations against Kavanaugh. 
Again, like Blasey Ford, Hill used her opening statement to stress her civic re-
sponsibility: “But when I was asked by a representative of this committee to 
report my experience,” claimed Hill, “I felt that I had to tell the truth. I could 
not keep silent” (C-SPAN, 1991b). Hill also stressed her disinterest in wanting 
to testify, even in the months leading up to Thomas’s confirmation hearing, go-
ing so far as to claim, “This is exactly what I did not want” (C-SPAN, 1991c). 
Noting the disruption the entire process had on her life, Hill claimed, “I have 
been threatened and I have not gained anything except knowing that I came for-
ward and did what I felt that I had an obligation to do and that was to tell the 
truth” (C-SPAN, 1991c). Tapping into her persona as conscientious, civically 
minded individual, Hill attempted to reinforce the role her motivations played 
as they aligned with her broader narrative coherence. Unlike Blasey Ford, how-
ever, Hill was not taken for her word and senators continued to draw attention 
to the fact that until now she had not come forward in the 10 years since the 
events initially took place.
The skepticism about Hill’s testimony illustrates a stark contrast between her 
treatment and the treatment of Blasey Ford and perhaps the most distinct break 
in their narrative fidelity. Early in Hill’s testimony a counternarrative of Hill as 
a “scorned woman” seeking public glory who was “prone to fantasy” began to 
emerge. As he was questioning Thomas, Sen. Hatch asked if Hill was vindic-
tive or sought to be a martyr for the civil rights movement (C-SPAN, 1991d). 
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Thomas added another dimension by recounting a story wherein Hill took a firm 
stance on an issue and, upon failing to convince her colleagues, went “storming 
off or throwing a temper tantrum of some sort that either myself or the chief of 
staff would have to iron out” (C-SPAN, 1991d). As the primary questioner, Sen. 
Specter would later inquire about a letter from Phyllis Berry about Hill feeling 
jilted and a sworn testimony from John Doggett that further reinforced an im-
age of temperamental, if not unhinged, woman that the Republicans were try-
ing to advance. Like Sen. Biden earlier, Sen. Heflin (D-AL) attempted to offer a 
space for Hill to alter the narrative but only gave voice to the opposition when 
asking, “Are you a scorned woman? . . . Are you a zealoting civil rights believer 
that progress will be turned back if Clarence Thomas goes on the Court? . . . Do 
you have a militant attitude relative to the area of civil rights? . . . Do you have 
a martyr complex?” (C-SPAN, 1991c). After denying each question, Hill finally 
burst into laughter at the idea of having a martyr complex. He then asked her 
to expound upon the psychology of fantasy and whether or not she planned to 
write a book about this entire ordeal. Even if he had the best of intentions, Sen. 
Heflin contributed to the challenge of Hill’s narrative fidelity.
Out of all the things that did not age well, these attacks on Hill’s character and 
the depiction of her as a scorned, vindictive women is arguably the worst: the 
stark contrast of the accuser, an African American professional woman bringing 
forth allegations of a sustained traumatic experience, and those asking the ques-
tions, a panel of White men unable to identify with her situation. In the nearly 
30 years since Hill’s testimony, knowledge about sexual harassment and sexual 
assault has expanded profoundly. As a result, the attacks on Blasey Ford’s narra-
tive fidelity were much more subdued, yet still present. Sen. Feinstein even called 
attention to this change by bringing up the #MeToo movement while also stress-
ing how institutional problems continue to impede victims reporting incidents 
to authorities (C-SPAN, 2018b). In an interesting rhetorical turn, Republicans 
attempted to validate Blasey Ford’s experience of trauma but stopped before im-
plicating Kavanaugh. In their telling, Blasey Ford had experienced an assault, 
except Kavanaugh was not the culprit. Several Republican senators voiced sym-
pathy for her experience and her bravery in coming forward, although this was 
mostly done outside of her testimony since the majority counsel Mitchell did 
the questioning for Republicans. This gave Democrats and Blasey Ford the op-
portunity to challenge that narrative without an immediate rebuttal (that would 
come in Kavanaugh’s testimony). In his questioning, Sen. Leahy called atten-
tion to the Republicans describing her as “mixed up” and the theory that there 
was a Kavanaugh lookalike who was the true culprit. In her opening remarks, 
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Sen. Feinstein also addressed this tactic as belittling to the trauma Blasey Ford 
endured and the fact that she had stated numerous times throughout her testi-
mony that she is certain it was Kavanaugh. For those who believed her testimony, 
the idea that she was “mixed up” was a bad faith argument that reflects a change 
since the Hill testimony, but not a meaningful one; it serves to reinforce the nar-
rative fidelity of Blasey Ford’s testimony in light of the legacy of Hill’s. For those 
who believed Kavanaugh, it offered an out from a tricky rhetorical bind created 
in wake of the #MeToo movement and other social and cultural changes that 
encourage believing victims.
Overall, these similarities and differences in the narratives of Hill and Blasey 
Ford illustrate the evolving rhetorical situation surrounding accusers coming 
forward, especially in such a high-profile setting. Whereas Fisher’s articulation 
of the narrative paradigm tends to focus on single narratives and their recep-
tion, comparing and contrasting these testimonies that transcend time calls at-
tention to the fact that prominent narratives like these are not located only in the 
moment of testimony and the immediate aftermath. They are part of a contin-
uous, overarching narrative, and mapping the similarities and differences helps 
to illuminate those elements of American political and public culture that have 
changed and those that have remained the same. However, these two narratives 
are only part of the story and cannot be understood without the competing nar-
ratives offered by the accused.
THE DEFENDERS’ NARRATIVES: CLARENCE THOMAS AND BRETT KAVANAUGH
As the accused, Thomas and Kavanaugh did not face the same burden of proof 
obstacle that Hill and Blasey Ford needed to overcome. Denying that the crimes 
took place meant that they were on different footing regarding their narrative 
coherence. After all, how can a story “hang together” if there is no story? None-
theless, they drew upon similar aspects of their backgrounds and careers to paint 
the picture that the accusations are out of character for them given the overar-
ching story of their careers and personal lives. One important similarity is their 
respective histories with women and the ways in which they articulated how 
they have been champions of women throughout their careers. During Thom-
as’s testimony, he asserted:
For almost a decade my responsibilities included enforcing the rights of victims 
of sexual harassment. As a boss, as a friend, and as a human being I was proud 
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that I have never had such an allegation leveled against me, even as I sought 
to promote women, and minorities into nontraditional jobs. (C-SPAN, 1991a)
This was a running theme throughout Thomas’s testimony: the work he had 
done combatting sexual harassment during his career. The narrative strategy 
relies on the incongruity between a sexual predator, which carries various con-
notations on what that entails and who that can be, and the stalwart advocate 
for the women who have endured sexual harassment. Sen. Hatch reinforced this 
element of his narrative when he addressed the ways in which Thomas was an 
expert on sexual harassment, and Thomas himself would often take the oppor-
tunity to stress the breadth and depth of his professional efforts to prevent and 
respond to sexual harassment:
During my tenure in the executive branch as a manager, as a policymaker, and 
as a person, I have adamantly condemned sex harassment. There is no mem-
ber of this committee or this Senate who feels stronger about sex harassment 
than I do. As a manager, I made every effort to take swift and decisive action 
when sex harassment raised or reared its ugly head. The fact that I feel so very 
strongly about sex harassment and spoke loudly about it at EEOC has made 
these allegations doubly hard on me. (C-SPAN, 1991a)
Attempting to reframe the narrative Hill had advanced in her testimony, Thomas 
stressed his long history of fighting against sexual harassment in order to suggest 
that the incidents described by Hill simply do not cohere to the public, profes-
sional aspects of his narrative.
Both Thomas and Sen. Hatch would also call attention to the lack of a pat-
tern. Drawing on his experience combatting sexual harassment, Thomas said an 
allegation from a single individual is highly unlikely to be true: “You could find 
a pattern and you can find more recent occurrences,” he claimed, adding, “You 
will find more than one person. . . . You will not find generally just one isolated 
instance” (C-SPAN, 1991e). Thomas called upon the senators to ask the women 
who have worked for him to offer an accurate insight into his credibility: “Give 
them as much time as you have given one person, the only person who has been 
on my staff who has ever made these sorts of allegations about me” (C-SPAN, 
1991d). Again, Sen. Hatch reinforced the coherence of this argument by assert-
ing “one woman’s allegations” should not be enough to upend Thomas’s career 
of service (C-SPAN, 1991d).
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Kavanaugh similarly traced his history with women, in both personal and 
professional capacities, so as to create a disconnect between his narrative coher-
ence and the one offered by Blasey Ford. In his opening statement, he shared an 
anecdote about a friend who trusted him with the story of her trauma:
One of my closest friends to this day is a woman who was sexually abused and 
who in the 1990s when we were in our 30s confided in me about the abuse 
and sought my advice. I was one of the only people she consulted. Allegations 
of sexual assault must always be taken seriously. Always. Those who make al-
legations always deserve to be heard. At the same time the person who is the 
subject of the allegations also deserves to be heard. Due process is a founda-
tion of the American rule of law. (C-SPAN, 2018a)
His story attempted to accomplish at least three goals. First, the trust his friend 
had in him is supposed to be indicative of his character and disposition when 
it comes to women, especially those who have suffered sexual assault. The idea 
is that nobody could be so trusted by someone in such a vulnerable state while 
also themselves being capable of the same kind of assault. His friendships with 
women would be a recurring theme in his testimony, wherein he claimed that 
he maintained close friendships with women as a teenager and continued to do 
so. Second, Kavanaugh stressed the need to be earnest and resolute when an al-
leged victim comes forward, differentiating himself from the sordid treatment 
of Hill and aligning with an important aspect of the #MeToo movement. Much 
like the narrative of Blasey Ford being “mixed up,” he would later affirm her 
experience by saying, “I am not questioning that Dr. Ford may have been sex-
ually assaulted by some person in some place at some time” (C-SPAN, 2018a), 
but then claiming it could not have been him. Finally, despite the hearing not 
being a trial, he nonetheless framed the situation in such terms when calling 
upon the idea of due process as a way to situate the rhetorical requirements of 
the narrative coherence.
Kavanaugh and Thomas both also stressed the previous hearings and investi-
gations that they have been subject to given their high-profile positions. Both of-
fered rundowns of their respective careers, noting the various times the FBI had 
done background checks and interviewed people from their pasts. Kavanaugh 
noted how many had been exposed for “sexual wrongdoing” in the aftermath of 
the Clinton impeachment and how it “exposed some prominent people,” but there 
was “nothing about me” (C-SPAN, 2018a). Via questioning from Sen. Hatch, 
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Thomas similarly noted how his Supreme Court hearing was the “fourth con-
firmation in nine years” (C-SPAN, 1991d). In an attempt to undermine the tes-
timony of their accusers while cultivating the idea that partisan politics was 
the main driving force behind the allegations coming forward, both defenders 
used this strategy to call into question the timing of the allegations occurring 
in their most high-profile hearings, likely the last that would ever be required 
of them. As we will see, this aspect of their narrative coherence intersects with 
their shared narrative fidelity.
The two men part ways in their narrative coherence at two important points. 
Whereas Thomas focused on the historic treatment of Black men in America, 
especially those with positions of power, Kavanaugh had a similar challenge that 
confronted Blasey Ford — namely the accuracy of his memory. Regarding the for-
mer, at several times throughout his testimony, Thomas drew attention to the 
various racial obstacles he had faced throughout his career. In perhaps the most 
famous statement uttered throughout the process, maybe even the most famous 
in any Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Thomas argued:
And from my standpoint, as a black American, as far as I am concerned, it is a 
high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for them-
selves, to do for themselves, to have different ideas, and it is a message that, 
unless you kowtow to an old order, this is what will happen to you, you will 
be lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a committee of the U.S. Senate, rather 
than hung from a tree. (C-SPAN, 1991d)
Calling attention to the United States’ violent past and horrific treatment of 
African Americans, Thomas attempted to situate his narrative amidst the broader 
story of American history. While the methods may be different, the end goal 
remains the same: to prevent African Americans from gaining a modicum of 
success and to put fear in the hearts of any who may try.
Thomas also focused on the long-standing racist stereotypes regarding Black 
men’s sexuality:
The language throughout the history of this country, and certainly through-
out my life, language about the sexual prowess of black men, language about 
the sex organs of black men, and the sizes, et cetera, that kind of language has 
been used about black men as long as I have been on the face of this Earth. 
These are charges that play into racist, bigoted stereotypes and these are the 
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kind of charges that are impossible to wash off. And these are the kinds of 
stereotypes that I have, in my tenure in Government, and the conduct of my 
affairs, attempted to move away from and to convince people that we should 
conduct ourselves in a way that defies these stereotypes. But when you play 
into a stereotype it is as though you are skiing downhill, there’s no way to stop 
it. And this plays into the most bigoted, racist stereotypes that any black man 
will face. (C-SPAN, 1991e)
Thomas was not wrong in his statement that these stereotypes have haunted 
Black men for a long time and have been used to paint them as barbarians driven 
by unbridled lust. Stories of this kind were used to strike fear of Black men in 
White communities and justified violence perpetrated on Black communities, 
whether the institutional violence of the legal system or vigilantism. Framing his 
narrative as a representative example of what continues to happen to Black men, 
Thomas attempted to align his narrative coherence with that of the established 
knowledge of the racist tropes and stereotypes long used to undermine them. 
Interestingly, the intersectional positionality of Hill as an African American 
woman was more or less ignored throughout the hearings.
Kavanaugh clearly could not rely on such an appeal to history and identity as 
he crafted his narrative coherence. Instead, he faced a similar problem of mem-
ory that Blasey Ford needed to overcome in that the alleged events had taken 
place over 30 years prior. Whereas she relied on the psychology of trauma to le-
gitimize her narrative, Kavanaugh relied on the detailed calendars he kept as a 
youth. Acknowledging that they were not objective facts that could completely 
exonerate him, he positioned them as “another piece of evidence in the mix for 
you to consider” (C-SPAN, 2018a). Nonetheless, as he used them throughout his 
defense, the underlying argument was that one should defer to them as a neutral, 
objective resource. In her questioning, Mitchell asked whether or not he docu-
mented parties and Kavanaugh replied that he did. However, Blasey Ford noted 
it was not so much a party as an impromptu gathering, thus challenging the use-
fulness of the calendar. Kavanaugh also noted how nothing could remotely fit her 
accusations given when and where he was at the time. Because Blasey Ford could 
not remember the exact date, only a rough estimate, and the Judiciary Committee 
refused to follow up with potential leads that could narrow the window for her 
assault, the calendar thus allowed him the benefit of the doubt.
Kavanaugh also faced an additional challenge to his memory due to his history 
of drinking. Several Judiciary Committee members asked questions concerning 
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the frequency and extent of his drinking throughout his high school and col-
lege years. Sen. Feinstein claimed that it was “not credible for him to say he has 
no memory lapses” (C-SPAN, 2018a), thus his recollections are suspect. Sen. 
Klobuchar would similarly call attention to his drinking as she introduced news 
reports about it. Kavanaugh replied that the story was from an old college room-
mate who could not be trusted because their relationship was contentious. Taking 
a somewhat different angle, Sen. Leahy introduced a book written by Kavanaugh’s 
high school friend wherein a character reminiscent of Kavanaugh was known 
for drinking heavily and blacking out. Kavanaugh claimed the work was a fic-
tionalization of their past used for therapy and attempted to shame Sen. Leahy 
as someone who was making fun of an individual with an addiction. Whether 
the character was a reflection of Kavanaugh or not, the issue of his drinking was 
a critical component of his narrative coherence. If one believes he was a heavy 
drinker who was prone to blacking out, his story becomes quite vulnerable and 
does not appear to hang together well.
These aspects of narrative coherence, whether shared or distinct, are inti-
mately tied to the narrative fidelity that each man would attempt to construct. 
Two important similarities were present throughout their hearings: (1) the par-
tisan process that had harmed their character and families, and (2) their judicial 
temperament. Regarding the first, both men would spend a significant amount 
of time calling attention to the harm produced by what they perceived to be a 
concerted effort at character assassination. In his opening remarks, Kavanaugh 
claimed, “My family and my name have been totally and permanently destroyed 
by vicious and false additional accusations” and would go on to call the hearings 
“a national disgrace” where the main objective was not “advice and consent,” per 
the Constitution, but “search and destroy” (C-SPAN, 2018a). Suggesting that 
Democrats were searching for a “new tactic” to undermine his appointment 
since it was becoming increasingly likely that he would become the newest jus-
tice, Kavanaugh condemned the entire process as “a calculated and orchestrated 
political hit fueled with apparent pent-up anger about President Trump and the 
2016 election” (C-SPAN, 2018a).
Thomas similarly called attention to the “excruciatingly difficult” experi-
ence he and his family had endured. Using disinterest to bolster his credibility, 
Thomas asserted:
No job is worth what I have been through, no job. No horror in my life has 
been so debilitating. Confirm me if you want, don’t confirm me if you are so 
led, but let this process end. Let me and my family regain our lives. I never 
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asked to be nominated. It was an honor. Little did I know the price, but it is 
too high. (C-SPAN, 1991a)
He would go on to accuse senators of being driven by “interest groups and hate 
mongers” in a spectacle he described as “more dangerous than McCarthyism” 
(C-SPAN, 1991d). Both of their appeals to the struggle they and their families 
endured are attempts to have the audience identify with their plight. In a sense, 
both Kavanaugh and Thomas are asking people to place themselves in their 
shoes with the presumption that they are innocent — to consider how the process 
would make them feel. It was a fairly effective way in which to get the audience 
to align with their narrative fidelity.
Whereas this strategy of identification worked in their respective favors, 
Kavanaugh and Thomas faced a similar obstacle in the issue of judicial tempera-
ment. The phrase “judicial temperament” is somewhat vague, but it gets at a set of 
expectations people tend to have concerning judges and their roles in American 
democracy and the rule of law. The American Bar Association describes judicial 
temperament as a judge’s “compassion, decisiveness, open-mindedness, cour-
tesy, patience, freedom from bias, and commitment to equal justice under the 
law” (American Bar Association, 2009, p. 3). Kavanaugh faced a much more ro-
bust challenge than Thomas, in large part due to the visible anger and frustra-
tion he exhibited throughout his testimony, so much so that it became a source 
of parody and sparked think pieces on what judicial temperament should look 
like. At one point, he claimed the entire ordeal was “revenge on behalf of the 
Clintons . . . and as we all know in the political system of the early 2000s, what 
goes around comes around” (C-SPAN, 2018a). When Sen. Klobuchar was ques-
tioning him on his drinking habits, he turned the tables and asked, “Have you 
ever blacked out? I’m curious if you have” (C-SPAN, 2018a), which was partic-
ularly caustic given that the senator had just spoken about her experiences with 
an alcoholic parent. Kavanaugh would later apologize for this moment. In an 
attempt to justify his lack of patience and courtesy, Sen. Cornyn (R-TX) noted 
that Kavanaugh was right to be angry at the situation. Those who agreed with 
Kavanaugh likely saw his anger and resolve as a testament to his narrative fidelity 
with the presumption that any innocent person would act in a similar fashion, 
whereas those who perceived him as guilty found his outbursts and disposition 
indicative of someone without the right judicial character.
Thomas faced milder criticism, but it was nonetheless a part of his narrative. 
Whereas patience and courtesy framed Kavanaugh’s struggle with judicial tem-
perament, Thomas had his fairness and open-mindedness challenged when he 
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told the Judiciary Committee that he did not listen to Hill’s testimony. “I’ve heard 
enough lies” (C-SPAN, 1991d), he claimed. Sen. Heflin would pick up this thread:
You are, in effect, defending yourself, and basically some of us want to be fair 
to you, fair to her, but if you didn’t listen to what she said today, then that puts 
it somewhat in a more difficult task to find out what the actual facts are rela-
tive to this matter. (C-SPAN, 1991d)
In his response, Thomas asserted that “there is a difference between approaching 
a case objectively and watching yourself being lynched. There is no comparison 
whatsoever” (C-SPAN, 1991d). Again, those who were sympathetic to Thomas 
likely saw his disinterest in watching Hill’s testimony as how an innocent person 
would react and those who believed Hill found his behavior unbecoming of a 
potential Supreme Court justice.
Finally, there are important departures that each took in constructing and 
defending their narrative fidelity. The changing sociopolitical landscape, differ-
ent personas adopted by each figure, and disparate treatment of the accusers led 
to Thomas and Kavanaugh deploying alternate rhetorical strategies. Given the 
varying dimensions at play, Thomas was able to take a proactive role in crafting 
his credibility whereas Kavanaugh needed to be on the defensive. Two aspects 
of their testimonies capture this divide well: Thomas was able to capitalize on a 
narrative of the parental figure given the heavy skepticism levied on Hill, whereas 
Kavanaugh was in a more vulnerable position as a result of his high school per-
sona and the hearing taking place in the #MeToo era. Concerning Thomas, recall 
the dismantling of Hill’s credibility that had taken place during the hearing. With 
her testimony described as perjury by her Republican interlocutors, Thomas 
was in an advantageous position. As such, he was able to rely on a narrative that 
likened himself to a parental figure in order to reinforce his fidelity. Thomas po-
sitioned himself as a doting supervisor who saw his role as one of care and men-
torship for those under his supervision. He noted both how much he admired 
Hill’s work ethic and his own concern for “younger kids” who “are not from 
this city and who do not understand the city,” but also that Hill was distinct be-
cause he trusted her common sense (C-SPAN, 1991f). His strategy of parental 
care was, in large part, an attempt to explain away the various times in which 
Thomas had driven Hill home during their time at the EEOC and Department 
of Education. Sen. Hatch, capitalizing on this point, asked leading questions that 
allowed Thomas to reinforce his persona as professional mentor and parental 
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figure: “You never thought of any of this as anything more than normal, friendly, 
professional conversation with a colleague?” (C-SPAN, 1991d). Throughout the 
hearing, Thomas was often framed as a consummate professional whose only in-
teractions that addressed nonprofessional topics were in a parental, caregiving 
capacity, thus undermining Hill’s narrative while reinforcing Thomas’s.
Kavanaugh was in a tighter bind. Since the events surrounding the allegations 
took place during his high school years, he could not deploy the same strategy 
concerning his relationship with Blasey Ford (or, according to his telling, lack 
thereof). Instead, Kavanaugh had to defend his high school identity and the 
various things he said that may be in contrast to the kind, thoughtful, religious 
persona he attempted to craft in his opening statement. In addition to the afore-
mentioned stories of his heavy drinking, Senate Democrats focused on particular 
language found in his high school yearbook and the calendars that played such 
a prominent role in his narrative coherence. For example, Democrats attempted 
to pin Kavanaugh on his yearbook description as a “Renate alumnus” — a refer-
ence to a high school friend. Democrats suggested the phrase referred to a sexual 
conquest, thus illustrating his indifference to women and perception of sex as a 
game. In response, Kavanaugh asserted that it was “intended to show affection in 
that she was one of us, but in this circus, the media determines it was related to 
sex. It was not related to sex” (C-SPAN, 2018a). Later, Sen. Whitehouse (D-RI) 
inquired about Kavanaugh’s membership in the “Beach Week Ralph Club,” as-
suming the term was in reference to vomiting as a result of drinking too much. 
In response, Kavanaugh claimed he had a weak stomach, so the “ralphing” had 
nothing to do with drinking heavily. Sen. Whitehouse also called attention to 
the term “boofed,” which Kavanaugh claimed was flatulence, and the “devil’s tri-
angle,” which implied a three-partner sexual activity but which Kavanaugh as-
serted was a drinking game involving quarters. Clearly, Senate Democrats and 
those who believed Blasey Ford did not accept his definitions and considered 
his reframing as an attempt to maintain unwarranted innocence. Defending 
him, Sen. Hatch stressed the fact that Kavanaugh wrote and said dumb things 
in high school, like everyone apparently does: “We’re talking about his time in 
high school!” (C-SPAN, 2018a). The underlying claim was that immaturity as a 
teenager does not equate to criminality. The overarching goal of the Democrats 
was to point out inconsistencies or outright lies in Kavanaugh’s statements and 
to show that, as a result of these, his entire testimony was tainted fruit from the 
poisonous tree. In this regard, Kavanaugh faced a similar line of criticism as Hill 
in that both faced challenges to their consistency and narrative fidelity.
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The various elements of narrative coherence and fidelity that were outlined 
by no means constitute the entire scope of the Hill-Thomas and Ford-Kavanaugh 
hearings. With more than 25 years separating them and different charges levied, 
each offered compelling aspects of coherence and fidelity while also respond-
ing to their own unique challenges. Given that both men were confirmed at the 
conclusion of their hearings, one could presume their narratives ultimately won 
the day, but the margins of their confirmations were narrow. Thomas was con-
firmed on a 52–48 vote, whereas Kavanaugh was confirmed 50–48. The public 
was equally divided, which illustrates the significant ideological divide that de-
fined each of these confirmation hearings. The rhetorical legacy will linger in-
definitely, and every time a similar situation exists we will hearken back to these 
hearings, just as the Hill-Thomas testimonies were revived and revisited during 
Kavanaugh’s hearing. Depending on one’s ideological commitments, the narra-
tives articulated will resonate more or less, with faults and strengths found in 
the coherence and fidelity of each claim. In addition to the impact on the judges 
and their accusers, another long-lasting narrative impact goes beyond these in-
dividuals, focusing instead on the legislative processes and policies that dictate 
how such hearings are to be held and the overarching narrative we tell about 
the Supreme Court.
LASTING IMPACT ON THE NARRATIVE OF SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS
As the previous analysis indicates, there are numerous similarities and differ-
ences between the Hill-Thomas and Ford-Kavanaugh hearings. While the events 
leading up to, during, and following these hearings left an indelible impact on 
many — most importantly the four individuals at the center of the controversies 
and their respective families — the hearings also had a significant impact on the 
narrative we tell about the confirmation hearings and Supreme Court. To what 
extent do they cohere and ring true for the senators charged with confirming 
appointees and the American public writ large? Have these moments weakened 
the legitimacy of the Court? At the level of Senate policy, four particular changes 
bear mentioning: the questioning done by a third party, the amount of time af-
forded to testimonies, the role of FBI investigations, and the simple majority 
required to override a filibuster. These points help to illustrate how the expec-
tations of confirmation hearings is changing.
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First, the Senate Republicans implicitly acknowledged the sordid legacy of 
Hill’s testimony. Although there was not as much criticism at the time, retro-
spective analyses of Hill’s treatment while in the midst of the #MeToo move-
ment encouraged them to utilize a proxy, attorney Rachel Mitchell, to serve as 
the face of their inquiry instead of asking the questions themselves. An Arizona 
prosecutor with significant experience prosecuting sex crimes, Mitchell provided 
a shield for the Republicans, all of whom were White men, so they could gain 
(or, at the very least, not lose) credibility while attempting to dismantle Blasey 
Ford’s narrative coherence and fidelity. Criticized by some, the strategy none-
theless proved effective, and the use of a proxy will likely continue if a similar 
situation should occur in future confirmation hearings.
Second, the time afforded to the testimonies differed greatly between the 
two hearings. Thomas and Hill were each given 6 or more hours of testimony, 
some of which was an extensive question-and-answer session with a single sen-
ator. Their hearings spanned multiple days and also included testimony from 
character witnesses speaking on their behalf. In total, the Senate dedicated over 
20 hours to the public hearings. Conversely, Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford each 
had 3 hours of testimony done in 5-minute increments as the Democrats and 
Republicans ping-ponged back and forth in their questioning. Aside from their 
opening statements, Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford were not given an opportunity 
to offer extensive remarks, nor were individuals called on their behalf despite 
specific persons being named and offering written testimonies. Those who sup-
port Kavanaugh would argue that the spectacle did not merit more time and at-
tention, whereas those who support Blasey Ford would claim the abbreviated 
schedule indicated a lack of seriousness on behalf of Senate Republicans. With 
a new precedent set, the abbreviated schedule will likely continue if the individ-
ual nominated is from the same political party as the Senate majority.
Third, the role of the FBI in investigating allegations also changed. In addition 
to the standard background checks that occur during any important nomina-
tion process, the FBI played a more active role in investigating Hill’s allegations 
at the behest of President George H. W. Bush. The statements given to the FBI 
were incorporated into the hearing, especially during Hill’s testimony. Although 
the FBI was certainly involved in Kavanaugh’s confirmation process, its presence 
was much more limited compared to Thomas’s hearing. Despite calls for a more 
robust investigation by senators, including Sen. Flake (R-AZ), the FBI director 
and the deputy attorney general did not intend to perform extensive interviews 
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of the various figures involved. This became a significant point of contention 
during the hearings, as Senate Democrats continuously called for them and used 
their absence to indict the process as wholly partisan and done in bad faith.
The final important change involves what is called the “nuclear option” in 
confirmation hearings. The term refers to the Senate’s ability to require a simple 
majority in votes that would usually require more per the standing rules of the 
Senate. Regarding the confirmation hearings concerning the judiciary, Sen. Reid 
(D-NV) used the nuclear option in 2013 to expedite the confirmations of federal 
judges with only 50 votes, but not for Supreme Court nominees. That step was 
taken by Sen. McConnell (R-KY) in 2017 during the nomination of Neil Gorsuch. 
While the change was not sparked by the Kavanaugh nomination, he nonethe-
less benefited from it as Senate Democrats were powerless to stop, or at the very 
least extend, his confirmation hearing. This option is the driving force behind 
the shortened timeline for testimonies and the lack of an extensive FBI investi-
gation surrounding Blasey Ford’s allegations. Although the Senate may return to 
the long-standing policies on filibustered nominations, such a return is unlikely.
What do all of these changes mean? In short, the story of the Supreme Court 
and the role of the confirmation hearings has been significantly altered. In the 
hyper-partisan climate that has defined the contemporary American political 
environment, the various changes that have taken place during the time be-
tween the two hearings are likely viewed through an ideological lens. As a re-
sult, the legitimacy of the political process that confirms nominees is in question, 
which also undermines the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Criticisms over 
the partisanship of hearings was prevalent throughout each of them and was 
not limited to one political party. In the wake of the caustic nomination pro-
cess of Robert Bork, the confirmation hearings have often been used as a site 
for ideological clash and media spectacle. The Thomas and Kavanaugh hearings 
are distinct in the allegations of sexual harassment and assault levied upon the 
nominees. In concert with various other issues, including polarizing decisions 
that make the Court appear less independent and more political, public trust in 
the Supreme Court has waned over the years. With the eventual retirements of 
the left wing of the Court, the process and policy changes outlined will result in 
lasting and perhaps irrevocable alterations. One can only speculate about the 
potential strategies Democrats or Republicans may deploy in the future since so 
many previously unthinkable lines (e.g., the nuclear option) have already been 
crossed. Although one cannot predict whether allegations of sexual misconduct 
will be a part of future confirmation hearings, the two examples examined in this 
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chapter underscore how some significant changes have taken place in the pro-
cess and how other aspects of the process have remained the same.
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CHAPTER 3
PARTISANSHIP OVER PRINCIPLE
The “Logic” of Congressional Impeachment Inquiries
Matthew L. Bergbower and Robert Van Sickel
INTRODUCTION
Our research seeks to explore the evolution of congressional attempts to impeach 
the president, with particular focus on what constitutional philosophies are used 
by members of Congress (MCs) to legitimize their impeachment speeches. This 
exploration includes a successful attempt at impeaching a president with Bill 
Clinton, the beginning of impeachment proceedings with Richard Nixon, and 
congressional explorations of impeaching other presidents since Nixon. While 
Clinton and Nixon are the most well-known examples of Congress exercising 
its impeachment powers, several other presidents since Nixon have been ac-
cused of impeachable offenses by the House Judiciary Committee, the commit-
tee which is the focus of our study.1
The Constitution provides the initial vague guidance that a president “shall be 
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 65 
adds to the realm of charges by stating that the Senate is a more suitable venue for 
impeachment trials over the courts because it would be a trial on the “miscon-
duct of public men . . . from the abuse or violation of some public trust” (2006a, 
p. 361). Language concerning impeachment briefly appears again in Federalist 
Nos. 66, 69, 79, and 81 (for an overview, see Gerhardt, 1996). On top of that, state 
conventions to ratify the U.S. Constitution give further insights on the Framers’ 
intent to give the House of Representatives impeachment powers. Despite these 
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few records from the Founding Era, legislators serving over 200 years later have 
little textual record to guide them in considering the specific contours of using 
their impeachment power against presidential actions — such as refusing subpoe-
nas of Congress, lying about sex, and approving warrantless wiretapping.
While prior impeachments of a sitting president are obviously important to 
how the current president behaves in office, threats to impeach are also mean-
ingful. Specifically, impeachment threats and investigations, with their varying 
degrees of seriousness, still produce institutional effects on executive-legislative 
branch relations. For example, threats of impeachment target accountability for 
presidential wrongdoing. Congressional oversight should strengthen when it 
threatens or investigates impeachment, much like a veto threat offers the presi-
dent strength in the legislative arena.
We also know that recent presidents have been acutely aware of congressio-
nal oversight powers to investigate potentially impeachable offenses. The record 
shows that this unique power also can affect presidential behavior. In addition 
to the concern shown in the impeachment cases of Nixon and Clinton, G. H. W. 
Bush’s personal diaries showcase an overwhelming amount of concern that if he 
were to wage war in Kuwait and Iraq without congressional approval, and if that 
war was prolonged with a high number of causalities, that it would surely end his 
presidency with a 1992 electoral defeat or impeachment. To confirm these per-
sonal thoughts, several Democratic MCs directly told the president this fate was 
likely (Meacham, 2016, pp. 450–457). In the end, the administration decided to 
push for a U.N. Security Council Resolution to legitimize its preferred military 
action in the Middle East. After that, Congress took a formal vote and approved 
a resolution authorizing the use of force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. An 
air raid attacking selected Iraqi targets was ordered first, on January 15, 1991. 
The next day, Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) introduced articles of 
impeachment against the president. The Operation Desert Storm military cam-
paign lasted just a few weeks, freed Kuwait, capped the number of U.S. casual-
ties at 148, and boosted G. H. W. Bush’s approval ratings to over 80% (Meacham, 
2016, pp. 458–469). The president’s triumph gave little incentive for Congress to 
pursue Gonzalez’s articles of impeachment.
While the environmental context of G. H. W. Bush’s post–Desert Storm pop-
ularity may have not been a concern for Gonzalez, it surely was for other MCs. 
Thus, we should also recognize context in impeachment arguments as legislators 
may practice pragmatism in their opinions of a president’s possible impeachment. 
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Specifically, we should expect MCs to consider public approval of the president, 
electoral effects for themselves and their party, and the power wielded by the 
executive branch at a given time in their calculation to support or oppose im-
peachments (for an overview, see Murrill, 2018). For instance, just a few days 
before Nixon resigned but after the House Judiciary Committee had voted to 
move impeachment articles to the House floor, Gallup polled support for his re-
moval from office. Support for removal was at 57%, the highest it has been since 
Gallup started polling the question (Murray, 2017).2
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS AND JURISPRUDENCE
There are many jurisprudential typologies that purport to explain the vari-
ous modes employed by judges in applying the Constitution to disputes before 
them (Bobbitt, 1982; Bork, 1971; Epstein & Walker, 2019; Murrill, 2018). For 
the purposes of MCs publicly evaluating and applying the impeachment clause, 
these many approaches and descriptions can be distilled down to two basic per-
spectives. First are the approaches relying upon “textualism” and textual prece-
dent — that is, a search for the meaning of the written words of the Constitution’s 
explicit impeachment provisions, as well as the written precedents that have au-
thoritatively interpreted those provisions.3 The second approach can be termed 
the “extra-textual” approach. This involves looking beyond explicit written im-
peachment texts to deeper, more holistic meanings, or what some have called 
“constitutional truths” (Bloom, 2009; Bobbitt, 1982; Bork, 1971). Advocates of 
this approach look beyond the positive legal text to the more subjective inten-
tions of the Framers and of previous legislatures involved in impeachment mat-
ters (or other constitutional provisions).
Both of these approaches have been employed by MCs when discussing 
presidential impeachment. However, what distinguishes legislative rhetoric in 
the realm of presidential impeachment is a tendency for all parties involved, 
whether addressing textual or more philosophical aspects of the Constitution, 
and whether supporting or opposing impeachment in a particular instance, to 
more or less across-the-board emphasize originalism. Probably the best-known 
method of constitutional interpretation, and certainly the one most widely 
praised and condemned, is the so-called doctrine of originalism, which empha-
sizes original intent. All variations on this theme begin with the precept that what 
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matters most in discerning the meaning of the Constitution is what the draft-
ers of that text intended and what the words they adopted meant to them at the 
time of their adoption. The underlying assumption is that subsequent genera-
tions of Americans owe their fidelity to those intentions, and if they no longer 
seem relevant or acceptable to a current generation, then the Constitution itself 
must be amended to reflect those evolving views, rather than each generation 
substituting its own meaning for that of the Framers.
Significantly, ostensible adherence to originalism can take either the textu-
alist or extra-textualist form. This creates confusion as originalism takes on a 
form that can be used as a strict or non-strict constitutional interpretation of 
impeachment powers. For whether one is searching for the plain meaning of the 
words at the time of their adoption, or the broader, historical, social, and cul-
tural meaning of the concepts embodied by those words, the originalist approach 
mandates that the interpreter return to the various written materials of the time.
We thus arrive at two main conclusions. First, virtually all of those engaged in 
an impeachment inquiry are focused on identifying the meaning and application 
of impeachment for the Founding generation, and second, the inevitable focus of 
such inquiries will be the words of the Constitution and other contemporary 
documents of the period (e.g., the Federalist Papers). In this context, a strict tex-
tualist approach might restrict itself to the meaning of words such as “Treason, 
Bribery, and high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” or even argue that impeachment 
be reserved for the commission of actual indictable felonies (Dershowitz, 2018). 
On the other hand, the non-strict extra-textualist investigator seeks guidance 
beyond the constitutional text, perhaps in the Federalist Papers, the Declaration 
of Independence, or the state convention debates surrounding the Constitution’s 
ratification in 1788–1789. The non-strict extra-textualist approach concludes 
that impeachable offenses need not be restricted only to “crimes” in the con-
ventional sense. At this point, we are forced to confront the paucity of constitu-
tional provisions actually addressing impeachment.
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
As mentioned, the different approaches to constitutional interpretations are typ-
ically found in scholarship focusing on judicial decision-making; but equally 
important in America’s practicing democracy is how Congress deliberates con-
stitutional issues (Pickerill, 2004). MCs’ interpretation of the commerce clause, 
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the 2nd Amendment, or the free exercise of religion clause, for example, has 
profound effects on how legislation is drafted and voted upon. While legisla-
tors’ constitutional interpretations are likely more consistent on issues such as 
religious freedom and gun ownership rights, we expect inconsistency on the is-
sue of impeachment. Specifically, we expect party allegiances to dwarf constitu-
tional values held by MCs on the matter of impeachments. Thus, when seeking 
to impeach the president, strict and non-strict interpretations of impeachment 
are forefront, regardless of party. And, while seeking to defend a president from 
impeachment, strict interpretations of impeachment rationale are prominent.
It still remains uncertain if jurisprudential considerations are appropriate for a 
congressional debate. Although MCs rarely discuss constitutional provisions and 
interpretations when it comes to legislative debates, the Judiciary Committees of 
the House and Senate are identified as being the most likely places where such 
discussions take place (Pickerill, 2006, p. 137). Also on this note, a comparison 
of Supreme Court decision-making and congressional decision-making was rec-
ognized by the House Judiciary Committee’s 1974 advisory report on impeach-
ments, which stated:
Delicate issues of basic constitutional law are involved. Those issues cannot 
be defined in detail in advance of full investigation of the facts. The Supreme 
Court of the United States does not reach out in the abstract to rule on the 
constitutionality of statutes or of conduct. Cases must be brought and adjudi-
cated on particular facts in terms of the Constitution. Similarly, the House does 
not engage in abstract, advisory or hypothetical debates about the precise na-
ture of conduct that calls for the exercise of its constitutional powers. Rather, 
it must await full development of the facts and understanding of the events 
to which those facts relate. (American Archive of Public Broadcasting 2019)4
The “Constitution outside the Court” literature (e.g., Tushnet, 1999; Pickerill, 
2004) argues that constitutional interpretations are important outside the judi-
cial branch because other political entities have the power to shape the public’s 
and governments’ understandings of certain constitutional principles. Overall, 
it is not just the courts but several political entities that affect how one may in-
terpret the Constitution. These entities are likely to come from some of the 
more powerful American political institutions, such as the presidency, Congress, 
the bureaucracy, the media, political parties, interest groups, and state actors. 
For example, the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause has been argued 
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for equal treatment of same-sex couples long before Romer v. Evans (1996) and 
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). In September 1993 Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) 
spoke on the Senate floor of equal protections for all Americans in his opposi-
tion to a Department of Defense fiscal authorization amendment that threat-
ened to ban gays and lesbians from serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. And, Ted 
Weiss (D-NY) referenced the 14th Amendment on the House floor when he in-
troduced legislation to provide non-discrimination protections based on sexual 
orientation in March 1991.
Constitutional interpretations are shaped from multiple sources, and argu-
ably MCs have more varied influences than judicial actors. While ideology is the 
most common predictor of judicial decision-making on constitutional matters 
(Segal & Spaeth, 2002), MCs’ constitutional interpretations may be influenced 
by their party, constituents, and region they represent, in addition to ideology. 
For instance, Pickerill (2006) argues that conservative MCs from the West are 
more motivated to serve on the Agriculture- and Interior-related standing com-
mittees because of their relations to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
These MCs share a unique concern and constitutional interpretation of when 
government has the power to exercise eminent domain.5
Katyal (2000) also recognizes that MCs have unique constitutional views com-
pared to judges, and that “interpretive symmetry” between the two should not be 
assumed. Federal judges are unelected judicial actors without party affiliations 
who occasionally interpret the Constitution to determine the appropriateness 
of state action, presidential decrees, and congressionally approved legislation. 
The courts have a history of adhering to stare decisis, thus they are not an in-
stitution designed for implementing policy reform. And, courts are seen as the 
institution to use the Constitution to protect minority rights. MCs have regu-
lar elections and relatively short terms in office and are specifically tasked with 
creating laws to make a more perfect union. Congress does not abide by prece-
dent, rather it actively pursues changing policy from what it was like in the past. 
Furthermore, constitutional interpretations are rarely discussed as a predictor to 
explain individual congressional behavior on bill sponsorship, votes, and floor 
speeches. From these institutional makeups, it makes sense that individuals serv-
ing within the judicial branch have constitutional interpretations that are dif-
ferent in practice than those serving in the legislative branch. So what does this 
mean in the case of MCs debating impeachment charges against the president? 
Given the political ramifications of an impeachment charge, conservative MCs 
are not necessarily pigeonholed to be strict interpreters of the Constitution, nor 
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should we assume that liberal MCs are adopting a non-strict Living Constitution 
jurisprudence for impeachments.6
We do not expect the content from MCs to be entirely within the realm of 
positive contributions to constitutional deliberation. In other words, MCs do not 
always engage in the healthiest forms of democratic debate. In some instances, 
MCs grandstand for television cameras in hopes of receiving media and public 
attention (Wildrick & Novak, 2018). In these scenarios, it is clear that the MCs’ 
motivations are not to convince their congressional colleagues of a particular 
nuanced constitutional interpretation of an impeachable offense.
Another major takeaway from our assessment of the “Constitution outside the 
Court” literature as it relates to our study is that while legislation can and is occa-
sionally challenged in the courts, Congress’s discretion on impeachment is cur-
rently unlimited and members use some level of constitutional jurisprudence to 
make impeachment-related decisions. Our research seeks to find out how much 
constitutionally based reasoning is present during impeachment proceedings. No 
court or other institution has thwarted Congress’s ability to impeach the presi-
dent. It is only in a few rare instances that one can find constitutional provisions 
on which the courts have provided so little guidance.7 Finally, we should recog-
nize that there is normative value in MCs deliberating constitutional interpre-
tations as it is an effort to perfect democratic practices (Sunstein, 1993). These 
debates are expected to “rise above petty partisan politics” (Gerhardt, 2018, p. 21) 
and instead form a deliberation around constitutional politics (Ackerman, 1989).8
STRICT AND NON-STRICT CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS: 
A LEGAL VERSUS POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF IMPEACHMENTS
At this point, we are forced to confront the paucity of constitutional provisions 
actually addressing impeachment and find the extra-textual points raised by 
the Framers. When judges, scholars, or legislators seek additional constitutional 
guidance beyond that document’s pages, they often turn to the Federalist Pa-
pers, the series of newspaper opinion essays written by James Madison, Alexan-
der Hamilton, and John Jay in defense of the newly drafted Constitution during 
the ratification period between 1787 and 1789. Several of these essays, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, touch upon the issue of impeachment.
Hamilton in particular seems to have authored the papers that most di-
rectly address impeachment. In Federalist No. 65, he focuses on the crux of 
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impeachment as involving “the abuse or violation of some public trust.” Also in 
that essay he asserts that impeachable infractions would include
those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a na-
ture which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they 
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. (Hamilton, 
2006a, p. 361)
In Federalist No. 68 he refers to “cabal, intrigue, and corruption” as the “most 
deadly adversaries of republican government,” and warns that they “chiefly” derive 
“from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.” 
“How,” he continued, “could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature 
of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union?” (Hamilton, 2006b, p. 377).
These passages seem to assert at least three important notions. First is the idea 
that impeachable offenses are essentially those that involve an abuse of power. 
Second, Hamilton clearly distinguishes such abuses from crimes in the normal 
sense of the term — they are by definition, as violations of a public trust, politi-
cal offenses. We can also infer that the impeachment process is itself a political 
one; elsewhere, in Federalist Nos. 66 and 81, he suggests that impeachment is 
part of the overall scheme of the separation of powers, as it can also be viewed 
as a check on the judiciary in addition to the executive. And finally, and impor-
tantly, he states that the most extreme examples of abuse of power would be those 
involving foreign interference in the American political sphere.
To summarize, presidential impeachment debates tend to revolve around 
questions of the constitutional Framers’ intentions, the appropriate interpreta-
tion of the relevant textual materials, and the question of whether impeachment 
at its root is an expressly legal and criminal matter, or a fundamental political 
judgment. Our research leads us to also consider that the process has been char-
acterized not by legal or constitutional judgments, and not merely by political 
questions, but rather by expressly partisan interpretations and arguments. This 
consideration should not be surprising. The MCs who entertain their impeach-
ment power are “inescapably political creatures, with partisan sympathies, pro-
fessional aspirations, and constituent pressures” (Whittington, 2019, p. 13). The 
Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, and Donald Trump impeachment experiences lead 
to the inevitable realization that impeachment has largely become, to borrow 
Whittington’s term, “the plaything of factional politics” (p. 12).
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CODING CONTENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN
We conducted a content analysis of MC statements from House Judiciary Com-
mittee impeachment-related hearings from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. 
Our expectation is that MCs will inconsistently use strict and non-strict argu-
ments to support impeachment. The number of House Judiciary Committee 
meetings discussing the possibility of impeaching the sitting president varies 
greatly since Nixon’s tenure in office and is listed in Table 3.1. In May 1974 the 
House Judiciary Committee announced its plan to meet in closed executive ses-
sions around 3 times per week during the summer to investigate, hear, and de-
bate evidence related to articles of his impeachment (CQ Press, 1974).9 Then, 
starting in late July, the House Judiciary Committee met in public hearings that 
were televised by a national public television network.10 After Nixon’s resigna-
tion, a great period of impeachment calmness occurred. Specifically, for the 
Ford, Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush presidencies no impeachment-related 
committee hearings were held.11 The Clinton impeachment is well documented, 
and we code eight of those hearings (most of them lasting at least 6 hours). Less 
known is that G. W. Bush and Obama each had one House Judiciary Commit-
tee hearing that discussed the possibility of their impeachment.12
Here, we need to recognize that for Nixon and Clinton we are looking at for-
mal impeachment investigations and for G. W. Bush and Obama we are look-
ing at non-formal impeachment investigations. The best example of a formal 
impeachment inquiry is one where the U.S. House votes to authorize the House 
Judiciary Committee to conduct an inquiry of the president. This vote happened 
for Nixon and Clinton. However, according to our search, the House Judiciary 
Committee held two hearings focused on discussing the impeachment of the 
president while not being charged from the full House to conduct a formal in-
quiry. One such committee hearing was during G. W. Bush’s second term and the 
other was during Obama’s second term. For the purposes of our research, these 
committee hearings still provide valuable content on the congressional mem-
bers’ constitutional principles toward impeachment. The political environment 
is noticeably different for these two meetings nonetheless as it was unlikely that 
these impeachment discussions were going to progress to an investigation, al-
beit that was their intent (see Table 3.1 for overview).
The C-SPAN Video Library provides scholars a unique opportunity to explore 
the variety of reasons that MCs pursue articles of impeachment against various 
presidents.13 We code committee member statements per daily impeachment 
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hearing. That means some of the same committee members are coded across 
multiple days. This is not an issue for the G. W. Bush and Obama era data be-
cause their committee hearings are for only 1 day. This is less of a concern for the 
Nixon era data as well because the committee discussed different impeachment 
charges each day and many of the members’ opinions actually differed from ar-
ticle to article (on the last committee meeting day, July 30, 1974, the commit-
tee addressed two articles of impeachment). Even though the different articles 
were not separately addressed in different days for Clinton, there is much con-
sistency in what the members thought for the entirety of the committee inves-
tigation (e.g., see party-line votes in Table 3.2).
One motivation underlying our research exploring congressional impeach-
ment efforts is to gain a better understanding of the explicitly expressed argu-
ments underlying one of the legislative branch’s most powerful constitutional 
TABLE 3.1 House Judiciary Committee Meetings Coded a
President Dates






Nixon May 9; July 24–27, 29–30 (1974)d 7 164
Ford  — 0 0
Carter  — 0 0
Reagan  — 0 0
G. H. W. Bush  — 0 0
Clinton Oct. 5; Nov. 19; Dec. 1, 8–12 (1998) 8 273
G. W. Bush July 25 (2008) 1 22
Obama Dec. 3 (2013) 1 17
Total 17 476
aNixon committee hearings available from the American Archive of Public Broadcasting (2019). 
All other video recordings are available from the C-SPAN Archives.
bPublic hearings only.
cMember statements are coded per day. Thus, it is possible for a representative to be coded up to 
7 times during the Nixon impeachment hearings and up to 8 times for the Clinton impeachment 
hearings. The sampled distribution of MCs coded is as follows: 34.4% is from 1974, 57.3% is from 
1998, 4.6% is from 2008, and 3.5% is from 2013.
dThe chair and ranking member were the only two committee members to speak at the May 9 
hearing. This brief public hearing announced that the committee was to investigate the president 
in closed executive sessions throughout the summer.
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authorities. Do MCs believe that presidents can be impeached for breaking the 
law, such as obstructing justice? Do MCs argue that it as an impeachable offense 
when a president knowingly deceives the public? When the charge of impeach-
ment is produced, how do those in the same party as the president defend the 
president’s actions? We expect our research to answer these impeachment ques-
tions as seen in the U.S. House Judiciary Committee.
Two trained undergraduate students separately coded the impeachment-related 
House Judiciary Committee hearings. The intercoder reliability results are pro-
vided in the Appendix to this chapter. We code rationales behind impeachment 
arguments, which include strict interpretations of the Constitution as being a 
president (1) breaking the law, (2) partaking in corrupting actions (including 
bribery), and (3) committing treason. The non-strict accusations are (1) deceiv-
ing Congress and/or the public, (2) losing the public’s confidence in their ability 
to lead, (3) abusing constitutional powers, (4) neglecting the duties of the office, 
and (5) violating the oath of office. Furthermore, we are interested in reasons for 
countering the charges of impeachment such as statements related to a president 
(1) innocent of wrongdoing (strict), (2) being subject to a partisan witch hunt 
(non-strict), and (3) acting as intended by the Constitution (strict). Vigorous 
defenses of the president are expected to come from the president’s party and 
aggressive charges against the president are expected from the opposition party. 
This loyalty to the party is expected to also undermine any consistency in con-
stitutional interpretation held by MCs or their party on the matter of impeach-
ment. Of course, MCs may totally disregard constitutional interpretation and 
simply seek wrongdoing and vote for impeachment without contextualizing their 
preferences with a personal philosophy on constitutional interpretation. Many 
argue that MCs behave in this very manner when composing, debating, and vot-
ing on legislation (Pickerill, 2006). However, lengthy House Judiciary Committee 
hearings on impeachment charges lend themselves to MCs engaging in high lev-
els of constitutional interpretation and an understanding of the Framers’ intent.
The juxtaposition between strict and non-strict constitutional interpretations 
can be illustrated by contrasting statements made by a 1974 Judiciary Committee 
advisory impeachment report to that of the committee’s ranking member, Edward 
Hutchinson (R-MI). The report written by lawyers for the committee stated that 
“to limit impeachable conduct to criminal offenses would be incompatible with 
the evidence . . . and would frustrate the purpose that the Framers intended” 
(Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, 1974, p. 25). Hutchinson disagreed at a 
press conference shortly after the report went public, stating, “There should be 
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criminality involved” by the president to justify his impeachment (Naughton, 
1974, p. 1).
As another example of strict constitutional interpretation, during a com-
mittee hearing devoted to the Nixon impeachment articles Hutchinson first 
quoted the Constitution’s impeachment clause. Then he informed the commit-
tee of the definition of impeachment from an English law dictionary published 
in 1776. Part of the definition quoted, and emphasized by Hutchinson, was 
“that the same evidence is required in an impeachment in parliament as in or-
dinary courts of justice.” He used this definition as the Framers’ intent, that the 
Founders clearly established a standard of criminal culpability for impeachment 
proceedings, and thereby identified his constitutional interpretation as strict 
in the case of impeachment. Illustrations of strict interpretations also can be 
seen from Democrats in later impeachment-related hearings as well — for exam-
ple from Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), who in the 1998 impeachment 
proceedings against Clinton specified on the House floor that criminal acts like 
perjury are not impeachable offenses when they involve matters unrelated to the 
duties and responsibilities of the presidency (C-SPAN, 1998c).
Now consider a non-strict illustration from Henry Hyde’s constitutional in-
terpretation during the Clinton impeachment proceedings. A team of Democrats 
on the committee challenged Hyde to identify the exact words stated by Clinton 
that were perjurious. If Clinton committed perjury during his Grand Jury testi-
mony, the Democrats wanted to know the exact words in the transcript so that 
they may debate its specific merits. After failing to answer the question Hyde 
was ready to dismiss its merits entirely. Responding to fellow committee mem-
ber Charles Schumer (D-NY), Hyde argued, “This is not an indictment, this is 
not a criminal proceeding. You keep casting it as such, it isn’t. This is impeach-
ment as we are reminded of ceaselessly . . .” (C-SPAN, 1998b).
DATA ANALYSIS
We begin our analysis with Table 3.2 which is a cross-tabulation of party-based 
support for impeaching our four presidents under consideration. As expected, 
Republicans seek to impeach Democratic presidents when wrongdoing is alleged, 
and vice versa. The partisan-based split in impeachment opinions is nearly uni-
versal for the committee hearings held during the Clinton and Obama admin-
istrations. On the other hand, for the Nixon and G. W. Bush administrations, 
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more bipartisanship is seen for supporting impeachment. Looking closer at the 
data, though, we can see that none of House Judiciary Republicans supported 
impeachment of G. W. Bush during the 2008 committee hearing in which Den-
nis Kucinich (D-OH) presented his case for impeachment. Instead, it is those 
few Republicans, such as Robert McClory (R-IL) and William S. Cohen (R-ME) 
who broke rank in 1974 and expressed their support in impeaching Nixon in at 
least one of the articles against him.
Table 3.3 further delves into the reasoning for MCs to support or oppose im-
peaching the president during House Judiciary Committee hearings. Overall, 
strict interpretations are seen at nearly the same rate as non-strict arguments. 
Specifically, we score 237 combined strict arguments for impeachment while 
232 non-strict arguments occur. The most commonly used strict argument is 
that the president broke the law (221 mentions). The most common non-strict 
argument is the generic line that the president abused his constitutional au-
thority (93 mentions.) A close second in the non-strict category is deceiving 
the public and Congress (79 mentions), which matches Hamilton’s points seen 
in Federalist No. 65.
TABLE 3.2 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Impeachment by Party Affiliation
Party of MC supporting impeachment of Republican presidents (Nixon and G. W. Bush)
Democrat (%) Republican (%) Total (%)
Support 89.2 (91) 30.96 (26) 60.31 (117)
Support with reservations 7.85 (8) 5.96 (5) 6.71 (13)
Oppose 2.95 (3) 63.1 (53) 28.87 (56)
Total 100 (102) 100 (84) 100 (186)
Chi2 = 80.45 (p < 0.01)
Party of MC supporting impeachment of Democratic presidents (Clinton and Obama)
Democrat (%) Republican (%) Total (%)
Support 0 (0) 82.5 (132) 45.84 (132)
Support with reservations 3.13 (4) 16.88 (27) 24.8 (31)
Oppose 96.88 (124) 0.63 (1) 43.41 (125)
Total 100 (128) 100 (160) 100 (288)
Chi2 = 269.87 (p < 0.01)
Note: MC = member of Congress. Unit of analysis is member of the House Judiciary 
Committee statement per day it publicly met to discuss impeachment.
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Earlier we outlined the possibility that Democrats and Republicans could use 
different philosophies when seeking to impeach the president. If this were ac-
curate, one should expect the party members with strict interpretations of the 
Constitution (most commonly seen in conservatives) to use strict arguments at 
a greater rate than non-strict arguments. On the other hand, the party members 
with non-strict interpretations of the Constitution (most commonly seen in lib-
erals) should be using non-strict arguments for impeachment (as well as strict ar-
guments). We create two variables (ratio) to capture the priorities of MCs in their 
impeachment arguments. Ratio is calculated as the number of strict arguments 
divided by the total number of arguments made by the MC on a given day. This 
calculation is done for MCs who (1) support impeachment, and again for those 
who (2) oppose impeachment. We graphically present the distribution of the 
two ratio variables by party affiliation in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. We also calculated 
TABLE 3.3 Rationale for Supporting or Opposing Impeachment
MCs supporting impeachment Number of mentionsa
Strict
Breaking the law 221
Partaking in corrupting actions (including bribery) 16
Committing treason 0
Non-strict
Deceiving Congress and/or the public 79
Losing the public’s confidence in their ability to lead 8
Abusing constitutional powers 93
Neglected duties of the office 12
Violated oath of office 40
MCs opposing impeachment Number of mentionsa
Strict
Innocent of wrongdoing 65
President acting as intended by the Constitution 101
Non-strict
Only partisan motivations (witch hunt) 57
Note: MC = member of Congress.
aNumber of mentions is if a House Judiciary Committee member stated the position at least once 
per day. Each position allows for a maximize of one mention per MC, per day.
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coefficients for the bivariate relationship between ratio and party identification 
(see notes to Figures 3.1 and 3.2). The differences between the two parties are 
non-distinguishable, and statistically insignificant in Figure 3.1.
If party members collectively were reliant on strict interpretations of the 
Constitution to impeach a president, then the right side of the figure should be 
disproportionately weighted for Republicans. Instead, it is both parties using 
about the same rate of strict and non-strict arguments to support a president’s 
impeachment. As for those who oppose impeachments (Figure 3.2), strict ar-
guments seem to be slightly preferred by Republicans. Democrats have a rela-
tively high number of strict arguments as well, but the biggest difference between 
the two parties is that Democrats use non-strict arguments at a 32% rate while 
Republicans use them at a 9% rate. Predicated probabilities can further illumi-
nate the difference between parties here as the OLS (ordinary least squares) coef-
ficient suggests a relationship, albeit with a modest level of statistical significance. 
FIGURE 3.1 Ratio of strict interpretation of the Constitution in reasoning to support a president’s impeachment. Note: 
Figure includes only those MCs who support impeachment (N = 222). A bivariate OLS regression model produces: β = 
0.006 (0.04); (p = 0.86). A strict interpretation of the Constitution to oppose impeachment is that the president is (1) 
innocent of wrongdoing and/or (2) acting as intended by the Constitution. A non-strict interpretation of the Constitution 
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The sole non-strict MC argument to oppose a president’s impeachment is par-
tisan motivation points, most frequently that a partisan witch hunt is occur-
ring or electoral considerations are being made by the party not holding the 
White House. Democrats were more likely to make these statements. Specifically 
predicted probability changes show a 12% difference between the two parties, 
with Democrats making more non-strict arguments compared to Republicans. 
However, the 95% confidence intervals overlap in these effects, eliminating as-
surance in these results.
NOTES ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF DONALD J. TRUMP
On September 14, 2019, Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi 
(D-CA) ordered the commencement of an official impeachment inquiry 
into the behavior of President Trump. A partisan House vote was taken on 
FIGURE 3.2 Ratio of strict interpretation of the Constitution in reasoning to oppose a president’s impeachment. Note: 
Figure includes only those MCs who oppose impeachment (N = 161). A bivariate OLS regression model produces: β = 
0.12 (0.07); (p = 0.08). A strict interpretation of the Constitution to oppose impeachment is that the president is (1) 
innocent of wrongdoing and/or (2) acting as intended by the Constitution. A non-strict interpretation of the Constitution 
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October 31, 2019, to make the inquiry officially endorsed by the chamber. Al-
though at least six House standing committees (Judiciary, Intelligence, For-
eign Affairs, Ways and Means, Financial Services, and Oversight and Reform) 
were engaged in investigations, hearings, and litigation over a wide range of 
Trump’s activities, Pelosi “funneled” their work into the Intelligence Commit-
tee. Only after their investigations did the House Judiciary Committee enter-
tain and approve two articles of impeachment over three separate days of public 
hearings. The allegations against Trump have been described by Pelosi as in-
volving his betrayal of U.S. foreign policy, his undermining the integrity of the 
American electoral system, and his use of the federal government for his own 
political and financial gain.
The charges revolved primarily around Trump’s apparent pressuring of 
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to open investigations into Trump’s 
domestic U.S. political adversaries, while withholding American military aid 
as a precondition for such cooperation. House Intelligence Committee chair-
man Adam Schiff (D-CA) and others argued that such behavior violates both 
federal statutory law (strict), including campaign finance rules, and the presi-
dent’s oath of office (non-strict). Trump did not deny asking the Ukrainians to 
investigate Joe Biden (Trump’s potential 2020 election opponent) and Biden’s 
son Hunter, and he also openly called for the Chinese government to investigate 
alleged improprieties on the part of Hunter Biden in that country. To date, there 
has been no clear evidence that Joe Biden or his son committed any crimes in 
either country. The Trump administration informed the various House com-
mittees that it would not cooperate with the impeachment inquiry, would re-
fuse to provide much of the requested documentary evidence, and would forbid 
administration officials to give requested depositions. Pelosi and Schiff coun-
tered that such resistance led to the second impeachment article involving ob-
struction of Congress.14
Given that the data highlight the frequency of strict arguments in favor of 
impeachment, our assessment of the 2020 impeachment is that Democrats 
needed to clearly show that Trump broke a law or was acting beyond what 
is intended by the law. Our examination of the recent preceding presidents 
demonstrates a bipartisan emphasis on these actions being impeachable of-
fenses. And, it appears that a strong congressional argument in late 2019 and 
early 2020 on Trump’s impeachment did not materialize. Republicans in both 
the House and Senate were nearly unanimously unconvinced that a criminal 
action took place.
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CONCLUSION
Our analysis demonstrates that when the House Judiciary Committee debates 
specific charges against a president and whether to impeach the president, mem-
bers also present a debate on the very power of impeachment. As such, these 
hearings give us a glimpse into the lack of MCs’ constitutional philosophies in 
the face of a rare and highly publicized political process. To the out-party, a po-
litical opportunity to discredit the sitting president is apparent. Our investiga-
tion seeks to better understand the balance between partisan considerations and 
constitutional principles. We find little to no evidence of a party difference be-
tween constitutional interpretations of the impeachment power. While the com-
mittee votes on impeachment are expected to heavily split down partisan lines, 
MCs are free to withhold the motivations behind their vote. This largely does 
not occur. Instead, MCs on the House Judiciary Committee consistently find 
constitutional principles to back up their vote. And, these principles are incon-
sistently presented across party identifications and presidents.
The legislative accomplishments of Lyndon Johnson and the unilateral mili-
tary policies against Vietnam during both the Johnson and Nixon periods lend 
themselves to the idea of the imperial presidency, at the expense of a weak 
Congress (Schlesinger, 2004). With the War Powers Act, Watergate investiga-
tions, and impeachment proceedings against Nixon, Congress successfully re-
asserted its power in the mid-1970s. Similar acts of legislative authority can be 
seen in subsequent administrations, with impeachment threats being one of the 
strongest messages of power a Congress can send to the president. However, with 
some unchecked authority given to the G. W. Bush administration in the wake 
of terrorist threats, a new era of the imperial presidency threatened Congress’s 
ability to be a worthy check on the executive (Rudalevige, 2006). Furthermore, 
illegitimate impeachment threats and poor congressional investigations into the 
president’s actions (Teter, 2013, p. 1134) compromise one of the most powerful 
tools the legislative branch has in providing a check on the executive.
It is clear that the impeachment process has become a more popular mecha-
nism for investigating and condemning a president. Prior to Nixon, only Andrew 
Johnson’s presidency was threatened with impeachment. Most recently, every 
president since Clinton has experienced some type of impeachment threat from 
the House Judiciary Committee. This phenomenon speaks to the current state 
of polarized American politics. Combine this with the unprincipled nature of 
the constitutional arguments seen by MCs in this chapter and it appears that 
party identification will continue to be the causal explanation in understanding 
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congressional behavior to support or oppose impeachment articles against a pres-
ident. This creates a normative concern about America’s practicing democracy. 
If impeachment has evolved to only be a tool to gain political points, then the 
American Congress’s and public’s perception of presidential wrongdoing and in-
vestigations become perceived solely as biased. The inconsistent interpretations 
of impeachment offenses from elected leaders also negatively affect the consti-
tutional literacy of the nation. Given the latest round of debates over Trump’s 
impeachment, it remains unclear what society should consider as impeachable 
offenses given the rhetoric from MCs in 2019. Rather, legitimate concerns about 
abuses of presidential power and behavior by Congress become diluted by no-
tions of partisan wins and losses.
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NOTES
 1. Resolutions to impeach the president have been drafted for Donald Trump, 
George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan. On the 
other hand, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Barack Obama were not charged 
with impeachment by a congressional resolution during their tenures in of-
fice. Legislative floor speeches, and subsequently C-SPAN videos, with specific 
mentions of impeachment on the House floor are extremely limited for most 
of these presidents. Thus, our study concentrated on legislators’ content from 
the House Judicial Committee hearings considering impeachment charges for 
Nixon, Clinton, G. W. Bush, and Obama (addressed in more detail in the para-
graphs that follow).
 2. As one comparison, support for removing Trump from office was consistently 
45%–49% between October 2019 and February 2020 (Bycoffe et al., 2020).
 3. In the contemporary era, whether such meanings can or should be inferred 
from “texts” such as the Congressional Record, media interviews with elected of-
ficials, or the president’s Twitter posts is an interesting and important question.
 4. Hyde quoted this line in an opening statement during a 1998 Clinton impeach-
ment inquiry authorization committee hearing (C-SPAN, 1998a). This 1974 
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report was further quoted by ranking member John Conyers (D-MI) during 
this same committee hearing.
 5. MCs can also greater shape how the public interprets constitutional provisions 
given MCs’ consistent presence in the media and constant interactions with 
constituencies compared to judges.
 6. The living Constitution approach for interpreting impeachment power could 
be supporting impeachment for a president who artfully eschewed the facts of 
a sexual relationship with an intern during a Grand Jury testimony.
 7. Another example is the Senate’s advice and consent role for judicial and cabi-
net appointments. As early as Marbury v. Madison (1803), Chief Justice John 
Marshall expressed a belief that this advice and consent power was unreview-
able by the federal courts.
 8. It would be difficult to conjure up a scenario in which the Court’s interpretation 
of a constitutional clause would not exist because it would be improper for the 
Court to do so. The impeachment process is one of those rare instances. MCs are 
free to use their own criteria of what an impeachable act entails for a president 
or any civil officer without the guidance of judicial constitutional interpretations. 
This was directed by the Supreme Court in the 1993 case Walter Nixon v. U.S.
Predating this 1993 case, Representative George Danielson (D-CA) argued 
during the Nixon impeachment committee hearings while they reacted to the 
Supreme Court’s decision to have the White House turn over its tape record-
ings to the Congress, “The Supreme Court ruling very properly did not make 
any reference to these impeachment proceedings as it should not have, since it 
is apparent on the face of our Constitution that the Supreme Court has no juris-
diction whatever to inject itself into these proceedings” (American Archive of 
Public Broadcasting, 2019).
 9. Some of the more famous committee hearings involving testimonies from 
John Dean and Alexander Butterfield were not before the House Judiciary 
Committee.
 10. These video recordings are available from the American Archive of Public 
Broadcasting (2019).
 11. These presidencies nonetheless had their fair share of investigations and scan-
dals. Ford testified before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice about 
any promises of a pardon he may have offered to Nixon before his resignation. 
The Iran-Contra Affair during the Reagan administration involved investiga-
tions by the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions 
with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
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and the Nicaraguan Opposition. An independent counsel was also appointed by 
the Department of Justice to investigate. Representative H. B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
composed an article of impeachment resolution against Reagan, but no hear-
ings on the resolution were held. As previously stated, Gonzalez also pursued 
impeachment articles against G. H. W. Bush but no committee hearings were 
held on this charge as well.
 12. Articles of impeachment, specified in a House resolution, were composed 
against G. W. Bush (H.R. 1258, 110th Congress), but not Obama. On December 
3, 2013, the House Judiciary Committee held a meeting on “Presidential Powers 
and the Constitution.” The committee invited a panel of constitutional law ex-
perts to testify about the abuses of authority committed by the Obama ad-
ministration. The Republican majority intentionally did not use the word 
“impeachment” in their prepared statements. Instead, they wanted the pan-
elists to propose impeachment as an appropriate means to curb presidential 
abuses of power. And, the panelists did just that.
 13. C-SPAN started in 1979, and thus the House Judiciary Committee debate on 
Nixon’s 1974 impeachment resolutions are not archived by C-SPAN (although 
parts of the hearings have aired on the network on a few occasions). Transcripts 
from this committee’s hearings and video from the American Archive of Public 
Broadcasting (2019) are used for these data.
 14. The House approved two articles of impeachment that were sent to the Senate 
after a delay. After nearly 3 weeks of a Senate trial in which there were no addi-
tional witnesses, Trump was acquitted on Article I (Abuse of Power) by a vote 
of 48 guilty, 52 not guilty and acquitted on Article II (Obstruction of Congress) 
by a vote of 47 guilty, 52 not guilty.
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Position on impeaching the president
1. Support
2. Support with reservations
3. Oppose
86.4 41.7 0.76 0.04
Reason representative supports impeachment
President broke the law/president not 
above the law
60.0 50.6 0.35 0.04
President deceived/mislead/lied to the 
country and/or Congress
79.9 71.9 0.25 0.05
President has lost the ability to lead 88.7 78.9 0.46 0.10
President is corruption/did a corrupt act 97.2 97.2 -0.01 0.05
President abused power/went beyond the 
office’s constitutional authority
96.5 95.9 0.12 0.03
President neglected the duties of 
the office
83.3 74.1 0.35 0.04
President violated the oath of office 96.9 96.9  —  —
Reason representative opposes Impeachment
Innocent of wrongdoing/did 
not break law
85.5 81.4 0.22 0.05
Only partisan motivations (e.g., witch 
hunt or winning elections)
86.3 83.9 0.14 0.04
President is acting as intended by the 
Constitution
87.3 87.7 0.02 0.03
aExpected agreement should be interpreted as the by chance agreement level between coders. 
Cohen’s kappa should be interpreted as follows: <0 = poor agreement; 0.01–0.2 = slight agreement; 
0.21–0.4 = fair agreement; 0.41–0.6 = moderate agreement; 0.61–0.8 = substantial agreement; 
0.81–0.99 = almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).
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PART 2




s the three chapters in Part 2 of this volume demonstrate, the C-SPAN 
Video Library is a critical tool for examining rhetoric and discourse across 
the political process. From understanding perceptions of press secretar-
ies to considering the multifaceted nature of presidential campaign rhetoric, 
the C-SPAN Video Library enables researchers to consider the diverse nature 
of discourse across contexts and over time. These three studies are very di-
verse — spanning disciplines and employing diverse methods — yet they are 
united in their arguments for the importance of deeply studying the nuances of 
communication, particularly the role of narratives and rhetoric, in shaping our 
policy and political spheres.
In Chapter 4, “Careless or Criminal? The Social Construction of Wall Street in 
the Aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis,” Justin Rex examines a critical policy 
moment following the 2008 financial crisis and the political discourse around 
the Dodd-Frank Act. Rex seeks to understand the role of elite framing in shap-
ing the government’s response following this crisis. He argues that elite rhetoric 
around white-collar crime has shifted to focus on narratives around risk-taking 
and unleashing the market and that this, combined with substantial deregula-
tion, explains the lack of action taken against Wall Street executives following 
the crisis. Rex uses the search capabilities of the C-SPAN Video Library in com-
bination with the legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Financial Protection Act to identify and examine speeches and de-
bates related to Dodd-Frank and categorize the different narratives used during 
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the crisis. Ultimately, he argues that narratives focusing on poorly designed and 
lax regulation, instead of framing the actions leading to the financial crisis as 
“white-collar crime,” limited the perceived scope of the conflict and shaped pol-
icy responses.
Chapter 5, “Schrödinger’s Podium: The Rhetoric of Presidential Campaign 
Announcements” by Stephen M. Llano and Alexander J. Carver, considers the 
unique nature of presidential campaign announcements. The authors argue that 
these announcements sit at the intersection between campaign rhetoric and pres-
idential rhetoric as they act as both a campaign speech and the speech of a fu-
ture president. From this assessment, Llano and Carver consider how this dual 
role influences both public evaluation of presidential campaign rhetoric and the 
construction of these speeches to portray the candidate as both an everyman 
and better than the everyman. The use of the C-SPAN Video Library is vital to 
this study, as the authors examine both the content of presidential campaign an-
nouncements over time and the chosen setting around the speeches. They argue 
that both of these (content and setting) are carefully chosen to weave a narra-
tive of everyday exceptionalism that satisfies the dual role of this type of address.
The final chapter in Part 3, “He Said, She Said: How Gender Affects the Tone 
and Substance of White House Press Briefings” by Newly Paul, looks at how the 
gender of both journalists and press secretaries affects the substance and tone of 
White House press conferences. This chapter looks specifically at two of President 
Trump’s press secretaries: Sean Spicer and Sarah Huckabee Sanders. Drawing 
from work examining the role of gender in the newsroom, Paul presents con-
flicting expectations that either female actors would perform in stereotypical 
feminine ways or that their awareness of gender norms would encourage them 
to act in ways that counter those broad stereotypes. Once again, the nature of 
the C-SPAN Video Library was critical to this study, as the author assessed not 
only the content of journalist questions and press secretary responses but also 
the tone, which would be impossible using only written transcripts.
These three chapters are linked as they each examine one portrait of what dis-
course can look like, whether that is a particular type of rhetoric or a specific pol-
icy moment. Additionally, they all consider the implications of both the nature 
of each context and the rhetoric used by various actors on policy and political 
outcomes. From this, these three chapters collectively demonstrate the breadth 
of communication recorded by the C-SPAN Video Library. This range of politi-
cal discourse spans from campaigns to press conferences and provides exciting 
opportunities for scholars of rhetoric and discourse as they can leverage these 
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tools to examine different parts of the political and policy process. Additionally, 
the nature of the C-SPAN Archives as a video library enables scholars to more 
seriously consider the different facets of political communication, from the set-
ting of the address to the tone of the speaker, in ways that would prove impos-
sible with only transcripts of events. The C-SPAN Video Library contains over 
260,000 hours of content that offers unparalleled insight into both particular pol-




The Social Construction of Wall Street in the 
Aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis
Justin Rex
INTRODUCTION
Academics (Haugh, 2014), judges (Rakoff, 2014), politicians (Henning, 2019), 
journalists (Frontline, 2013), and the public (Erman, 2013) alike have all lamented 
the fact that no executives from major Wall Street banks went to jail for actions 
related to the 2008 financial crisis, despite ample evidence of criminality (Ramirez 
& Ramirez, 2017). This inaction stands in stark contrast to the approximately 
1,000 executives jailed after the 1989 Savings and Loan Crisis, despite the S&L 
crisis being of much smaller magnitude (Black, 2012). Why did so few execu-
tives go to jail after 2008 and what accounts for the change in policy response 
from the previous crisis? Scholars have offered a variety of legal (e.g., the statute 
of limitations is too short), bureaucratic (e.g., limited agency resources), politi-
cal (e.g., banks captured politicians via lobbying) and economic (e.g., criminal 
prosecutions risked economic stability) answers (Rex, 2019a).
Despite a robust debate, there is been less focus on how politicians framed 
elite behavior in the aftermath of the crisis and how these frames shaped their 
policy response. Over the past several decades, the public narratives framing 
elite and street crime have shifted: as politicians used increasingly fearful rhet-
oric to justify a draconian crackdown on low-level blue-collar street crimi-
nals, they also shifted their rhetoric about white-collar crime toward a focus 
on risk-taking and unleashing the power of the market, coupled with dereg-
ulation of the financial industry (Hagan, 2012). How did this broad narrative 
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architecture influence how elite behavior related to the 2008 financial crisis was 
framed? On one end of the spectrum, controversial industry actors framed their 
behavior as socially beneficial. For example, during an interview, Goldman Sachs 
CEO Lloyd Blankfein said banks do “God’s work” (Bryan, 2009). Less positively, 
President Obama said, “On the issue of prosecutions on Wall Street, one of the 
biggest problems . . . is that a lot of that stuff wasn’t necessarily illegal, it was just 
immoral or inappropriate or reckless . . . a lot of practices that should not have 
been allowed weren’t necessarily against the law” (Marlowe, 2011). Others em-
phasized criminality. During congressional hearings about the Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ’s) lack of prosecutions, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) said, 
“If you’re caught with an ounce of cocaine, the chances are good you’re going to 
jail. If it happens repeatedly, you may go to jail for the rest of your life. But evi-
dently, if you launder nearly a billion dollars for drug cartels and violate our in-
ternational sanctions, your company pays a fine and you go home and sleep in 
your own bed at night — every single individual associated with this — and I just 
think that’s fundamentally wrong” (Good, 2013). These quotes illustrate the le-
gally ambiguous space white-collar actors operate within, in which it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between legitimate business activity and criminal behavior 
(Van Slyke et al., 2016), making this ripe territory for examining the relation-
ship between framing and policy response.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss previous literature on how 
public narratives about Wall Street and white-collar crime shifted in the de-
cades before the crisis and literature on the difficulty of creating moral panics 
around white-collar crime, which informs the research questions and expecta-
tions. Second, I outline the methods and data used for study as well as the cri-
sis narratives used to code the Senate speeches under study. Third, I present the 
results. Lastly, I end with a discussion of the results and implications.
THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Framing the Financial Industry and Financial White-Collar Crime
How has Wall Street, and the financial industry behavior more broadly, been 
framed in public narrative during the decades that preceded the 2008 finan-
cial crisis? Hagan (2012) describes two historical eras of how attitudes toward 
regulating blue-collar crime on the streets and white-collar crime in the suites 
have dominated how behavior of street criminals and elite white-collar actors 
is framed, and how the framing of each worked in concert to support the other. 
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In the age of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, blue-collar street crime was placed 
in a social context in which criminals responded to social constraints that left 
them constrained to reach goals of material success through legitimate means 
(Hagan, 2012). With the right social setting and the right training, criminals 
can be rehabilitated to become typical law-abiding members of society. Pol-
icies focused on rehabilitation and reintegration. At the same time, study of 
white-collar crime was growing and arguing that suite criminals should be 
treated as a legitimate area of concern for social scientists and law enforcement 
(Hagan, 2012). Policies to tightly regulate business and prevent the excesses 
that led to the Great Depression were instituted. The age of Reagan flipped 
these framings, arguing that the public should fear street crime and that the 
proper way to treat criminals was through incapacitation and incarceration 
(Hagan, 2012). At the same time it was ratcheting up fear of street crime, the 
Reagan era was downplaying fears of crime in the suites. White-collar crime 
was seen more as a product of risk-taking, failure, and unforeseeable accidents 
rather than intentional deviancy. Corresponding policy shifts followed with 
the DOJ reallocating prosecutorial emphasis toward street crime and away 
from white-collar crime as well as an emphasis on industry deregulation, par-
ticularly in the financial industry (Hagan, 2012). This framing of elite finan-
cial industry behavior persisted until the crisis and still found support in the 
policy debates after the crisis.
This shift in framing took place against the backdrop of an increasingly 
finance-driven economy and culture. Johnson and Kwak (2010) chart the shift 
from the decades of boring banking in the middle of the 20th century in which 
banking was a respectable but low-risk profession, to one in which risk-taking 
and outsized financial rewards dominated in the three decades before the 2008 
crisis. After the Great Depression, corporate profits in the financial sector were 
roughly the same as those of nonfinancial corporations (Johnson & Kwak, 2010). 
Executive pay displayed parity as well. The number of bank failures was small. 
Securities firms tended to focus on tasks like underwriting stocks and bonds, ad-
vising companies on acquisitions and mergers, and acting as brokers for clients 
(Johnson & Kwak, 2010). Many banks were structured as partnerships, where 
executives were much more risk-averse because their own money was on the 
line (Johnson & Kwak, 2010).
In the 1980s, these trends reversed. Profits in the financial sector began to 
outpace those of the nonfinancial sector, as did banker pay (Johnson & Kwak, 
2010). The partnership model fell by the wayside as many banks went pub-
lic and began working with other people’s money (Johnson & Kwak, 2010). 
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Banks also began getting into riskier trading activities and using risky deriva-
tives. Mortgage-backed securities were originally created by the federal gov-
ernment in the 1960s, but 1990s saw the growth in the size and complexity 
of mortgage-related derivatives, in addition to federal legislation deregulating 
the market, allowing the speculative trading that contributed to the 2008 crisis 
(Headworth & Hagan 2016). The financial industry took up an increasingly larger 
share of the GDP, and Wall Street banks grew ever larger (Johnson & Kwak, 2010). 
The ethos began to change as well. Karen Ho (2009) describes the new culture 
on Wall Street as one with a “volatile combination of unplanned risk-taking with 
the search for record profits, constant identification with the financial markets 
and short-term stock prices and continual corporate downsizing.”
Wall Street was also able to export its ideology of unrestrained finance to the 
larger corporate world in the U.S. in which corporations increasingly followed 
its logic (Ho, 2009). Wall Street investment banking culture infused U.S. corpo-
rations, who placed increasing importance on shareholder value and corporate 
restructuring to maximize it, leading to a “finance capital-led version of capital-
ism” (Ho, 2009 p. 35). Further, deregulation of Wall Street became a dominant 
platform across both major political parties and the industry was lavished with 
deregulation through multiple decades, despite crises (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). 
In fact, on the eve of the crisis, the financial industry saw its highest level of de-
regulation in the previous century (Philippon & Reshef, 2012).
At the same time, financial industry values were increasingly situating them-
selves in the broader culture, with the growth of credit cards and debt, the cen-
trality of homeownership, investing in the stock market, and finance being a 
prime destination for graduates of elite universities as Wall Street amped up its 
recruitment of the best and brightest (Johnson & Kwak, 2010). Together these 
reinforced the positive cultural framings of the financial industry Hagan (2013) 
describes and the “quiet coup” finance made over American society and politics 
(Johnson, 2009). Though this positive image was challenged with events like the 
savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, the failures of hedge funds like Long Term 
Capital Management in the 1990s, the corporate scandals in the early 2000s, 
and movies like Wall Street and its antagonist’s “greed is good” ethos, the dam-
age kept the finical industry’s image in the realm of legitimacy; though it in-
volved risk-taking, greed, and sometimes spectacular failure, it was certainly 
not one in which crime was rampant, requiring the public fear and crackdown 
that blue-collar street crime and the drug trade required (Hagan, 2012). In short, 
its values influenced both corporate culture and the broader public, and elites 
across the political spectrum were aggressive champions.
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Prosecutions and the Nature of White-Collar Crime
In the context of financial market triumphalism and Wall Street’s, and its val-
ues’, ascendance, the 2008 financial crisis occurred. Though the Wall Street, 
and the financial industry more broadly, received broad backlash for contribut-
ing to the crisis, particularly gaining intense criticism when banks were bailed 
out to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars with the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, why was the industry able to weather this negative framing and avoid 
significant criminal sanctions, despite a popular backlash? In other words, why 
were white-collar financiers able to escape the label of criminal deviant despite 
events that challenged its social legitimacy? As countless news stories, books, 
and articles after the crisis asked, why was public anger not translated into more 
prosecutions for bankers? Why did no high-ranking executives from major fi-
nancial firms go to jail?
Part of the reason may be that no criminal actions occurred, and there was 
thus nothing to prosecute. Despite greedy, reckless behavior, financiers were 
operating in the wild west of deregulated finance but were careful not to step 
over the line into criminality. Obama’s quote earlier in the chapter is illustrative 
of the common argument that these were sins of greed, not criminality. This was 
an opinion shared by DOJ leadership as well. And in fact, as detailed below, this 
line of argument became a dominant narrative to explain the crisis and justify 
new regulations across the financial system.
Yet, the criminal argument cannot be so easily dismissed. Mortgage fraud 
was rampant throughout the system, leading the FBI to declare it an epidemic 
in 2004, years before the crisis hit (Schmitt, 2008). This initial fraud was baked 
into the complex securities Wall Street bundled and frequently misleadingly 
sold to investors, banks, and pension funds throughout the system (Barak, 2012; 
Ferguson, 2012). And after the crisis hit, foreclosure fraud, a straightforward 
crime to prove, was rampant throughout the system, despite a lack of will to 
prosecute it (Mayer et al., 2014). The white-collar crime narrative will be out-
lined in more detail below, but here it is noteworthy that it has substance and 
cannot be so easily dismissed.
Others have pointed to more mundane, but no less important, reasons for the 
lack of prosecutions, though these did not build into larger narratives of the fi-
nancial crisis. For some, the hurdles were bureaucratic, like the DOJ’s decision 
to prioritize firm-level prosecutions instead of individuals (Garrett, 2016), or 
the prioritization of terrorism, at the expense of white-collar crime, after 9/11 
(Rakoff, 2014). Others argued that the political dominance Wall Street built 
102 PART 2 Portraits of Policy Discourse on C-SPAN
pre-crisis did not subside, and it was able to maintain its political influence 
throughout the crisis aftermath and financial reform period (Connaughton, 
2012). Economic reasons also predominated, including the worry that many 
firms were too big to fail without harming the broader financial system (Pontell 
et al., 2014). Lastly, legal arguments included the difficulty of meeting the high 
burden of criminal proof in such complex cases as well as a short statute of lim-
itations (Headworth & Hagan, 2016).
These arguments echo the larger literature on white-collar crime. Why it 
is harder to raise a public moral panic over white-collar crimes than it is for 
street offenses like drug use and property crimes (Levi, 2009)? Levi argues it 
is hard to sustain moral panic about white-collar crime because there are sev-
eral entry barriers to challenging the dominant framing. The first category of 
reasons relates to finance’s, and the private sector’s more broadly, relationship 
to the capitalist structure. Whereas street crime is a direct affront to social or-
der or private property, it is relatively more difficult to negatively label person/
actions that are not seen as acting outside the normal moral functions of cap-
italism (Levi, 2009). As others have noted, there is inherent ambiguity in sep-
arating normal business practices from white-collar crime (Pontell, 2005). As 
discussed above in relation to the recent financial crisis, some are quick to draw 
a distinction between the morally suspect, but legal, risk-taking and greed Wall 
Street engaged in. Further, business occupies a privileged place in market so-
cieties, in which it is handed the responsibility to play a key role in important 
social functions that a more centralized government would otherwise under-
take, like producing certain goods, as well as maintaining high employment and 
economic growth (Lindblom, 1977; Yeagar, 2016). This position gives it a stron-
ger veto than any other interest group against government policies that may af-
fect it, given it can threaten negative social consequences on jobs and economic 
prosperity (Lindblom, 1982). More broadly, government often does not inter-
fere with markets in a capitalist society for fear of negative consequences and vi-
olating the intellectual superstructure of free market orthodoxy that dominates 
current politics (Levi, 2009).
A second body of reasons relates to the nature of the offense. White-collar 
crime happens abstractly, typically involving paperwork and money shifting, 
whereas street crime has a more concrete reality; street crime occurs directly 
between persons, or in intimate places in the case of property crime, and often 
poses a direct threat to a victim’s physical well-being (Levi, 2009). Moreover, 
unlike street criminals, white-collar criminals have legitimate access to their 
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victims (such as their bank account), which lends an offense more legitimacy 
than that of a street criminal, who has to break into someone’s house (Van Slyke 
et al., 2016). White-collar crime is also often harder to detect, and it takes a long 
time to connect the dots and prosecute a case, which makes sustaining moral 
panic about it difficult (Levi, 2009). Suite crimes also happen within a corpo-
ration, which provides a larger degree of diffuse responsibility and anonymity 
than street crimes; this diffusion, along with the ambiguity of what is outside 
normal business practices versus socially beneficial risk-taking and greed, makes 
proving the criminal mens rea of intentional harm more difficult (Levi, 2009). 
Even if crime is detected, and is prosecuted, simplifying what is often complex 
behavior for a jury or the broader public is difficult; assault or robbery is more 
intelligible than securities fraud involving a fraudulent prospectus for a collat-
eralized debt obligation.
Third, the political, economic, and cultural power of elite criminals gives 
them more power than street criminals to shape the dominant social construc-
tion of their behavior. The revolving door (Project On Government Oversight, 
2013) and similar social circles (Kwak, 2014) among key government economic 
advisors, Securities and Exchange Commission personnel, DOJ leadership, and 
Wall Street and its law firms gives the financial industry cultural power to cap-
ture elite institutions to shape their response to the 2008 crisis. There was in-
tense opposition to the regulatory reforms in the wake of the 2008 crisis, and 
reform passed by a thin partisan majority. An attempt to criminally prosecute 
large financial institutions and executives likely would have received even more 
opposition. Given the above-mentioned features, Levi (2009) argues that most 
attempts to create a moral panic about white-collar crime fail and end with fi-
nancial and regulatory remedies, rather than retributive ones. Fitting this pat-
tern, few individuals in the financial industry and no executives at major banks 
went to jail; instead, banks paid fines to the tune of hundreds of billions of dol-
lars (Haugh, 2014).
Research Questions and Expectations
The forgoing suggests important questions.
Research Question 1: What are the main narratives politicians used to 
explain Wall Street’s role in the 2008 financial crisis during the years 
following the crisis?
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Research Question 2: Did politicians use narratives that described Wall 
Street executives as white-collar criminals feature frequently during 
policy reform debates after the crisis?
As indicated earlier, portrayals of Wall Street range from white-collar criminal 
to greedy capitalist to innocent participant swallowed up by unforeseeable eco-
nomic events. Though elements of each of these stories had their proponents, 
which narrative had the most champions? Given the preexisting power of the 
financial industry and the way it infiltrated the broader corporate and public cul-
ture in the U.S., and given the difficulty of building and sustaining moral panics 
about white-collar crime for the many reasons listed above, I expect criminal 
accounts of the crisis to be infrequent.
DATA
The data gathering process used several sources. First, I used the legislative his-
tory of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection 
Act, which was compiled by the Law Librarians’ Society of Washington, D.C., 
to find all legislative actions related to the Dodd-Frank Act, including hear-
ings, bill introductions, amendments, and floor debate (LLSDC, 2017). Given 
the size and scope of the bill, there were a considerable number of actions be-
fore its eventual passage. To narrow the scope, I focused on legislative actions 
in the Senate, narrowing further to debate on the floor. The Senate is often re-
garded as the slower, more deliberative upper chamber, and the Senate major-
ity leader has relatively less power to control debate, making it a good place for 
studying narratives, given the opportunity for debate. Further, as other schol-
ars have noted, the Congressional Record series is an underutilized but never-
theless important place to study the thinking of legislators, given that elected 
officials prepare and edit speeches, and these are included in the official histor-
ical record (Newton, 2005).
After identifying the dates of relevant Senate legislative actions from the 
Law Librarians’ list, these dates were searched in the C-SPAN Video Library’s 
Congressional Chronicle for the Senate. For each date, the Chronicle lists all 
Senators who spoke on the floor that day and provides full text for each. To 
narrow further, any speeches unrelated to Dodd-Frank were not included in 
the dataset. For example, given that health care reform was being debated at 
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a similar time, many speeches were eliminated as unrelated. Additionally, any 
speeches related to strictly procedural matters were eliminated as well. After 
narrowing, the dataset included 123 speeches by 58 senators across 13 sepa-
rate days of floor debate. Procedurally, debate included the bill’s introduction, 
amendments, and debate on the conference version reconciling differences be-
tween the House and Senate bills. Table 4.1 provides descriptive data about the 
speeches included in the dataset.
METHODS
After compiling the dataset of relevant speeches, I used the social construction of 
target populations theory and the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to analyze 
senators’ discourse. SCTP theory seeks to determine how policy discourse influ-
ences policy outcomes and proposes that “the allocation of benefits and burdens 
to target groups by public policy depends on the extent of their political power as 
well as their positive or negative social construction” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). In 
other words, the social construction and the power of political actors targeted by 
policy act as independent variables that influence the policy benefits or burdens 
actors receive (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). For example, advantaged targets, like 
veterans, have high political power and positive social constrictions and thus re-
ceive ample resources through policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Contenders, 
like big business, have power but are negatively constructed and typically receive 
symbolic policy burdens (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Dependents, like mothers, 
have less power but positive constructions and tend to receive meager resources 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Deviants, like criminals, have low power, are nega-
tively constructed, and receive strong punishment and harsh regulation (Schnei-
der & Ingram, 1993). Table 4.2 summarizes this framework. SCTP theory has been 
widely used and substantiated in the public policy literature to study social con-
structions and policy outcomes for actors in all four categories (Pierce et al., 2014).
Given its extensive political power, Wall Street would fall into either the 
advantaged or the contender category according to SCTP theory. Yet, social 
TABLE 4.1 Descriptive Data, Dodd-Frank Senate Floor Debate Dataset
Total speeches Senators speaking Republican senators Democratic senators Days of debate
123 58 25 33 13
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constructions are not static and shift over time (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). 
Though Wall Street was arguably in the advantaged category before the crisis, in 
the aftermath, competing narratives constructing Wall Street as a contender or 
deviant gained traction as well. To determine which categorization was used in 
a Senate speech, I used the NPF to analyze precisely how the target population 
is constructed, either negatively or positively. The NPF argues that the elements 
of story underpin the policy narratives political actors use to justify policy, in-
cluding a setting, characters, plot, and a moral (Jones et al., 2014). Narratives 
gain traction to the extent that they appropriately tap into public perceptions 
about who is deserving of government resources and which groups are deserv-
ing of punishment (Schneider & Ingram, 2005). For example, the basic narra-
tive embedded in the earlier quote from Obama indicates that the setting for 
the story of the financial crisis is Wall Street and the financial industry. The key 
characters are major Wall Street banks and the plot is one of greed gone awry 
(rather than more insidious criminal motives) and the moral is that this greed, 
and the risk-taking it fostered, need to be better regulated rather than crimi-
nally punished.
I conducted content analysis (Singleton & Straits, 2005) of each Senate floor 
speech and coded the speech into predefined categories of narratives based on 
the most prominent explanations of the financial crisis that emerged during its 
aftermath (Levitin, 2008). To make sure categories are clearly defined, exhaus-
tive, and mutually exclusive, I created a codebook of eight different narratives 
for the crisis, identifying the setting, characters, plot, and moral for each. These 
categories are described in more depth in the next section.




(high benefits, low burdens)
Veterans
Contender
(symbolic burdens, hidden benefits)
Big business
Weak Dependent
(low benefits, high burdens)
Mothers
Deviant
(high burdens, low benefits)
Criminals
aModified from Schneider and Ingram (1993).
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CRISIS NARRATIVES
What are the dominant narratives used to explain the financial crisis and Wall 
Street’s role in the crisis? And do these narratives portray Wall Street positively 
or negatively and as powerful or weak, according to categories of SCTP theory? 
According to the NPF, the first ingredient in a narrative is the setting for the 
story. The broad setting for the narratives has been described previously. Over 
the decades preceding the crisis, there were key cultural, political, and economic 
changes that set the stage for the crisis: the financialization of economy, increas-
ing risk-taking in the financial sector, decades of financial deregulation, an ide-
ology of self-regulating markets, both major political parties moving toward a 
neoliberal view of finance and markets, a growth in both inequality and con-
sumer debt, and the rise of the homeownership society that promoted expand-
ing homeownership.
Several broad, distinct, and sometimes overlapping narrative threads emerged 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which are described below and sum-
marized in Table 4.3 (later in this section). These range from more structural ac-
counts, which place less blame on individual actors, to more agentic accounts, 
which place blame squarely on the shoulders of particular actors (Headworth 
& Hagan, 2016). On the furthest end of this spectrum, one structural narrative 
is that of the 100-year flood. Former Treasury secretary Hank Paulson likened 
the crisis to a 100-year flood, an unlikely outcome from a highly complex con-
fluence of events that few if any could have predicted (Belvedere, 2013). Though 
housing bubbles had burst for particular geographic areas in the past, few ex-
pected that the housing market as a whole could experience such substantial 
declines. Further, dominant theories about the efficiency of financial markets 
further precluded worries about a recession. Summing up this view after reflect-
ing on narratives that place more blame on individual actors, Levitin (2008) ar-
gues, “None of these characters can carry the drama themselves. For better or 
worse, all of these individuals and institutions were no more than bit players in 
a crisis that is marked by its maddening impersonality” (p. 1008). According to 
this theory, there were no true villains because nobody is to blame for a crisis 
nobody could have seen coming or had the power to prevent if they did. Wall 
Street, along with the broader public, is a victim of historical events.
Similarly, Posner (2009) identifies a series of interrelated incentives in the 
financial system that encouraged individually rational behavior that led to 
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collectively irrational outcomes for the financial system. A case in point is the 
proliferation of low-quality mortgages. The original lenders had little incen-
tive to monitor quality as they were securitized quickly, and the risk spread and 
masked into the securitization chain funneled through Wall Street banks and the 
government-sponsored entities. The key actors supposedly monitoring the qual-
ities of the complex securities in which risky loans were bundled were the credit 
ratings agencies. They had an incentive to rate the securities as low risk because 
they would lose business when banks would take securities to another ratings 
agency to shop for the stamp of approval. Like originating bad mortgages with 
the intent to sell them to others, shopping for ratings was individually ratio-
nal for the parties involved but collectively irrational for the broader economy 
(Posner, 2009). Summing up this view, Citigroup’s CEO Chuck Prince infamously 
said, in response to why he kept investing in what would soon be toxic assets, 
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But 
as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still danc-
ing.” Here again, there are no real villains, just individuals and firms acting in 
their own self-interest, but acting within broader historical and economic sys-
tems that they did not shape.
Despite the complexity of the crisis, others have been more willing to point the 
finger at particular actors. One such view is the easy money narrative (Levitin, 
2008). According to this story, the Federal Reserve set interest rates low in an era 
with a surplus of global money looking for investment. Doing so lured investors 
looking for higher returns into riskier and riskier investments. Eventually this 
search led to the toxic mortgage-based investments and derivatives that blew 
up the financial system. Unlike previous narratives, this one has a clearer villain 
in the form of centralized banks, though like previous narratives, Wall Street is 
implicitly relatively positively portrayed and skirts any blame.
According to the poorly designed regulation narrative, a variety of govern-
ment policies and bureaucracies are to blame for the crisis, not just the Fed. The 
conservative version of the regulatory narrative focuses on government incen-
tives run amok, with particular attention on the government-sponsored entities 
(GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, as well as legislation like the Community 
Reinvestment Act, which encouraged lending to traditionally underserved pop-
ulations, leading to banks to lend to people who should not be getting loans 
and creating too much risk. These government intrusions created problems in 
an otherwise well-functioning market. The lending mandates pushed banks to 
lend to people who would otherwise never be able to quality for a mortgage, 
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leading to imprudent lending. The GSEs were able to build up risk by buying 
and securitizing pools of bad loans and had no incentive to be prudent given the 
implicit backing of the federal government, which most anticipated would bail 
them out if needed. These incentives were a moral hazard and created a clear 
case of government failure waiting to happen. In this narrative, the real villains 
are govern ment bureaucrats and legislators, whose attempts at regulating the 
market backfired. Again, Wall Street’s image remains fairly positive according 
to this narrative because blame is placed elsewhere.
The deregulation, lax regulation, and lax enforcement narrative points to de-
cades of deregulatory financial legislation from Reagan to Clinton that set the 
stage for reckless financial speculation. This deregulation was amplified through 
lax enforcement by key financial regulatory agencies, who turned a blind eye and/
or did not properly understand the risk growing in the system. Further, there was 
an unholy alliance between industry and government, in which the financial in-
dustry exercised outsized influence, pushing for deregulation through lobbying 
and campaign donations as well as benefiting from a revolving door between in-
dustry and regulatory agencies (Johnson & Kwak, 2010). Together, these actions 
created a financial system with nobody supervising and greedy, reckless finan-
ciers who destroyed the economy. Like the more conservative-friendly, poorly 
designed regulation narrative discussed above, this narrative places some blame 
at the foot of legislators and bureaucrats, though it takes a much different an-
gle; government policy can work, but it was corrupted and coopted by legisla-
tors and bureaucrats who too closely favored the industry at the expense of the 
broader public. Unlike the previous narratives, Wall Street is portrayed more 
negatively; rather than being a passive bystander, it actively pushed for dereg-
ulation and reduced oversight of its activities and engaged in lucrative but so-
cially destructive risk-taking. Wall Street then is a clear villain and a key driver 
of the crisis; the moral is that it needs reining in with more stringent regulations.
Similarly, the Frankenstein innovation narrative portrays Wall Street more 
negatively (Levitin, 2008). Legislators enabled deregulation of the derivatives 
market. Doing so allowed Wall Street to create complex mortgage-based deriv-
atives that few within government or the private sector properly understood, 
leading to huge amounts of unknown risk. Instead, the government and indus-
try primarily relied on the major credit ratings agencies to assess the risk in these 
complex products. A fee-for-rating model allowed investment banks to shop for 
the rating they wanted and incentivized ratings agencies to give high ratings to 
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systemic risk posed by the way these investments tied large institutions together 
financially, creating the potential for the failure of one bank to ripple across the 
financial system. Here Wall Street is painted again as a central driver of the cri-
sis because its allegedly risk-reducing innovations were actually much more 
risky than anyone thought, and they actively pushed against attempts to bring 
more transparency to the market, particularly with the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 1999. The moral is that these instruments are in need of 
more transparency and/or regulation.
The greed narrative offers a more generalized narrative for the crisis, and one 
that intersects with other narratives by providing a less structural and more per-
sonal motive for behavior that drove the crisis (Levitin, 2008). Homeowners, 
driven by greed for bigger and bigger houses, pushed themselves beyond their 
means with mortgages they would never be able to pay back. This greed inter-
sected with the greed of mortgage brokers, real estate owners and investors, and 
banks all looking for bigger returns on their investment. All were looking to make 
a profit, and the securitization machine allowed everyone to make a buck while 
seemingly diversifying risk enough to prevent a market collapse. The right tends 
to focus its ire most on the greed of homeowners who should have known bet-
ter. The left has focused its ire on the greed of Wall Street executives who knew 
they were building risk into the system but tried to make money as long as they 
could, then offloaded toxic assets onto unsuspecting investors when it was clear 
a crisis was on the horizon. Though a variety of politicians criticized Wall Street’s 
greed, they described it as within the legal boundaries of a capitalist system that 
needed more regulation, not criminal punishment for fraud. Though banks and 
their executives were reckless, they were innocent of graver moral sin worthy of 
criminal punishment. With a variety of villains, the moral of this story for the 
right was to let homeowners and banks get what was coming to them — the loss 
of their home or the failure of their bank. The government should not enable the 
behavior with support for struggling homeowners or bailouts to reckless banks. 
The moral from the left is that the financial industry needs new regulations to 
better channel the greed toward the public good and curb its worst excesses. In 
both narratives, Wall Street is portrayed negatively.
The white-collar crime narrative is the most critical of Wall Street. This ac-
count is primarily articulated by law professors and white-collar crime scholars, 
though a variety of news outlets have run stories over the last decade questioning 
why there were not more prosecutions for Wall Street executives after the crisis. 
Scholars emphasize the presence of a criminogenic environment that arose in the 
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financial system in which crime became routinized up and down the mortgage se-
curitization chain (Black, 2012). Some argue entire companies, like Countrywide 
Financial, became criminogenic enterprises, in which crime was routinized as 
normal business (Mayer et al., 2014). Key actors routinely falsified mortgage doc-
uments, creating a giant pool of “liars loans,” knowing they could easily sell them 
to investment banks that would securitize them and sell them off to investors. 
Investment banks knowingly hid key information about risks inherent in these 
securities, or that some were created to fail by the very investment banks selling 
them, and offloaded them to unsuspecting investors (Barak, 2012). Unlike the 
greed narrative, the criminal one argues that actors were not just making a profit 
by playing within the cowboy capitalisms rules of a heavily deregulated finan-
cial system. They knowingly and repeatedly violated fraud and securities laws in 
search of profit. Though primarily articulated by academics, it found some pop-
ular purchase in the frustration that no Wall Street executives went to jail for ac-
tions related to the crisis. News stories in major publications like The New York 
Times, Frontline, The Atlantic, NPR Marketplace, and The New York Review of 
Books, among many others, all ran stories about the lack of criminal accountabil-
ity in the years following the crisis. Charles Ferguson, the winner of the Oscar 
for Best Documentary in 2011 for his film on the crisis called Inside Job, even 
used his acceptance speech to decry the lack of criminal prosecutions for Wall 
Street. A majority of Americans in one opinion poll even believed there should 
have been more punishment accounting to public opinion polls, and the moral 
of this narrative is that there should have been. According to this narrative, the 
lack of prosecutions was not for a lack of criminal behavior but a lack of will 
in the Obama administration to prosecute widespread crime, instead prioritiz-
ing the financial health of the system over criminal accountability (Pontell et al., 
2014). Unlike in the other narratives, Wall Street is painted as a criminal deviant.
The key characters, plot, and moral of each of these narratives is summa-
rized in Table 4.3.
RESULTS
Table 4.4 shows the aggregate results of the narrative codes for speeches, as well 
as the totals by party. In total there were 123 separate substantive speeches by 58 
senators, split fairly evenly between Democrats and Republicans. The results sug-
gest that three narratives dominated the speeches: poorly designed regulation, 
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Frankenstein innovation, and deregulation. The greed narrative followed af-
ter, with the other four narratives being employed much less frequently. How 
did the use of particular narratives vary by party? The overall leading narrative, 
poorly designed regulation, was used almost exclusively by Republicans. This is 
unsurprising, given their skepticism of government regulation; it makes sense 
that they would portray the crisis as one of government overreach and mistakes, 
downplaying the private sector’s role in the crisis.
Key villains in this narrative are the government-sponsored corporations 
Fannie May and Freddie Mac, who helped encouraged home lending by buying 
and securitizing mortgages and did so recklessly given the assumption that they 
had the implicit backing of the U.S. government. Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) 
lays out this narrative well:
It is estimated that the American taxpayer will end up picking up somewhere 
around $400 billion to $500 billion in costs as a result of the activities of Freddie 
and Fannie. . . . But a lot of the initiative for that came from the Congress, basi-
cally asserting that people should be able to get those types of loans and push-
ing Freddie and Fannie from using what had been very traditional spurned 
writing standards in the 1990’s into much more aggressive standards as they 
moved into the period of 2000, 2001, and the early 2000 period, and as a result 
had you this proliferation of loans that didn’t have the underlying value and 
did not have the capacity to be repaid and they were all securitized by Fannie 
TABLE 4.4 Senator Narratives, Dodd-Frank Floor Debate, by Party and Total
Narrative Democrats Republicans Total
Poorly designed regulation 6 39 45
Frankenstein innovation 30 14 44
Deregulation, lax regulation/enforcement 37 5 42
Greed/reckless innocence 21 8 29
Misaligned incentives 7 8 15
Easy money 3 8 11
100-year flood 1 0 1
White-collar crime 1 0 1
Total 67 56 123
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and Freddie . . . a path towards basically decoupling Freddie and Fannie from 
the American taxpayer, making it — having those two organizations no longer 
be dependent on the American taxpayer and have the American taxpayer no 
longer have to pick up the debts of mistakes made by those two corporations, 
when those mistakes — even when those mistakes were caused to some sig-
nificant degree by the Congress taking actions which were inappropriate or 
which were bad policy. Not necessarily inappropriate but definitely bad pol-
icy. (C-SPAN, 2010c, 21:25)
Similarly, according to Senator John McCain (R-AZ):
I am not calling for the abolition of Fannie and Freddie. I am calling for 
them to stop being in the government trough. I am saying that Fannie and 
Freddie ought to be doing their job in competition with everybody else who 
finances home loan mortgages in America and the history of these organiza-
tions is replete with enabling by the Congress of the United States. (C-SPAN, 
2010c, 1:56:10)
Given that government intervention was the cause of the crisis, the moral of 
this story is that more government regulation is not the solution. According to 
Mitch McConnell (R-KY):
Later today we’ll have a decisive vote on the financial regulatory bill that does 
nothing to reform the government-sponsored enterprises that many people be-
lieve to have been at the root of the financial crisis this bill grew out of. . . . As 
it turns out, the American people don’t seem to like this government-driven 
solution to the financial crisis any more than they like the democrats’ 
government-driven solution to the nation’s health care crisis. . . . All told, this 
bill would impose 533 new regulations on individuals and small businesses, 
regulations that will inevitably lead to the kind of confusion and uncertainty 
that will make it even harder for struggling businesses to dig themselves out of 
the recession. . . . So here’s a bill that fails to address the root causes of the kind 
of crisis it meant to prevent, that creates a vast, new, unaccountable bureau-
cracy that, if past experience is any guide, will lead to countless burdensome 
unintended consequences for individuals and small businesses. (C-SPAN, 
2010d, 1:22:20)
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Similarly, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) highlighted the inadequacy of bu-
reaucracy preventing the crisis and the ineffectiveness of this as a solution to 
preventing the next one:
Nearly two years ago, the financial crisis exposed massive deficiencies in the 
structure and the culture of our financial regulatory system. Years of tech-
nological advances, product development, and the advent of global capital 
markets rendered the system ill-suited to achieve its mission in the modern 
economy. Madam president, decades of insulation from accountability dis-
tracted regulators from focusing on that mission. Instead of acting to preserve 
safe and sound markets, the regulators primarily became focused on expand-
ing the scope of their bureaucratic reach. And after the crisis which cost tril-
lions of dollars and millions of jobs, it was clear that significant reform was 
necessary. But despite broad agreement on the need for reform, the major-
ity decided it would rather move forward with a partisan bill. The result is a 
2,300-page legislative monster I believe before us that expands the scope and 
the power of ineffective bureaucracies. It creates vast new bureaucracies with 
little accountability and seriously I believe undermines the competitiveness 
of the American economy. Unfortunately, the bill does very little to make our 
financial system safer. Therefore, I will oppose the Dodd-Frank bill and urge 
my colleagues to do the same. . . . All the democrats will succeed in doing with 
the help of republicans is to give the failed bureaucracies more power, more 
money and a pat on the back with the hope that they will do a better job next 
time. This is not real reform, madam president. That is just more of the same. 
(C-SPAN, 2010d, 00:49:45)
Alternatively, Democrats’ most frequent narrative was that of deregulation and 
lax enforcement. Though in part this narrative places blame on government 
and regulatory agencies for not being tougher on Wall Street, the emphasis is on 
the way the financial industry grew too strong and powerful, and shaped policy 
and deflected oversight accordingly. And too much of the activity on Wall Street 
was done in the absence of any regulation at all, either because areas like deriva-
tives were deregulated or because regulation never kept up with new changes in 
the market. Further, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a centerpiece 
of the reform legislation, was important to add because it could act as the con-
sumer watchdog that banking regulators had failed to be before the crisis. Thus, 
the main villain is an out-of-control financial sector that needs tougher regulation. 
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Like the poorly designed regulation narrative did for Republican Party orthodoxy, 
this narrative fits well within the expected Democratic ideological orthodoxy.
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) typifies this narrative, with attention to inade-
quate regulation and supervision of the financial sector:
For too long, too many firms on Wall Street have had a free rein to reign to 
profit, to prosper from their risky bets when they pan out, and to have the tax-
payers cover the losses when they don’t pan out. For too long there has been 
no cop on the beat on Wall Street. That must end, and we can end it today by 
passing the Dodd-Frank bill. (C-SPAN, 2010d, 4:17:45)
Consumers in particular were under-protected, according to Senator Chris 
Dodd (D-CT):
I think it is widely understood, Mr. President, that it was a failure of consumer 
protection that was at the very heart of the financial crisis. It was of course 
these bad mortgages that were being sold, that people were being lured into, 
that was where the fires began, that consumed our economy or nearly con-
sumed our economy. (C-SPAN, 2010a, 2:55:40)
The moral then is legislation that puts in place stricter oversight and protec-
tions. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) argued:
We’re going to give consumers and investors the strongest protections they have 
ever had against abusive banks, mortgage companies, credit card companies, and 
credit rating agencies. We’re going to bring derivative markets that operate in the 
darkness out in the light. We’re going to hold Wall Street accountable because 
we know we’re accountable to the American people. (C-SPAN, 2010d, 1:32:24)
Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) outlines the broad scope of these new recom-
mended protections:
We need to put in place reforms to stop Wall Street firms from growing so big 
and so interconnected that they can threaten our entire economy. We need to 
protect consumers from abusive practices and empower them to make sound 
financial decisions for their families. We need more transparency in regula-
tion in the now shadowy markets where Wall Street executives and investment 
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banks have made gambles. In those shadowy markets, the Wall Street firms 
got all the upside and American families got all the downside. We need to do 
everything we can to ensure that a financial crisis like the one we experienced 
in late 2008 never happens again. And we need to ensure that taxpayers will 
not be asked to bail out Wall Street. In short, we need to pass the strong Wall 
Street reform bill that is before us today. (C-SPAN, 2010d, 3:09:00)
The second and fourth leading narratives were most frequently used by 
Dem o crats but had more bipartisan support from Republicans. The Frankenstein 
innovation in the derivatives market that created complex financial instruments 
that few inside or outside government understood was something both parties 
highlighted as a driver of the crisis. Describing the portions of the bill to address 
these complex products, Senator Dodd argued:
We tried to deal with the exotic instruments that had caused so much of the 
difficulty. The derivatives market was a $90 billion market and it mushroomed 
in less than a decade to $600 trillion, putting our nation at risk because of a 
lack of transparency and accountability to determine what was occurring in 
those markets. To consider it a radical idea that we might want to have trans-
parency and accountability I find rather remarkable considering what our 
country has been through. (C-SPAN, 2010d, 1:15:45)
According to Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA):
I have spent a great deal of time understanding the over-the-counter deriva-
tives market, its complexities and its legitimate utility. I have found that both 
Republicans and Democrats generally agree on the major issues relating to 
derivatives regulation. We all generally agree that there needs to be greater 
transparency, registration, more clearing and compliance with a whole host 
of business conduct and efficient market operation regulations. (Bush, 2019)
Similarly, senators in both parties blamed greed on Wall Street as a key driver 
of the crisis, though Democrats were more likely to do so. According to Senator 
Byron Dorgan (D-ND):
[T]hey were building a house of cards that came down and nearly collapsed 
this country’s entire economy. A lot of people are still paying the price for it. 
They got up this morning without a job, millions and millions of them and 
Careless or Criminal? CHAPTER 4 119
they can’t find work. They’re the victims of the cesspool of greed that we’ve 
watched for far too long. (C-SPAN, 2010d, 4:08:00)
According to Senator Levin:
The evidence from our investigation and from so many other sources is clear: 
we must put a cop back on the beat on Wall Street so that the jobs, homes, and 
futures of Americans are not again destroyed by excessive greed. (C-SPAN, 
2010d, 4:20:35)
The last four narratives were much less frequently used. Notably, the one 
speech coded using a white-collar crime narrative was a very weak version 
of this argument. Senator Arlen Specter (D-PA) was not describing rampant 
law-breaking that led to the crisis or advocating for throwing more bankers in 
jail. Rather, he spoke on behalf of an amendment that would allow investors and 
the public better grounds to sue for various kinds of financial fraud (C-SPAN, 
2010b). Though white-collar crime researchers are less concerned with whether 
elite behavior receives civil or criminal penalties, instead concentrating on the 
nature of the offense and the public harm done (Sutherland, 1983), this speech 
is a much more muted version of the full-throated, populist, radical appeal to 
put executives behind bars.
DISCUSSION
With Research Question 1, I asked what are the main narratives politicians used 
to explain Wall Street’s role in the 2008 financial crisis during the years following 
the crisis. The results suggest that the brunt of the focus fell along party lines, in 
which Republicans blamed poorly designed government policies and the Dem-
ocrats blamed deregulation and lax enforcement, along with blaming complex 
securities created by Wall Street. As one might expect, the crisis narratives fell 
into clear partisan paths that fit neatly with center-left tendency of the Dem-
ocratic Party and the harder right turn the Republican Party has taken in the 
last few decades (McCarty et al., 2016). Yet, an economic crisis of this magni-
tude offers the possibility to radically rethink the status quo, as some previous 
crises have. The popular movements that grew out of the crisis, Occupy Wall 
Street on the left and the Tea Party movement on the right, were further to the 
left and right of their parties, and both had an anti-elite flavor, toward different 
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ends. Though the Tea Party made significant inroads in institutionalizing itself 
within the Republican Party (Williamson et al., 2011), Occupy Wall Street did 
not have the same impact on the left (Gitlin, 2013), though it had more success 
reframing the dialogue around inequality. In response to Research Question 2, 
did politicians use narratives that described Wall Street executives as white-collar 
criminals feature frequently during policy reform debates after the crisis, the an-
swer is clearly no. Only one senate speech broached the idea of criminal con-
duct and focused more on civil fraud. Voices like Occupy on the left did call for 
more prosecutions but did not push either party in this direction.
Another way to view the narrative landscape is to see how the eight narratives 
used fit into the social construction of target population typology, as outlined 
in Table 4.5. Theorists note that though constructions can be static in the short 
term in crystallizing the framing of a target population, they do have the power 
to shift over time (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). With the eight narratives we can 
see the contest over trying to shift away from, or maintain, Wall Street’s domi-
nant social construction of advantaged on the eve of the crisis. One could argue 
it shifted from advantaged to contender after the negative attention the crisis 
and Wall Street’s role in it brought to the industry. Republican narratives pushed 
against this framing, but Democrats pushed successfully to have it labeled more 
negatively as a contender, with some support from Republicans.
If it wasn’t treated as a deviant, to what extent did the policy outcomes of the 
Dodd-Frank Act fit with those we would expect a contender to receive accord-
ing to SCTP theory, symbolic burdens, and hidden benefits? The most clearly 
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symbolic burden Wall Street received was the billions of dollars of fines leveled 
by various financial regulators. Though these fines achieved some symbolic jus-
tice and worked to appease populist demands for justice from the public, they 
were small slaps on the wrist compared to the profits of major banks and have 
not achieved substantive reforms in the industry (Macartney & Calcagno, 2019). 
Though these fines are large, they fall short of the strength of criminal punish-
ments. Importantly, for all the arguments from the Obama administration that it 
did not like Wall Street greed despite its legality, neither the administration nor 
anyone in Congress introduced new criminal provisions into the Dodd-Frank 
Act to expand the scope of criminal law (Ramirez & Ramirez, 2017). The clearest 
hidden benefit Wall Street and the financial industry received was the over $14 
trillion in back-channel lending and cash infusions through obscure Treasury 
Department and Federal Reserve programs, which received much less atten-
tion and public outcry than the direct bailout funds in the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (Prins, 2010).
Yet, not all reforms were symbolic. The Dodd-Frank Act provides more clear 
procedures for winding down too-big-to-fail institutions that avoid bailouts or 
lending of last resort from the Fed (Konczal, 2013). Whether these can be fol-
lowed in practice if one of the largest Wall Street institutions fails is another 
question. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was a substantial win for 
consumers, and Wall Street lobbied vehemently against it. Likewise, the Volcker 
Rule attempts to reduce insured banks from engaging in speculation in the de-
rivatives market. Analyzing the Act more comprehensively is outside the scope 
of this chapter, but the above suggest some, but not all, provisions fit with the 
expectations of SCTP theory.
CONCLUSION
This study has several implications for theory. First, though the scholarship on 
the SCTP theory has grown and become well established in the field of public 
policy and political science, contender groups like elite business actors, corpo-
rations, and banks are the most understudied category; instead, much of the 
analysis focuses on marginalized groups lacking political power (Pierce et al., 
2014). Thus, this study offers a case in how social construction dynamics oper-
ate for groups labeled contenders. Second, just over a decade out from the crisis, 
scholars, journalists, and the public are still grappling with the lack of criminal 
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accountability for Wall Street, what it means for equity in the broader criminal 
justice system, and the dangers it poses for financial stability in the broader econ-
omy. This research suggests another plausible hypothesis for why there were no 
prosecutions: the stories we told about the crisis, and Wall Street’s role in partic-
ular, shaped the policy responses we pursued. In many ways, the narratives about 
the crisis, and the social construction of Wall Street, successfully contained the 
scope of conflict in the regulatory and civil justice arenas and prevented critics 
from expanding the scope of conflict to the criminal justice system. A neces-
sary, though not sufficient, condition for shifting the weight of the criminal jus-
tice system toward more prosecutions is a compelling narrative to paint Wall 
Street as deviant, and thus worthy of harsh criminal sanctions. Though there was 
some support for this narrative among commentators, interest groups, and cit-
izens outside government, the Senate floor speeches show this narrative failed 
to penetrate elected official rhetoric.
How does this study help us understand policy change over time? It demon-
strates the broader consequences of the financialization of the U.S. economy over 
the last several decades and how this change has affected policy outcomes. As the 
financial sector grew to take a larger share of GDP, financial deregulation grew to 
historically high levels, which allowed banks to grow larger and amplify their po-
litical power to push for more policy benefits for the industry. In turn, this power 
shaped the narratives about the crisis, and Wall Street’s role in it, as well as the 
policy response. As SCTP theory posits, powerful, but negatively constructed, 
actors will be able to push policy burdens toward less strict and more symbolic 
regulations, while avoiding the harsher criminal punishments reserved for ac-
tors constructed as social deviants. Though the Dodd-Frank Act reversed the 
decades-long trend of financial deregulation, adding some new substantive and 
symbolic regulatory burdens on the industry, it allowed some of the biggest is-
sues, like whether to tax or break up the largest financial institutions given their 
economic and political power, to remain largely unaddressed (Johnson & Kwak, 
2010; McDonnell, 2011). Further, key actors were able to avoid criminal sanc-
tioning or new criminal statues to deter future financial crime. This outcome 
suggests that the growth in political and economic power of the industry has 
changed the ability of the criminal justice system to hold the worst actors to ac-
count, in contrast to previous financial crises (Ramirez & Ramirez, 2017). To 
the extent criminal accountability is an effective deterrent, its absence allows 
substantial risk to remain in the financial system. Ultimately, this suggests that 
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changes in the political and economic power of the financial industry have nar-
rowed the scope of policy response key political actors are willing to pursue.
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The Rhetoric of Presidential Campaign Announcements
Stephen M. Llano and Alexander J. Carver
INTRODUCTION: THE CAT IS BOTH IN AND OUT OF THE BAG
The change I seek and the change we must all seek isn’t liberal or conservative. 
It’s different and it’s both.
 — Bill Clinton, presidential campaign announcement, October 3, 19911
Erwin Schrödinger’s cat was created as a thought experiment to illustrate the ri-
diculousness of believing that a conscious observer was needed to affect an at-
om’s quantum state. It serves as a metaphorical argument to prove a point about 
how ridiculous quantum theory sounded. An unobserved cat in a box, at risk of 
death from an explosion triggered by a Geiger counter present to detect the de-
cay of a radioactive substance would simultaneously be alive and dead accord-
ing to those who believed that the observer was needed for the substance to 
decay. Schrödinger hoped it would be clear to all that cats can be either alive or 
dead, not both, and thus it was ridiculous to assume that a conscious observer 
was needed to determine the state of the atom. Unfortunately for Schrödinger, 
rather than making his point, his thought experiment has led to memes and fan-
tastic jokes supposing the existence of living-dead cats.
This experiment was never meant to be conducted. It was meant to challenge 
claims about perception and theory. We are extending his idea as a metaphor 
into the realm of presidential rhetoric in order to answer a strange question: Why 
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has so little been said about presidential announcement speeches? We think the 
rhetoric of the presidential campaign announcement presents a quantum-state 
problem: Can you offer presidential rhetoric and not yet — or ever — be president? 
As our epigraph indicates, presidential candidates speak in a tension of coexis-
tence. Contrary ideas must be unified, and caring citizens of the United States 
like you and me should speak like a president. Echoing Clinton, the presidential 
campaign announcement speech isn’t presidential discourse or unpresidential 
discourse — it’s different and it’s both.
Our study looks at campaign announcements over time that are archived 
in the C-SPAN Video Library. In these speeches, the candidate must present 
themselves as a legitimate contender for the office of president. Simultaneously, 
they must be affected by and understand the problems faced by Americans. 
Understanding common problems and being exceptional often find themselves 
in a productive tension in campaign announcement speeches. Of course, form 
plays a big role in how we evaluate these speeches. For example, the presidential 
State of the Union would have different criteria from a national address on health 
care. But what wouldn’t be up for questioning is the nature of the speaker — they 
are the president. What changes when the speaker must speak “presidentially,” 
yet does not hold the office?
We maintain in our study that the best way to be a viable candidate for pres-
ident is to speak like one. Rhetoric, unbeholden to physics, can very easily hold 
the identity of a speaker in a “definitive” and “not yet” state simultaneously. And 
holding a candidate in that quantum state seems to be the goal of presidential 
campaign announcement rhetoric. The rhetoric of who I am and what I have 
done as “not the president” should be thought of as the words of a president. 
Very much like the cat, the speaker exists as president and as non-president at 
the same time. And just like Schrödinger’s fictional cat, is both until the box — the 
ballot box — is opened.
Our study is meant to convey examples of this simultaneous state and its 
power throughout the announcements. Every candidate provides unresolvable 
simultaneous states of their existence in order to provide proof that they are pres-
ident(ial). The candidates can do this in multiple ways. First, directly, they can 
speak as they imagine the president ought to speak or, perhaps, how they be-
lieve their audience believes that the president ought to speak. Failure to do this 
or discrepancies between their vision of presidential speech and the audience’s 
can be disastrous for the candidates. Candidates might suffer from this when 
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they fail to transcend regionalism or to make such regionalism endearing to the 
large fraction of the electorate. Paul Tsongas’s 1992 campaign announcement 
speech is an example of such a failure. Second, they can play on their indeter-
minate state — as a citizen like us and as the president — by saying that they’re 
just like us because of their unique, unshared experiences. They listen and care 
for the people like equals, and they have held positions and offices that none 
of us have access to. They have a loving family who supported them that is just 
like, and nothing like, yours. They have ideas for the country that are their own, 
but they are exactly what you want: freedom, prosperity, security, and happi-
ness. But they in comparison to the other candidates are best positioned to de-
liver these things that we all have, know, and want. These logical tensions serve 
as perfect rhetorical reasoning.
How do we study contradictory, coexistent articulated states of being? How is 
this persuasive? Kenneth Burke (1969) defines rhetoric as “forever proving op-
posites” (p. 45). But even these speeches seem to have given rhetorical scholars 
trouble, since we find very little scholarly literature addressing their significance.
A RESEARCH LACUNA
For the vast amount of rhetorical scholarship focused on the president and the 
presidency, we were surprised to find such a small amount of scholarship on 
the campaign announcement speech. What we did find says more about the 
strange nature of this form of public address than it does about the speeches 
themselves. Furthermore, many sites of presidential research and on presiden-
tial figures do not clearly or obviously archive the announcement speech among 
the other papers of a former president or national political figure. This suggests 
that campaign announcement speeches are not commonly considered to be part 
of presidential rhetoric studies.
Ryan Neville-Shepard (2014) writes about campaign announcements for 
the purpose of crafting a genre of third-party political candidate discourse. His 
essay indicates the lack of scholarship on campaign announcements when he 
has to rely on Time magazine to provide evidence for a diachronic structure 
to these speeches. Although Neville-Shepard gives careful attention to cam-
paign announcements, he focuses only on third-party candidates, arguing that 
disruption of the traditional campaign announcement is one of the few ways 
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third-party candidates can get solid attention to their efforts. He takes a tradi-
tional announcement model from Trent et al. (2011), who outline the purpose 
of the campaign announcement in very functional terms — namely that these 
speeches serve to attract attention, establish reasons for the candidacy, request 
support, and prove that the candidate has the background or experience for the 
job. Neville-Shepard attends to the campaign announcement speech precisely 
because it is viewed as outside the normal and more studied presidential forms 
of public address. He does this to make his claim about third-party candidates, 
not to examine or study the form of the announcement itself.
Jeffrey Tullis (1987) famously argued that the modern presidency is consti-
tuted rhetorically. Instead of the 19th-century mode of presidential discourse, 
often aimed at the Congress, 20th-century presidents aimed their rhetoric at the 
people directly, to address their needs, perform leadership, and to gain support 
for their policies. This shift in the way presidents speak and write was signifi-
cant to Tullis, so much so that he argued there might be a “second Constitution” 
operating for 20th-century presidents, where the president might attempt to 
persuade the people as to what issues matter, what issues are important, and 
therefore circumvent the role of congressional representatives. Tullis has since 
softened that view, arguing that all presidencies are rhetorical, in the sense that 
presidents define their leadership role, and their relationship to the people and 
government, through their public address (Tullis, 1996). However, neither in 
The Rhetorical Presidency nor in his reflective 1996 essay did Tullis mention 
campaign announcement speeches. If rhetoric is so vital to the construction of 
what counts as presidential, these speeches seem central. But they are ignored 
by Tullis, and by other scholars who investigate the role of public address in the 
formation of the office of president.2 For those who run for this office, consti-
tuting themselves as equal to the task, or as presidential themselves, is a discur-
sive role played out first on the national stage through speech.
In Presidents Creating the Presidency, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen 
Hall Jamieson (2008) argue more directly that the words of the president are 
constitutive with the public and official conceptions of “the presidency,” yet they 
do not discuss campaign announcements. The Appendix to their book, “Other 
Rhetorical Forms,” does not mention this form of public address. This furthers 
our observation that campaign announcements are not considered presidential 
rhetoric by scholars. In taking inventory of rhetorical moments where the na-
ture, form, and scope of the presidency would be forwarded in speech, States of 
the Union, inaugural addresses, and campaign rhetoric come to mind at once. 
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But it is perhaps because these speeches are not the official words of an actual 
president that they are ignored in scholarship.
Compounding the strangeness, we have comments from the candidates that 
these speeches are taken seriously. In her post-campaign book, What Happened, 
Hillary Clinton (2017) wrote, “For weeks before the speech, I went back and forth 
with my team about what to say and how to say it” (p. 76).
We believe these speeches warrant attention they have not received. First, 
insofar as presidential speeches warrant attention, then so too should these 
speeches receive attention because they are presidential in two ways. First, 
the winning candidate’s speech is no longer merely a candidate’s speech but the 
speech of the future president. Adding these speeches to the presidential oeuvre 
allows comparisons and considerations that might not otherwise be made. The 
tremendous attention on Barack Obama’s 2004 DNC nomination speech — he 
was then a state, not U.S., senator in the Illinois legislature — and the speeches 
of a young Abraham Lincoln are precedent for the importance of speeches of 
presidents before they were president. Second, if we view the presidency not as 
a person but as an institution that includes, for example, the constitutionally de-
fined successors to the president in the case of their death and the staff members 
who execute their orders, then we might take the small step to include all candi-
dates for the presidency as part of the presidency. Together they reflect issues of 
the campaign and adapt to the positions of the others. Their speeches also de-
serve attention because of their position as candidate, as in between states — not 
yet president but making rhetorical choices so that we see them as presidential.
We take a different approach than the received view that these speeches are 
meant to prove or posit something that is taken logically or rationally by an audi-
ence. Instead, we draw on the work of Edwin Black and Kenneth Burke to argue 
that the presidential campaign announcement is a complicated text that defies 
the preestablished speech genre for many reasons, the most central of which is 
that it is given by someone performing as though they are in a position that does 
not yet exist for them — United States president.
Edwin Black’s essay The Second Persona (1970) gives us some resources to 
think through how rhetors address audiences. The speech is not necessarily 
aimed at people who are compartmentalized, separating their clear and solid 
identity from the logical reasons they would support a candidate. Instead, audi-
ences are called into being by the rhetor by highlighting one identity or another 
through speech. Public address is not the delivery vehicle for facts and logic, it 
is creation of identity:
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The quest for identity is the modern pilgrimage. And we look to one another 
for hints as to whom we should become. Perhaps these reflections do not ap-
ply to everyone, but they do apply to the persuasible, and that makes them 
germane to rhetoric. (Black, 1970, pp. 112–113)
Using these hints, the speaker suggests who they wish for their audience to 
be. And if the suggestion is attractive and persuasive, the audience will follow 
through: “In all rhetorical discourse, we can find enticements not simply to be-
lieve something, but to be something. We are solicited by the discourse to fulfill 
its blandishments with our very selves” (Black, 1970, p. 119). Black is urging rhe-
torical scholars to connect their criticisms with ideology. For our purposes, we 
believe these speeches call on audiences to become a particular kind of American 
inhabiting a proposed “America,” one that serves as both canvas and evidence 
that there is a good American life that their audience can participate in, and that 
we all share a responsibility in keeping it alive. Black writes that although we 
can speak about public address as a kind of thing, the audience also hears it as 
an inducement to become something.
The candidate also must make a place for themselves as both part of this 
ideological American scene, while maintaining their uniqueness as a presiden-
tial figure. For this, we turn to Kenneth Burke’s refiguring of rhetoric as the at-
tribution of motives through simultaneous articulations of identification and 
division. Burke (1969) defines rhetoric as “an essential function of language it-
self . . . the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in be-
ings that by nature respond to symbols” (p. 43), providing a rich definition of 
rhetoric that can illuminate the campaign announcement speech. Instead of a 
rationalist model of public address, we see candidates attempting to identify or 
divide (acknowledging that any act of identification is also a division, and vice 
versa), with various attitudes, values, beliefs, figures, and places that are signifi-
cant to the American imaginary. “You persuade a man [sic] only insofar as you 
can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, 
identifying your ways with his” (p. 55). Burke understands rhetoric as far more 
than a container for facts and evidence.
Rhetoric functions as identification, in a “compensatory” relationship to 
division. When one attempts to identify with another, they are “substantially 
one with a person other than [themselves]. Yet at the same time [they remain] 
unique, an individual locus of motives” (Burke, 1969, pp. 20–21). It is this 
relationship that allows for persuasion to occur, as people see themselves as 
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connected to motives that are not their own, but are consubstantial with oth-
ers through identification.
Burke’s idea can be pushed on a bit in order to provide understanding for 
the campaign announcement speeches. As a candidate speaks to the ideologi-
cally constructed “American” audience, they identify with them as American in 
all the ways that matter. This rhetorical move provides consubstantial associa-
tion with the speaker’s motives, such as being elected president, forwarding par-
ticular policies and plans, and taking a corresponding attitude toward the role. 
As speeches that establish a mode of being for the audience and an association 
with that being for the speaker, the campaign announcement speech becomes a 
speech of two places. The candidate must speak to the audience as one of them, 
one of the fellow travelers within the American ideology, and at the same time 
constitute themselves as separate, and apart from the crowd. This is the chal-
lenge of the campaign announcement speech.
RHETORIC, ATTITUDE, AND PUBLIC ADDRESS
The presidential campaign announcement is a complex rhetorical event that 
serves as a direct argument for why someone should become president, both 
through direct rational means and through a Black-Burkean ideological iden-
tification, while simultaneously offering the candidate a space to perform pres-
identially — as if they were already president. The candidate is not rationally 
explaining why they should be given the office; they are performing as the office, 
as someone consubstantial with the presidency, someone who is already there 
in all aspects except official title. They sound presidential, they have acted pres-
idential, and they understand America from the bottom up, as any good presi-
dent should — they’ve lived it.
Our process is fully inductive. We looked at the speeches to see what they had 
in common and where they diverged. Using our rhetorical theorists, we found 
several ways that candidate speeches attempt identification. Most candidates ar-
range their speech around different kinds of ways of identifying: with places and 
times, with people, and with America. We also found variety in how candidates 
announce they are running and how they ask for support.
These speeches remain in a state of tension throughout. All of the speeches 
seem to offer common, American sites of identity and value and use these mo-
ments to prove that the candidate is uniquely suited for the job.
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REALIZING AMERICA THROUGH SPACE, PLACE, AND TIME
Dwight Eisenhower’s 1952 announcement (see C-SPAN, 2016) in his hometown 
of Abilene, Kansas, sets up a speech that starts with his childhood, the values he 
learned, and why that experience positioned him so well to lead America in war. 
Eisenhower mentions the weather, Kansas, his hometown, and all the positive 
associations one would have with returning home after a long absence. But he, 
pun intended, clouds this family reunion by mentioning the rain and indicating 
that no matter how bad the rain gets, it won’t be as much water as the English 
Channel holds. This reference serves to put Eisenhower as a common man, but 
uncommonly so. He’s happy to be in Abilene, just as you would be to be home, 
but his happiness comes from someone who planned and led the invasion of 
Europe in 1944. Eisenhower is consubstantial with us, someone who is Ameri-
can and loves America, but is his own person, someone who has been involved 
in the most important and unique experiences imaginable. Similarly, Senator 
John McCain (R-AZ), another military veteran, divides space and place in or-
der to create consubstantiality between himself and America:
I have the privilege of beginning my campaign with you here in New Hampshire, 
but I began this day as I began my career of service to our nation . . . in the 
company of United States Naval Academy midshipmen. Whenever I see those 
young men and women, and think of their dedication and the purposeful ca-
reers on which they will soon embark, I am reminded of how lucky I was to 
have been one of them. So there is no more appropriate place for me to have 
begun this mission than Annapolis. I do not announce my candidacy to sat-
isfy my personal ambitions. My life has already been blessed more than I de-
serve. (Llano, 2020v)
McCain’s introduction, or opening, is interesting in comparison to Eisen-
hower’s as McCain connects his campaign for president to his entering the navy. 
For him, this is one long story of service to the country, just like all the midship-
men in Annapolis are about to do. But not all of them are McCain. He’s lucky to 
have been a common “midshipman”; this service has satisfied all his ambitions. 
He doesn’t mention his privilege or potential inside help due to his familial con-
nections. He seeks the presidency because of his dedication to Annapolis, the 
navy, New Hampshire — the country. We see in these two examples that location 
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does not have to be material, and speakers can use the physical and material lo-
cation of a speech to conjure, through contrast, “the place they are really from.” 
For Eisenhower, victory over the Nazis; for McCain, a lifetime of sacrifice in 
service to America. Both of these claims are accented through the tension they 
hold with the physical location of the speech. The speakers are consubstantial 
with where they are from, but they have been so many places.
Extremely different in both distance and person would be Senator Kamala 
Harris, choosing Oakland, California, for her announcement address. Harris 
grew up in Oakland, but more importantly, she cites her work as prosecutor as 
where she learned her values:
In fact, my mother used to say, “Don’t sit around and complain about things, 
do something.” Basically I think she was saying you’ve got to get up and stand 
up and don’t give up the fight! And it is this deep-rooted belief that inspired 
me to become a lawyer and a prosecutor. It was just a couple blocks from this 
very spot that nearly 30 years ago as a young district attorney I walked into 
the courtroom for the very first time and said the five words that would guide 
my life’s work: “Kamala Harris, for the people.” (Llano, 2020i)
This is a powerful example as to how identity, geography, and consubstanti-
ality work together. Harris connects her family’s values, her career, and her ca-
reer’s orientation toward public service as part of the same movement. All of us 
can identify with being inspired by a loved one or family member, and many of 
us have connections to our culture — Harris makes reference to Bob Marley, a 
hidden reference to her Jamaican roots — but not the way Harris did, and not in 
Oakland. Her unique story is our story. It could be any of us, but it isn’t.
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both announced in New York, Trump’s 
home and Clinton’s adopted home (where she was senator for 8 years). 
Trump’s announcement within Trump Tower had value beyond convenience. 
His speech focused on his competency to be president, and the Trump Tower, 
especially that it is located in Manhattan, serves as obvious evidence of his 
abilities:
But in two seconds, they [the lenders] give me whatever I wanted. So I have 
a total net worth, and now with the increase, it’ll be well over $10 billion. But 
here, a total net worth of — net worth, not assets, not — a net worth, after all debt, 
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after all expenses, the greatest assets — Trump Tower, 1290 Avenue of the 
Americas, Bank of America Building in San Francisco, 40 Wall Street, some-
times referred to as the Trump Building right opposite the New York — many 
other places all over the world. But he [Trump’s father] used to say, “Donald, 
don’t go into Manhattan. That’s the big leagues. We don’t know anything about 
that. Don’t do it.” I said, “I gotta go into Manhattan. I gotta build those big 
buildings. I gotta do it, Dad. I’ve gotta do it.” And after four or five years in 
Brooklyn, I ventured into Manhattan and did a lot of great deals — the Grand 
Hyatt Hotel. I was responsible for the convention center on the west side. I 
did a lot of great deals, and I did them early and young. And now I’m build-
ing all over the world, and I love what I’m doing. (Llano, 2020b)
Trump’s connection of Trump Tower as the evidence of his successful pursuit 
of his dream is one way candidates can construct identification. Trump here ties 
his success with stories about his family, and his father warning him about un-
charted territory. Here Trump shows he is wealthy and capable, standing inside 
the building that his efforts led to.
Contrast this to Hillary Clinton, who announced on Roosevelt Island. It 
matched her desire to position herself in succession to the legacy of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, whom she saw as connected to the presidents she was most closely 
connected with, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. Reflecting on the speech, 
she wrote:
Four Freedoms Park, at the tree-lined tip of Roosevelt Island, commemorates 
the universal freedoms FDR proclaimed during World War II: freedom of 
speech and worship, freedom from want and fear. It’s a picturesque spot with 
a striking view of the New York skyline. Announcing my candidacy there felt 
right. (Clinton, 2017)
Just as meaning was attributed to Trump’s announcement location so it was 
for Clinton, particularly because she could use the environment to reinforce 
identification with the audience:
To be in New York with my family, with so many friends, including many New 
Yorkers who gave me the honor of serving them in the Senate for eight years. 
To be right across the water from the headquarters of the United Nations, 
where I represented our country many times. To be here in this beautiful 
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park dedicated to Franklin Roosevelt’s enduring vision of America, the nation 
we want to be. And in a place . . . with absolutely no ceilings. (Llano, 2020c)
Clinton identifies herself with New York and then New Yorkers, but strate-
gically places her work at the UN as “New York” — she was here working, repre-
senting the United States. She then identifies her motives with that of Roosevelt, 
whose park is in New York, and above it all, no limits, as she proved through 
her exceptional career, being in New York alongside her fellow New Yorkers.
There are many variations on this idea of coming back to one’s roots as a re-
source to run for president. Ronald Reagan’s 1979 campaign announcement 
(see C-SPAN, 2015a) did not occur in a live format like these previous two. In 
a prerecorded message, Reagan appears in a location that is either his profes-
sional or home office. We are invited to listen to him not as a member of the 
public but as a guest in his study — someone important enough to be invited 
into his inner circle. Moreover, by speaking like a lead actor Reagan is return-
ing to his professional home on the screen, a professional home that brought 
him into the homes of Americans. Although the set is quite different, one is im-
mediately reminded of Richard Nixon’s so-called Checkers speech, also given 
from an office appropriate for a serious conversation about being right for 
elected office. This intimate scene lies in stark contrast with the obvious pub-
licity of the presidency.
Robert F. Kennedy announced his campaign in March 1968 from the Senate 
caucus room as if he were on official business for the country as Senator Kennedy 
(see C-SPAN, 2018). The location may seem odd to contemporary viewers, but 
Senators Stuart Symington (D-MO) and John F. Kennedy (D-MA) announced their 
presidential campaigns there in 1960 and Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN) an-
nounced from there in November 1968. Robert Kennedy may have been follow-
ing Senate norms or alluding to his brother’s legacy. Moreover, the substance of 
Kennedy’s speech refers to differences within the party as to who should lead it 
into the election. With these factors in mind, and the lateness of Kennedy’s de-
cision to run, the venue — rather than in New York where he was senator or in 
Massachusetts, to which his family was so closely tied — is a choice interesting 
to analyze for its power to trigger identification with the audience. Contrasted 
with Reagan, the Senate caucus room identifies Kennedy as a senator, and per-
haps important and distant, rather than someone you’d meet in a home office.
Pete Buttigieg spoke from his hometown of South Bend, Indiana, where he 
also was serving as mayor, but riffed on this traditional venue by speaking from 
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an old, closed factory that was owned by Studebaker. He referenced this openly 
in his speech:
Once in this city, we housed companies that helped power America into the 
twentieth century. Think of the forces that built the building we’re standing 
in now, and countless others like it now long gone. Think of the wealth cre-
ated here. Think of the thousands of workers who came here every day, and 
the thousands of families they provided for. And think of what it must have 
been like in 1963 when the great Studebaker auto company collapsed and the 
shock brought this city to its knees. (Llano, 2020f)
Buttigieg asks us to identify with the powerful American company, then with 
the workers, then with the South Bend families that were hurt. Pete Buttigieg is 
not only standing in a place that represents past success — he asks the audience 
to imagine it as a driving force for the country as a whole. And now the audi-
ence stands with him in a place that meant so much, but also serves as an ex-
ample of future success:
For the next half-century it took heroic efforts just to keep our city running, 
while our population shrank, and young people like me grew up believing the 
only way to a good life was to get out. Many of us did. But then some of us 
came back. We wanted things to change around here. And when the national 
press called us a dying city at the beginning of this decade, we took it as a call 
to arms. I ran for mayor in 2011 knowing that nothing like Studebaker would 
ever come back — but believing that we would, our city would, if we had the 
courage to reimagine our future. (Llano, 2020e)
By standing and speaking in a place that symbolizes the greatness that once 
was South Bend, Pete Buttigieg visually demonstrates that he and the audi-
ence have achieved another sort of success. The past cannot return, but together 
they have proven they can reimagine the sort of city South Bend can become. 
Buttigieg crafts the audience as the type of people who would want to be there, 
standing in a site of economic failure to prove they are a symbol of success.
Cory Booker’s speech is similar, given from Newark, another city that experi-
enced economic difficulty. Booker chose a connection rooted in traditional rhe-
torical pathos when he spoke about what the speech location meant:
Schrödinger’s Podium CHAPTER 5 141
We’re here today to seek justice. We’re here today because we are impatient 
for that justice. And our sense of urgency, our impatience, comes from the 
most demanding of values, it comes from love. Love of our families. Love of 
our communities. Love of country. Love for each other. Newark, Brick City, 
this community taught me about that love. It’s not feel-good, easy-going love. 
It’s a strong, courageous love. It is defiant love. . . . The kind of love that is es-
sential to achieving justice. I learned here that you can’t make progress divid-
ing people, you can’t make progress by stoking fear, or setting us one against 
another. I learned that the only way to overcome the tough challenges is by ex-
tending grace, finding common ground, and working together. (Llano, 2020g)
Instead of an economic crisis uniting the audience, a shared commitment to 
justice that comes from intense love is what brings them all together. But notice 
that it’s a love everyone can understand and should be recognizable to everyone, 
yet it is a very specific relationship with a very specific set of actions that can 
only be gained from growing up in Newark, New Jersey. Like Buttigieg, Booker 
relies on the universal particular to establish his universal uniqueness as a rea-
son that has brought him to this point. Both sites of struggle and failure are sym-
bols of an abiding success through identification. We can be consubstantial with 
Booker, but we can’t be him. He should be president because of his association 
with our adversity, which is uniquely his.
Success can be a powerful element in how to open the announcement. Donald 
Trump chose to make his announcement from Trump Tower, the seat of his 
power as someone who wishes to be perceived as a businessman and the em-
bodiment of success. Jon Huntsman announced his campaign at Liberty State 
Park, New Jersey, the same location where Ronald Reagan announced his gen-
eral election campaign in September 1980. Selection of physical location is, in 
itself, an argument for the candidate’s presidential status. But one can go too far, 
such as the choice of Ron Paul to make his announcement from the Iowa City 
Airport Holiday Inn — perhaps a little too close to the everyday American to fos-
ter the sort of identification needed.
References to location, geography, and time function to constitute the speaker 
and the audience as either American, or special in their uniqueness of being to-
gether. This is Burke’s theory of consubstantiality: we are powerful since our mo-
tives are aligned; we recognize one another as individuals who share motives 
through a common identity. But candidates are not limited here. They can also 
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employ narrative to connect events and situations around people to a story of 
how they plan to intervene and save the country.
Many campaign speeches share a story of America: where we were, where 
we are now, where we might be in the future. Such an arrangement is so obvi-
ous in traditional oratory that it is barely worth a mention. We believe that it is 
important in these speeches because it casts the speaker as someone who has 
taken part in this story, just like the rest of us, but has a unique perspective, one 
that not anyone else could have. It is this unique position within the American 
experience that makes the speaker a good candidate.
Most candidates discuss their childhood, their upbringing, and the family 
events that shaped who they are. Here in Ronald Reagan’s 1979 announcement 
we see an example where the focus is on his personal experiences living in the 
United States:
I’m sure that each of us has seen our country from a number of viewpoints 
depending on where we’ve lived and what we’ve done. For me it has been as 
a boy growing up in several small towns in Illinois. As a young man in Iowa 
trying to get a start in the years of the Great Depression and later in California 
for most of my adult life. I’ve seen America from the stadium press box as 
a sportscaster, as an actor, officer of my labor union, soldier, officeholder, 
and as both a Democrat and Republican. I’ve lived in America where those 
who often had too little to eat outnumbered those who had enough. There 
have been four wars in my lifetime and I’ve seen our country face financial 
ruin in the Depression. I have also seen the great strength of this nation as 
it pulled itself up from that ruin to become the dominant force in the world. 
(C-SPAN, 2015a)
Here we see the “Schrödingerian” character of presidential announcement 
discourse. Reagan proves that he is both common and uncommon; with us and 
above us; presidential and yet everyday. Reagan starts with the commonality of 
perspective, suggesting we all have a valid view of the United States from our 
life experiences. He then details his own experiences, highlighting how opposi-
tional and unique each one was. These are amazing vantage points on American 
history that are unique, but could be ours. Reagan is at the same time both right 
there with us and with a better vantage point to understand the history, and the 
direction, of the country. He is giving us the chance to identify with him while 
Schrödinger’s Podium CHAPTER 5 143
the totality of his experiences implicitly suggests his uniqueness as a candi-
date. In campaign announcements, candidates must place themselves as simi-
larly special Americans. Reagan’s motives are consubstantial with America, but 
he is clearly his own, unique person, ready to be president, but also just like us.
SEEKING THE SEEKING OF THE PRESIDENCY
Aside from location and scenery, we were interested in what sort of approach 
candidates took toward the thesis — that they would be seeking the presidency. 
Very few candidates come out and immediately say they are seeking the nom-
ination, and of the candidates who do, they are more likely to have done so in 
the mid-20th century than at the start of the 21st.
Trump gives the impression that much of his speech is impromptu and that 
his speech was intended to begin with the statement of facts:
Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories anymore. We used 
to have victories, but we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody 
saw us beating, let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all 
the time. All the time. (Llano, 2020a)
Hillary Clinton, begins her speech by transitioning from the absence of ceil-
ings on Roosevelt Island to the actual Roosevelts:
You know, President Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms are a testament to our nation’s 
unmatched aspirations and a reminder of our unfinished work at home and 
abroad. His legacy lifted up a nation and inspired presidents who followed. 
One is the man I served as Secretary of State, Barack Obama, and another is 
my husband, Bill Clinton. (Llano, 2020d)
The phrase “you know” suggests that Clinton and her team are politically 
savvy. They gesture to this information as commonplace, as an aside, letting 
the audience become the kind of audience that would know such information. 
Leading a receptive audience from wild enthusiasm for her speech to uncertain 
ground, as if they are students at the start of a history lecture, is an odd choice. 
Perhaps Clinton and her speech writers were trying too hard to transition from 
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their physical location to the rest of the speech. How might Trump have said 
what Clinton said?
Wow, Roosevelt — what a winner! That’s right, winner. Beat the Nazis, can you 
believe that. I mean, he really kicked the shi . . . Oh, am I allowed to say that? 
No, better not. Gotta think of the children. Speaking of children, I love my chil-
dren. There they are. Stand up. Yes, stand up. Beautiful. Beautiful. Just like 
Roosevelt made America. What an example, Bill, Obama, tried to be like him, 
but not quite. Hey, they tried. But, I’m the real next Roosevelt. The real winner.
No candidate wants this to be a persuasive enterprise. Ironically, they want 
the choice to be a non-choice. They don’t open the option. They wish to describe 
themselves as the living embodiment of American values. Whatever struggles 
they faced, whatever life lessons they learned, and whatever values they were 
taught and internalized will be common enough to be recognized as American, 
but unique enough to ensure that the candidate, and only the candidate, could 
be president. If they have to ask for consideration, they are behind. Most candi-
dates declare that they are seeking the office as a natural conclusion to their life 
experience, values, and abilities. There’s not a lot of choice involved. Ironically, 
this is how most candidates persuade us that they should be president. Elizabeth 
Warren’s campaign speech is a good example of this:
Hardworking people are up against a small group that holds far too much 
power, not just in our economy, but also in our democracy. Like the women 
of Lawrence, we are here to say enough is enough! We are here to take on a 
fight that will shape our lives, our children’s lives, and our grandchildren’s 
lives, just as surely as the fight that began in these streets more than a cen-
tury ago. Because the man in the White House is not the cause of what’s bro-
ken, he’s just the latest — and most extreme — symptom of what’s gone wrong 
in America. A product of a rigged system that props up the rich and the pow-
erful and kicks dirt on everyone else. And so, once he’s gone, we can’t pretend 
that all of this never happened. It won’t be enough to just undo the terrible 
acts of this administration. We can’t afford to just tinker around the edges — a 
tax credit here, a regulation there. Our fight is for big, structural change. This 
is the fight of our lives. The fight to build an America where dreams are pos-
sible, an America that works for everyone. I am in that fight all the way. And 
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that is why I stand here today: to declare that I am a candidate for president 
of the United States of America. (Llano, 2020h)
Warren declares that she is a candidate because she is in the fight all the way, 
that she is not a tinkerer, that she understands what is at stake in the fight for 
America itself. She connects her campaign to the labor leaders of Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, who stood up for themselves in the lumber mill she’s speaking 
in. Such identifications and constitutions of who the audience is for this speech 
indicate that the declaration of candidacy might be a bit modest. She’s already 
leading the fight. It’s pretty much her identity.
In contrast, Ronald Reagan seeks the presidency out of obligation to a national 
narrative that has been corrupted by failed current leadership and bureaucracy:
They [current leaders] tell us we must learn to live with less, and teach our 
children that their lives will be less full and prosperous than ours have been; 
that the America of the coming years will be a place where — because of our 
past excesses — it will be impossible to dream and make those dreams come 
true. I don’t believe that. And, I don’t believe you do either. That is why I am 
seeking the presidency. I cannot and will not stand by and see this great coun-
try destroy itself. Our leaders attempt to blame their failures on circumstances 
beyond their control, on false estimates by unknown, unidentifiable experts 
who rewrite modern history in an attempt to convince us our high standard 
of living, the result of thrift and hard work, is somehow selfish extravagance 
which we must renounce as we join in sharing scarcity. I don’t agree that our 
nation must resign itself to inevitable decline, yielding its proud position to 
other hands. I am totally unwilling to see this country fail in its obligation to it-
self and to the other free peoples of the world. (Llano, 2020l)
Reagan simultaneously stands with and apart from the American people who 
believe in prosperity and freedom, against those who forecast a grim future for 
the country and the world. Reagan is standing up against the faceless accoun-
tants of the government who instruct us to prepare for a meager future instead 
of accepting wealth as the natural result of hard work. This partition places him 
against such people and with the natural order at the same time, making his iden-
tification with the narrative of hard work and prosperity clear. He seeks the pres-
idency because he sees a failing obligation of the country to itself and the free 
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world. This is a style of asking where the candidate indicates that they have seen 
a particular obligation or need and only they can do something about it — even 
though many of us would identify with the characterizations of the world as they 
are presented in these speeches.
PORTRAYING A FUTURE PRESIDENCY PRESIDENTIALLY
Speaking as president, but not having the role, creates some rhetorical opportu-
nity when discussing policy during the announcement. Speakers often move to 
proving ability or capacity to act on the problems they’ve outlined in their nar-
rative or opening, and then indicate a presidential response.
Here’s Elizabeth Warren, proving that she has the capacity to address the is-
sues America faces:
When government works only for the wealthy and well-connected, that is 
corruption — plain and simple. And we need to call it out. Corruption is a 
cancer on our democracy. And we will get rid of it only with strong med-
icine — with real, structural reform. Our fight is to change the rules so that 
our government, our economy, and our democracy work for everyone. And 
I want to be crystal-clear about exactly what I mean when I say that. First: 
We need to change the rules to clean up Washington. End the corruption. We 
all know the Trump administration is the most corrupt in living memory. 
But even after Trump is gone, it won’t be enough to do a better job of run-
ning a broken system. We need to take power in Washington away from the 
wealthy and well-connected and put it back in the hands of the people where 
it belongs! That’s why I’ve proposed the strongest and most comprehensive 
anti-corruption law since Watergate. (Llano, 2020s)
Warren argues that corruption is a cancer on democracy that requires the se-
rious medicine of “real structural reform,” which is anti-corruption law. Warren 
argues that defeating Trump is not enough to solve the issues facing America, 
that the system itself needs overhaul, but that overhaul means passing more laws. 
A systemic solution is offered for a systemic problem, and that is what return-
ing power to the people looks like.
Compare this to Ronald Reagan’s from 4 decades earlier:
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The key to restoring the health of the economy lies in cutting taxes. At the same 
time, we need to get the waste out of federal spending. This does not mean 
sacrificing essential services, nor do we need to destroy the system of benefits 
which flow to the poor, elderly, the sick and the handicapped. We have long 
since committed ourselves, as a people, to help those among us who cannot 
take care of themselves. But the federal government has proven to be the costli-
est and most inefficient provider of such help we could possibly have. We must 
put an end to the arrogance of a federal establishment which accepts no blame 
for our condition, cannot be relied upon to give us a fair estimate of our situa-
tion and utterly refuses to live within its means. I will not accept the supposed 
“wisdom” which has it that the federal bureaucracy has become so powerful 
that it can no longer be changed or controlled by any administration. As pres-
ident I would use every power at my command to make the federal establish-
ment respond to the will and the collective wishes of the people. (Llano, 2020n)
Both speeches indicate that the president should return power to the people, 
both through law. It is the directness and refusal to accept “business as usual” 
that forms the core of both arguments. But the culprit here is quite different: cor-
ruption for Warren and wasteful spending for Reagan. Both are a type of corrup-
tion however, consubstantial with a government that has left the people out of its 
operation either through willful evil or gross incompetence. The solution is to 
return power to the people by electing another president to operate this return 
from within using the available laws and processes. Apparently even proposed 
presidential actions are quantum here. The power must be returned by return-
ing another singular figure to the top to orchestrate this return. The vague exer-
cise of presidential power — “whatever is available” or “proposing laws” — is not 
the argument here. The point is to identify as a president who is a strong actor 
and who will take action. The force is in the speech itself.
THE END OF THE BEGINNING: CLOSING THE SPEECH
Ending the announcement speech often involves the candidate asking for sup-
port. This can be riddled with tension as the candidate has already made several 
claims to the inevitability or unique fit they have to be president. How do candi-
dates balance the arguments of their unique position and ability to be president 
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with asking the common folks to help? At some point it seems that there is little 
influence we can have in the face of this formidable historical moment.
Ronald Reagan ended his announcement by rehearsing his interpretations of 
the current leadership’s narrative on what is wrong with America:
In recent months leaders in our government have told us that, we, the people, 
have lost confidence in ourselves; that we must regain our spirit and our will 
to achieve our national goals. Well, it is true there is a lack of confidence, an 
unease with things the way they are. But the confidence we have lost is con-
fidence in our government’s policies. Our unease can almost be called bewil-
derment at how our defense strength has deteriorated. The great productivity 
of our industry is now surpassed by virtually all the major nations who com-
pete with us for world markets. And, our currency is no longer the stable mea-
sure of value it once was. (Llano, 2020m)
Instead of encouraging resistance to these horrible leaders, or anger toward 
them, or indignation that this horrible story has any credibility whatsoever, 
Reagan moves his appeal for conviction to a different level entirely:
We — today’s living Americans — have in our lifetime fought harder, paid a 
higher price for freedom and done more to advance the dignity of man than 
any people who have ever lived on this Earth. The citizens of this great nation 
want leadership — yes — but not a “man on a white horse” demanding obedi-
ence to his commands. They want someone who believes they can “begin the 
world over again.” A leader who will unleash their great strength and remove 
the roadblocks government has put in their way. I want to do that more than 
anything I’ve ever wanted. And it’s something that I believe with God’s help 
I can do. (Llano, 2020p)
Reagan is indignant that anyone would buy that story if they identified with 
America the way he does — by living in different states, having different jobs, 
and suffering economic hardship. Hardly uncommon experiences. He then tells 
the audience they have worked harder and supported human dignity more than 
anyone else, ever. He aspires to leadership, but alongside them. And he asks God 
to support him, not those he’s going to be working with in the future. He closes 
with a connection between his vision and the vision of the Pilgrims, evoking 
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more religious support for his candidacy than the actual living Americans he 
claims to support:
We who are privileged to be Americans have had a rendezvous with destiny 
since the moment in 1630 when John Winthrop, standing on the deck of the 
tiny Arbella off the coast of Massachusetts, told the little band of Pilgrims, 
“We shall be a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us so that if we 
shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken and so cause 
Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a 
byword throughout the world.” A troubled and afflicted mankind looks to 
us, pleading for us to keep our rendezvous with destiny; that we will uphold 
the principles of self-reliance, self-discipline, morality, and — above all — re-
sponsible liberty for every individual that we will become that shining city 
on a hill. I believe that you and I together can keep this rendezvous with des-
tiny. (Llano, 2020o)
We are invited to support this Puritan vision by standing alongside him, be-
ing consubstantial with him, and that alone will help bring the Puritan vision to 
pass. We are induced to help him because he wants to be with us, working to-
gether, from the Oval Office, a place very few people are ever allowed to enter. 
At the same time, he appears to already hold that office, speaking with the au-
thority he asks us to help him get.
Elizabeth Warren directly asks her audience to stand with history and fight 
even though all the evidence points to the fight being hard and against nearly 
impossible odds:
So, no, I am not afraid of a fight. Not even a hard fight. When the women of 
Everett Mill walked away from their machines and out into the cold January air 
all those years ago, they knew it wouldn’t be easy. But they also knew what was 
at stake for themselves and their families. And they weren’t going to let any-
one tell them it was “too hard.” Doubters told the abolitionists, “It’s too hard.” 
Skeptics told the suffragettes, “It’s too hard.” Cynics told the trust-busters, 
“It’s too hard.” Naysayers told the foot soldiers of the civil rights movement, “It’s 
just too hard.” But they all kept right on going and they changed the history 
of America. Sure, there will be plenty of doubters and cowards and armchair 
critics this time around. But we learned a long time ago that you don’t get what 
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you don’t fight for. We are in this fight for our lives, for our children, for our 
planet, for our futures — and we will not turn back. (Llano, 2020t)
Warren sets herself up as standing with the people, but standing with ex-
ceptional figures that stood up for social justice through history. She uses rep-
etition — “too hard” — to indicate the similarity between her run for president 
and impressive campaigns for social justice. Equating these events might be 
enough — rhetorically she has created her campaign as a fight against injustice 
and evil. But then she raises the stakes by indicating that the fight includes the 
planet, all children, and the future of everyone and everything.
With the stakes this high we can say Warren is attempting to whip the audi-
ence into an emotional frenzy of desire to fight realizing that they could lose ev-
erything, serve the right side of history, and prove the critics wrong with their 
actions. But the actions she explores the audience to take are not the obvious 
connection:
My daddy ended up as a janitor, but his little girl got the chance to be a pub-
lic school teacher, a college professor, a United States Senator — and a candi-
date for president of the United States. I am grateful, all the way to my bones. 
Grateful — and determined. So here is the promise I make to you today: I will 
fight my heart out so that every kid in America can have the same opportu-
nity I had — a fighting chance to build something real. I will never give up on 
you and your future. I will never give up on your children and their future. I 
am in this fight all the way. It’s a long way to election day. But our fight starts 
here. And it starts with you. It starts with your decision to get involved, right 
now. Join us on Elizabeth Warren.com. Help us organize. Volunteer. Pitch in 
5 bucks. We need everyone in this fight. The textile workers here in Lawrence 
more than 100 years ago won their fight because they refused to be divided. 
Today, we gather on those same streets, ready to stand united again. This is 
our moment in history, the moment we are called to. This is our moment to 
dream big, fight hard, and win! (Llano, 2020u)
Warren turns back to her everyday-unique identity and reinforces how un-
usual and common her life story is — a requisite in these speeches for the joint 
purpose of consubstantiality with the American people and the American pres-
idency. She asks the audience to donate $5 to stand in solidarity with the lumber 
mill strikers, the civil rights movement, the suffragettes, and abolitionists. Even 
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though the audience support is needed, it is Warren’s unique life and her unique 
gratitude for that life which is the engine that will propel her, and all of us, to the 
presidency, winning the battle for the children and the Earth. The stakes couldn’t 
be higher, but all it takes is $5 from you to participate in this historic triumph.
Cory Booker chose the date of his announcement to correspond with the date 
that Martin Luther King Jr. was in jail in Birmingham, Alabama, and wrote his 
famous response to the editorial by concerned clergy. He begins his peroration 
with reference to this corresponding date:
He was arrested on Good Friday while demonstrating against segregation, and 
on this very date, Saturday, April 13th in 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. woke 
up in that jail cell in Birmingham. The same jail cell where he wrote on the 
margins of a newspaper that had been smuggled in to him, this letter, these 
words: “For years now I have heard the word ‘Wait!’ This ‘Wait’ has almost al-
ways meant ‘Never.’ We must come to see . . . that ‘justice too long delayed is 
justice denied.’” He spoke to the possibility of what we can achieve when we 
realize our own power and refuse to wait. The children of Birmingham and 
a man named King showed what was possible when they refused to wait for 
justice and confronted dogs and fire hoses — when they defeated Bull Connor 
and brought down segregation in the city. (Llano, 2020q)
Booker argues that refusal to wait is the reason that King’s civil rights vision 
and leadership was able to bring down segregation. Booker discusses this im-
mediately after talking about how his parents refused to wait to get their family 
fair and livable housing in Newark. Booker seems to be comparing himself to 
King, but he dilutes it, showing that it is a commitment to the principle of “not 
waiting” that led his parents to finding justice for his family, King his victory 
over southern segregation, and Booker his run for president. These three things 
have in common a commitment to a principle that is not only shown success-
ful but is shown to be the principle of racial justice through this comparison.
Booker continues by then invoking the audience to act on this comparison, 
the idea that Booker’s campaign is the inheritor of the “not waiting” principle 
shared by King and by his family:
America, we know our history — it is perpetual testimony to impatient, de-
manding, unrelenting people who in every generation stand up for justice. 
Generations of Americans have shown us what was possible when they refused 
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to wait. Now it’s our turn. And we have work to do. America, we can’t wait. 
America, we will not wait. Together, we will run at the tough challenges. 
Together, we will do the things that other people tell us are impossible. Together, 
we will fulfill our pledge to be a nation of liberty and justice for all. Together, we 
will win. And together, America, we will rise. (Llano, 2020r)
Unlike Reagan, who focuses on himself as the leader the Pilgrims, needed 
and whom we should stand with, and unlike Warren, who believes in the power 
of disproportionately small actions to face incredible challenges, Booker’s per-
oration focuses on faith in the time-tested promise of “not waiting.” Using highly 
charged and poetic language, he repeats the phrase, demanding that we “not wait” 
to face the challenges ahead. By not waiting together, we will be successful. But 
we must do it with him, as he is the inheritor — through both his family history 
and the important date of his candidacy — of the principle of the practice. Again 
we see the dissonance of Booker having special and unique encounters with the 
“not waiting” principle, which is also an American principle, responsible for our 
greatest victories in racial justice. Although a unique intervention — you have to 
decide to stand with Cory Booker — it is our time generationally to “not wait.” 
History shows this as an inevitable part of American politics, yet standing with 
Booker is the only way to make it successful this time.
Candidates have a number of options to choose from to prove that they are 
both with us and exceptional at once. But what happens when the campaign year 
itself is seen as an exception? For many, 2016 was such a year, and a closer look 
at the two major candidates helps us address that question.
THE 2016 ELECTION — SPEECHES AND IDENTIFICATION 
OPTIONS FOR EXCEPTIONAL CANDIDATES
Former first lady, senator, and secretary of state Hillary Clinton and billion-
aire and reality TV star Donald Trump are exceptional candidates. Does iden-
tification work for these candidates? At first glance, they are too exceptional 
to identify with their audience. However, there are at least four ways that 
their speeches can call their audiences to identify with them. First, by arrang-
ing their speeches differently the candidates could have increased or decreased 
the potential for their audiences to identify with them. Second, identification 
need not be an either-or proposition. It may come in degrees. Hillary Clin-
ton and Donald Trump might seem disingenuous if they claimed to be our 
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neighbors, like Julian Castro, Kamala Harris, Pete Buttigieg, and Cory Booker 
can still claim, but that doesn’t mean that they can’t achieve some identifica-
tion. Third, they can claim third parties for their campaign or identify them-
selves with them to get identification. Fourth, even though Clinton and Trump 
can’t be our neighbors, their exceptional status gives them the option to iden-
tify with the audience on the basis of what they hope to be — a trailblazing and 
resilient defender of the people, especially children, or a famous Manhattan 
businessperson who claims to be worth billions.
First, ancient to modern rhetoricians believe that the arrangement of speeches 
influences the audience. Utterances earlier in the speech are often believed to 
be more important. It is in the beginning of the speech, and perhaps at the very 
end, when the least attentive audience members can be reached. “If you only 
remember one thing . . .” is a phrase often heard near the beginning or end of a 
speech for that type of audience member. Clark Judge, former speechwriter for 
President Reagan, said in Presidential Speechwriters (C-SPAN, 2017) that candi-
date Barack Obama, unlike Hillary Clinton, began his speeches immediately af-
ter coming on stage because his campaign knew that it was in those first minutes 
that the television agencies were most likely to air the speech. Thanking mem-
bers of the immediate audience is attentive to their needs but costs the speaker 
the opportunity of getting their message to the much larger television audience. 
This is another reason important points should be made early in televised polit-
ical speeches (which campaign launch speeches usually are).
Hillary Clinton presented herself in multiple ways in her announcement speech. 
Early in her speech she speaks of her relationship to presidents: “One is the man 
I served as Secretary of State, Barack Obama, and another is my husband, Bill 
Clinton” (C-SPAN, 2015b). Later in her speech she talks about her ancestors 
and childhood:
It’s America’s basic bargain. If you do your part you ought to be able to get 
ahead. And when everybody does their part, America gets ahead too. That 
bargain inspired generations of families, including my own. It’s what kept 
my grandfather going to work in the same Scranton lace mill every day for 
50 years. It’s what led my father to believe that if he scrimped and saved, his 
small business printing drapery fabric in Chicago could provide us with a 
middle-class life. (Llano, 2020j)
This description is the one to which more of her audience could have con-
nected. However, she begins with the former, noting her connection to past 
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presidents. Perhaps Clinton believes that identifying as close to the presidency 
makes her more presidential? It is an unusual choice, but she is in an exceptional 
position compared to most candidates.
Second, Clinton presents herself as the competent figure who is aware of, 
and concerned about, the difficulties of average Americans, but is no longer like 
them. She separates herself from her audience by reciting what they have suf-
fered with a litany of “You . . .” statements:
You worked extra shifts, took second jobs, postponed home repairs . . . you 
figured out how to make it work. You see corporations making record profits, 
with CEOs making record pay, but your paychecks have barely budged. . . . You 
brought our country back. (Llano, 2020k)
By using this construction Clinton conveys that her experience has been dif-
ferent than most Americans. At the same time, these statements convey that she 
is aware of everyday problems. She may be identifying with her audience but it is 
unclear that the identification is reciprocal. Had she placed herself as the person 
who knows those who have been hurt by the recession — like Bill Clinton did in 
response to a question at the 1992 town hall debate — she might have allowed for 
greater identification between her and her audience. She, like many in the audi-
ence, could have known people who suffered even if she did not.
Both candidates mentioned stories from earlier periods of their lives and 
could have done more to connect their lives to the voters. The template would 
have been “even if I’m no longer like you, I was like you, and understand you.”
Third, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump can claim third parties for their 
campaign or use those parties as an identification bridge between themselves and 
the audience. We can understand the following passage from Clinton in this light:
I’m running to make our economy work for you and for every American. For 
the successful and the struggling. For the innovators and inventors. For those 
breaking barriers in technology and discovering cures for diseases. For the fac-
tory workers and food servers who stand on their feet all day. For the nurses 
who work the night shift. For the truckers who drive for hours and the farm-
ers who feed us. For the veterans who served our country. For the small busi-
ness owners who took a risk. For everyone who’s ever been knocked down, 
but refused to be knocked out. I’m not running for some Americans, but for 
all Americans. (C-SPAN, 2015b)
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Clinton tries for no less than identification with all Americans. We can see the 
following Trump statements in this light:
We have wounded soldiers who I love, I love, they’re great, all over the 
place, thousands and thousands of wounded soldiers. . . . It’s going in, and 
that’s gonna be going into Tennessee. Great state, great people . . . my fellow 
Republicans, and they’re wonderful people, I like ’em. (C-SPAN, 2015c)
Fourth, both Clinton and Trump highlight experience that no average voter 
has participated in. This divides them from their audience. Donald Trump pro-
vides an example of this distance:
I sell apartments for — I just sold an apartment for $15 million to somebody 
from China. Am I supposed to dislike them? I own a big chunk of the Bank 
of America Building at 1290 Avenue of the Americas, that I got from China 
in a war. Very valuable. And I have assets — big accounting firm, one of the 
most highly respected — 9 billion 240 million dollars. And I have liabilities of 
about $500 million. That’s long-term debt, very low interest rates. In fact, one 
of the big banks came to me and said, “Donald, you don’t have enough bor-
rowings. Could we loan you $4 billion?” I said, “I don’t need it. I don’t want it. 
And I’ve been there. I don’t want it.” But in two seconds, they give me whatever 
I wanted. So I have a total net worth, and now with the increase, it’ll be well 
over $10 billion. But here, a total net worth of — net worth, not assets, not — a 
net worth, after all debt, after all expenses, the greatest assets — Trump Tower, 
1290 Avenue of the Americas, Bank of America building in San Francisco, 40 
Wall Street, sometimes referred to as the Trump Building right opposite the 
New York — many other places all over the world. (C-SPAN, 2015c)
Trump’s choice is to directly own his wealth and exceptional status. This direct 
approach is unusual, but perhaps it’s called for given its unavoidability. Trump 
also might appeal to his audience by being the sort of rich person they would 
imagine being — direct, wealthy, and proud of it.
Hillary Clinton’s attempt at addressing this problem is quite a bit different:
As a senator from New York, I dedicated myself to getting our city and state 
the help we needed to recover. And as a member of the Armed Services 
Committee, I worked to maintain the best-trained, best-equipped, strongest 
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military, ready for today’s threats and tomorrow’s. And when our brave men 
and women come home from war or finish their service, I’ll see to it that they 
get not just the thanks of a grateful nation, but the care and benefits they’ve 
earned. I’ve stood up to adversaries like Putin and reinforced allies like Israel. 
I was in the Situation Room on the day we got bin Laden. (C-SPAN, 2015b)
To suggest that she was not exceptional might have seemed disingenuous. A 
passage from her 2017 post-campaign memoir, What Happened, suggests she 
was aware of the ways in which she was limited and considered those limita-
tions when writing her campaign announcement speech:
I also knew that despite being the first woman to have a serious chance at the 
White House, I was unlikely to be seen as a transformative, revolutionary fig-
ure. I had been on the national stage too long for that, and my temperament 
was too even-keeled. (Clinton, 2017)
Clinton and Trump, both exceptional candidates, have options to identify 
with the audience. Rather than say that they are like their audiences, they can 
suggest that they are what they want their audiences want to become. Donald 
Trump, in reference to popular opinion conveyed by the media, said, “A lot of 
people say, ‘He’ll never run. Number one, he won’t wanna give up his lifestyle.’ 
They’re right about that, but I’m doing it” (C-SPAN, 2015c). Here Trump hopes 
to become likable because he is bucking the trends, going against what’s expected, 
and doing what he wants. This can be very persuasive to audiences on the level 
of identification with motives.
IDENTIFYING WITH THE CURRENT AMERICAN STORY
The questions What’s wrong? Where should we go? and How do we get there? 
are common elements of political speeches, campaign announcements included. 
So far, this chapter has focused on the audience identifying with the candidate 
as a person with their motives. However, campaign speeches also invite the au-
dience to identify not with the candidate as a person but with their story that 
answers these questions.
This perspective can recalibrate how we interpret campaign speeches, es-
pecially our evaluation of facts, reasons, and arguments. Errors and gaps in 
those — the focus of fact-checking websites — are likely insignificant to audience 
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members who broadly agree with the candidate’s story of America’s current con-
dition and the path forward.
When we piece together how Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump explain 
America’s current condition, what they would like it to become, and how to go 
about making that change from their campaign announcement speeches, we 
find sharp differences in answers and style. Clinton presents a world in which 
false promises, economic theories, Republican tax cuts, powerful currents, 
technological advances, corporate management, political paralysis, and pow-
erful forces explain the status quo and says that by working with Congress and 
implementing many policies she will make an economy that works for every-
one. Trump says that nice, stupid, weak, corrupt, loser politicians have sold the 
country down the drain; that Mexico and China are causing problems; and that 
a tough, smart, strong winner who is too rich to be bought by lobbyists, and 
who can negotiate with other countries, is needed to make America great again 
(rich, with guns, local educational control, Medicare, Medicaid, social security, 
a strong military, and veterans’ care).
Clinton’s story often uses vague phrases (“time-tested values were replaced 
by false promises”) and is impersonal, even described as oceanic phenomena 
(tides and currents), and her solution is to be elected so that she can work with 
Congress to implement policies. Trump’s story, in comparison, is vivid, personal, 
and simple: there are bad people; elect him to be the hero to stop them. The fa-
miliarity of the latter — a common action movie plot — may have predisposed 
people to identify with it and ignore his shortcomings.
The content and stylistic differences between speeches can be latched onto by 
audience members; stories can constitute audiences, whether intended or not. 
Awareness of both stories and stylistic choices allows auditors and speechwrit-
ers another perspective on how speeches might influence us. Auditors might 
wonder what vagueness obscures or specificity excludes, what is the balance be-
tween impersonal forces and individual actors in explaining the status quo, and 
how that answer influences the proposed solution.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF ANNOUNCEMENTS
As TV and the internet dominate the mode of political communication, cam-
paign announcements have become rhetorical events aimed at an “immedi-
ately distant” audience where the present audience — whether for Governor John 
Kasich (R-OH) at Ohio State’s basketball arena or Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) at 
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Liberty University — becomes a part of the larger rhetorical message meant for 
those watching synchronously or asynchronously on a screen somewhere. This 
has already been foreshadowed with the 1979 Reagan announcement. Candidates 
have already announced their candidacies on YouTube, distinct from “launch-
ing” their campaigns, but perhaps we are not too far away from a Twitter an-
nouncement or a livestream on Twitch as the preferred mode for announcing 
one’s candidacy.
There is diversity among campaign announcements in every presidential year 
and between campaign years. When we compare the 1992 campaign announce-
ments to the 2020 announcements, we see that the use of personal narrative is 
now greater. Announcing from a significant location (Nebraska State Capitol for 
Bob Kerrey; Arkansas State Capitol for Bill Clinton; Lowell Massachusetts, the 
hometown of Paul Tsongas; Independence Hall for Jerry Brown; New Hampshire 
for Pat Buchanan) is common to both elections. However, many of today’s can-
didates tell us comparatively more about themselves and their life stories.
It may be that today’s candidates are using public narrative — also known as 
the story of self, the story of us, the story of now — to craft parts of their speech. 
Public narrative is taught to community organizers, and Marshall Ganz’s classes 
at the Harvard Kennedy School have helped spread it to political operatives. This 
speech format is motivated, in part, by the belief that if someone is to do pub-
lic work, they owe it to the people they are trying to lead to give an account of 
their public selves. Public narrative helps create the everyday exceptionalism 
we’ve identified in this chapter. Ganz writes:
Our stories of self overlap with our stories of us. We each participate in many 
us’s: family, community, faith, organization, profession, nation, or movement. 
A story of us expresses the values, experiences, shared by the us we are evok-
ing at the time. But a story of “us” not only articulates values of our commu-
nity; it can also distinguish our community from another, reducing uncertainty 
about what to expect from those with whom we interact. Social scientists of-
ten describe a “story of us” as collective identity. (Ganz, 2010)
Is this not reminiscent of Burke? We identify, and when we identify we divide. 
Both identification and division benefit us and we become “substantially one 
with a person other than [ourselves]. Yet at the same time [remaining] unique, 
an individual locus of motives” (Burke, 1969, p. 21).
As we viewed these presidential campaign announcement speeches, reason 
and logic (those features that many observers look for and evaluate in speeches) 
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are deemphasized and in their place creation of consubstantial identities to of-
fer a new, potential identification are seen. This will be nothing less than a rad-
ical shift in perspective for many and has consequences for our understanding 
and potentially for candidates’ production of these speeches. Instead of a de-
tailed policy speech that would prove the candidate had completed — and can 
do or get someone to do — the difficult work of policy research and proposal, 
as well as understands the constraints of a national budget, we get connections 
between the candidate and ourselves through closed factories, Independence 
Hall, the idea that Americans are both common and one of a kind — everyday 
exceptionalism — and ideology. The campaign announcement speech is a form 
of presidential address that can only be described as dissonant unless you give 
up the belief that persuasion is predicated on conscious rationality or structured, 
school-style, logic. In this case it is predicated on the fundamental contradic-
tion that what makes America so incredibly special is its commonality and ev-
eryday experience that not everyone can have.
NOTES
 1. See GGIROUX, Clip of Bill Clinton presidential campaign announcement 
(October 3, 1991); User clip: Bill Clinton announces 1992 Democratic presi-
dential campaign [C-SPAN video user clip], October 3, 2019, https://www 
.c-span.org/video/?c4820810/user-clip-bill-clinton-announces-1992-demo 
cratic-presidential-campaign.
 2. None of the other essays in Martin J. Medhurst, Ed., Beyond the Rhetorical 
Presidency (Texas A&M University Press, 1996), cite or discuss campaign an-
nouncement speeches, even though the volume purports to investigate the im-
portance of public address in creating and constituting presidential authority 
and power.
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CHAPTER 6
HE SAID, SHE SAID
How Gender Affects the Tone and Substance 
of White House Press Briefings
Newly Paul
T
he White House press briefing is an important tradition in American pol-
itics since the time it first started in 1929. The briefing allows reporters to 
question the president and other public officials on their policies and ac-
tions. In the absence of the president, the press secretary acts as a representative 
of the president and conducts briefings for the press. Existing research on the 
White House press briefing has focused mainly on the president (Meeks, 2018; 
Clayman & Heritage, 2002; Clayman et al., 2006; Clayman et al., 2007) and a 
much smaller body of work has focused on briefings involving the press secre-
tary. Research on press secretaries has examined the nature and responsibilities 
of their role (Kumar, 2001) and the rhetorical maneuvers they employ to answer 
reporters’ questions (Schubert, 2014), but questions still remain about the gen-
dered aspects of this role (Meeks, 2018).
We know that gender plays an important role in the newsroom and in the 
ways in which news is sourced and framed (Craft & Wanta, 2004; North, 2009; 
Steiner, 2009). Two studies so far have examined the impact of gender on White 
House press conferences — both from the perspective of reporters. In the first, 
Clayman et al. (2012) examined questions asked by men and women reporters 
between 1953 and 2000 and found that women are more likely than men to ask 
questions that are assertive and adversarial. The second study by Meeks (2018) 
examined the issue topics of reporters’ questions and their variance by gender 
and found that men and women reporters emphasize different issues. Women 
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reporters are more likely than men to emphasize so-called masculine issues such 
as foreign trade and the economy.
Though these studies indicate gender-based differences in the nature and 
issue topic of questions posed by reporters at press conferences, they refer to 
presidential news conferences where the reporters ask questions of the male 
president. We are yet to know whether these trends extend to conferences held 
by press secretaries, and whether these effects are conditioned on the gender of 
the press secretary. Moreover, we are yet to systematically analyze whether there 
are differences in the styles of men and women press secretaries.
Given these gaps in research, it is important to examine how gender consid-
erations affect the White House press corps and the office of the press secretary, 
which are both overwhelmingly male institutions. Of the 33 press secretaries at 
the While House since 1929, all but 5 have been men. Incidentally, the Trump ad-
ministration has appointed 3 women press secretaries — Sarah Huckabee Sanders, 
who was the 3rd woman press secretary; Stephanie Grisham; and Kayleigh 
McEnany, who is the current press secretary.
The Trump administration offers a unique opportunity to examine the work-
ing style of a man as well as a woman press secretary. Sean Spicer held the post 
for 6 months, between January 20, 2017, and July 21, 2017, and Sarah Huckabee 
Sanders was in office for 2 years, from July 26, 2017, to July 1, 2019, before be-
ing replaced by Grisham. McEnany assumed the office on April 7, 2020. This 
unique set of circumstances allows for a comprehensive examination of an im-
portant process in the American democratic system, and this chapter explores 
this trajectory of research using videos from the C-SPAN Video Library. First, 
I explore differences in the tone and style of questioning the press secretary 
by reporter gender; second, I examine the patterns in the responses of the two 
press secretaries.
The question about the approach to this study — that is, the examination of 
gendered aspects of the White House press secretary’s office — bears some expla-
nation. While scholars have theorized about the masculine nature of the office 
of the president in America (Dittmar, 2015), the office of the press secretary per 
se is not associated with gender stereotypes. However, I argue that it is useful to 
study the relationship between the White House press corps and the press sec-
retary from a gendered perspective for a few reasons. The office of the press 
secretary has always been a male area of expertise, with only three women be-
fore Sanders holding the post since the time this office was established in 1929. 
Given the absence of women in this position, it is possible that reporters view a 
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woman press secretary as a novelty and a deviance from the masculine norms 
of the office and adjust their behavior accordingly (Shoemaker & Cohen, 2006). 
Stereotypes and social role theory posit that social context can make our social 
identities salient at an implicit level (Cota & Dion, 1986; Shih et al., 1999). In the 
case of women press secretaries working in a male-dominated profession, gender 
considerations could be activated among reporters as well as the women press 
secretaries themselves given the small number of women who have historically 
occupied this role. In addition, the focus on gender from external sources such 
as media coverage could also make gender salient. For example, in the period 
following Sanders’s appointment, the media highlighted that many top appoin-
tees in the Trump administration were men (Goren, 2017; Lowrey & Johnson, 
2018), while pointing out Sanders’s gender and her powerful role as an excep-
tion (Kerns, 2018). Sanders also faced sexist attacks from a handful of media 
columnists who criticized her weight and appearance (Siegel, 2017). These in-
stances of increased focus on her gender in the media could have made gender 
considerations salient in Sanders’s mind as well as in the minds of the White 
House reporters, and it is important to analyze how gender dynamics worked 
in the press briefing room.
WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFINGS AND ROLE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY
Press secretaries play four important roles (Kumar, 2001): They act as informa-
tion conduits for the press by accurately representing the president’s policies and 
actions; they represent constituents such as the White House press office, the 
president, White House staff, and reporters; they act as administrators by co-
ordinating media coverage of the president and coordinating information with 
the press office inside the White House; and lastly, they are active in communi-
cations planning. Though press secretaries change with every administration, 
there is a general understanding about the duties that they are expected to per-
form (Kumar, 2001), namely: “Tell the truth, don’t lie, don’t cover up, put out 
the bad news yourself, put it out as soon as possible, put your own explanation 
on it” (p. 298).
One of the main functions of the press secretary involves holding a daily 
televised press briefing which lasts from 45 minutes to an hour (Kumar, 2001). 
While Spicer held 40-minute press briefings toward the beginning of his ten-
ure, he shortened them considerably, to about 25 minutes, a month later. When 
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Sanders took office, she continued this tradition of shorter briefings. For both 
secretaries, the briefings followed the pattern set by their predecessors. The brief-
ings would start off with them reading prepared communications announcing 
new policy that the president had introduced, the president’s schedule, responses 
to critics, and information on breaking news (Kumar, 2001). They would then 
take questions from the press. Sometimes senior administration officials were 
brought to the briefings to help answer questions. The press secretaries also car-
ried written statements on topics that the reporters were likely to ask and would 
sometimes read these statements in response to the questions.
The relationship between the press and the press secretary has often been de-
scribed as “a duel” (DeCandia et al., 2013, p. 67) and “one of interdependence and 
cooperation” (p. 67) because on one hand the White House seeks to influence 
the press agenda and public opinion, and on the other the press tries to hold the 
president accountable and ask questions that will yield newsworthy information.
The job of the press secretary involves wearing many hats, and research in-
dicates that there are a few different ways to measure their success. The first is 
whether they are considered an “insider” of the administration — that is, whether 
their opinions are sought and whether they advise the president. This indicates 
that they understand the administration’s positions and are in a position to ex-
plain it to reporters (Towle, 1997). They are also considered successful by the 
manner in which they disseminate information. A press secretary who is tightly 
controlled by the president tends to act as a mouthpiece and is less respected 
than someone who is a representative of the president and is allowed to “inter-
pret, elaborate, and expound on the president’s thoughts” (p. 298). Other indi-
cators of a press secretary’s success include the president’s own actions, which 
demonstrate whether the press secretary is approved and respected, and the de-
meanor of the press — if the press secretary has knowledge, credibility, and orga-
nization skills, they are more likely to be respected by reporters (Towle, 1997).
Though there is scant research about the experiences of women press secre-
taries, Dee Dee Myers, who was the first woman press secretary, recalls in her 
2008 memoir that during the Clinton years the White House communications 
office was very gendered and that despite being press secretary she did not enjoy 
autonomy or equal pay because of the belief that she was not capable of handling 
the press (Myers, 2008). On one hand reporters commented on her appearance, 
but on the other they asked her hard-hitting questions. Though Sanders and 
Spicer occupied the office of the press secretary more than 2 decades after Myers, 
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when public opinion about gender stereotypes had changed (Dolan, 2014), the 
glass ceiling of the presidency remained to be shattered, and only a handful 
of women had been appointed to the top communication job in the White 
House. The enduring novelty of women in the White House raises the possi-
bility that gender could be an important factor in the press secretary’s rela-
tionship with the press.
Spicer was appointed press secretary as soon as Trump took his presiden-
tial oath, and he remained in his appointment for 6 months and 1 day. He had 
a political background, having served previously as communications director 
of the Republican National Committee and later chief strategist of the organi-
zation. Yet, Trump’s treatment of Spicer, and media coverage of Spicer’s reign, 
was largely negative. During his tenure as press secretary, Spicer received a lot 
of negative coverage ridiculing him for several scandals and gaffes, including 
his assertion that the size of the Trump administration Inauguration Day crowd 
was the largest in history, despite the existence of credible evidence to the con-
trary. Reporters described him as easily frustrated and unable to handle pres-
sure (he left without taking any questions at his very first media briefing). When 
Trump fired FBI chief James Comey, media coverage ridiculed Spicer for “hid-
ing in the bushes” to avoid reporters’ questions and for his lack of knowledge 
about the president’s actions. Trump often joined the press in publicly criticizing 
Spicer (Borchers, 2017), but when Saturday Night Live actor Melissa McCarthy 
parodied him, media reports indicated that Trump was displeased because he 
felt that by having a woman comedian portray Spicer’s role, he had appeared 
weak and incompetent (Karni et al., 2017).
In the beginning of May 2017, the White House began leaning on deputy 
press secretary Sanders and banked on her to handle important news occur-
rences such as Comey’s firing, when they knew that reporters would ask diffi-
cult questions. Media reports compared the two press secretaries’ styles and said 
that while they both deflected questions, Sanders seemed better than Spicer at 
“keeping her cool, maintaining composure and at least giving an answer and 
not seeming quite so flustered” (King, 2017). Sanders, who had a long career in 
political campaigning and had served as senior adviser on Trump’s 2016 presi-
dential bid, finally became press secretary when Spicer resigned in protest of the 
appointment of Anthony Scaramucci as communications director.
Press reports described Sanders as “more in line with what you would expect of 
a professional press relations person” (Chang, 2017). A report described her thus:
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She is a little muted, a little dead-eyed, yes, but she is also less aggressive, less 
condescending, less startlingly terrible. She speaks in a slow and deliberate 
Southern accent, often gracing her speech with rueful smiles. And she is not 
so obviously a shrieking propaganda mouthpiece, as Spicer was. (Chang, 2017)
Thus, both press secretaries can be considered partially successful in light 
of Towle’s (1997) measures of success. While Spicer was criticized by both the 
president and the press, Sanders seemed to enjoy the president’s favor. Despite 
occupying the same role, Sanders and Spicer had different personalities as press 
secretary. This, coupled with the gendered press coverage and the acrimonious 
relationship with the press, could give rise to different rhetorical strategies for 
the two secretaries. The next section provides an overview of gendered rhetor-
ical styles to provide a context for the examination of the press secretaries’ ver-
bal styles.
GENDERED RHETORICAL STYLES
Since no study to date has compared the rhetorical styles of men and women 
press secretaries, I draw from existing research on gendered rhetorical styles from 
leadership studies and political public relations. The literature of gender roles 
posits that as a result of the social roles men and women play in society — men 
as agentic and women as communal — men and women employ different lan-
guages that suit these gendered roles (Bakan, 1966). Men tend to use language 
that emphasizes individuality and to be more direct in their word choices, while 
women focus on expressiveness and meeting the needs of others and tend to 
use an indirect style of speech (Tannen, 1995). Masculine rhetoric is defined as 
“decisive, direct, rational, authoritative, and aggressive and feminine rhetoric 
is defined as cautious, receptive, indirect, emotional, and polite” (Baker, 1991, 
p. 36, as cited in Aldoory, 1998, p. 77).
Feminist scholars, however, disagree on these binary classifications because 
they portray women as lacking conventional leadership traits and rhetorical 
styles, and argue that women in leadership positions could have a different un-
derstanding of leadership and the language that a leader should use. In in-depth 
interviews with women public relations professionals, Aldoory (1998) found 
that the respondents envisioned leadership roles as ones that involved building 
consensus among team members; expressing motivation, passion and courage 
for the job; and being human toward their staff. Overall though, the findings 
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indicated that “women were not explicitly emotional, cautious, or indirect. They 
exhibited a mix of assertiveness and rational analysis with receptiveness and 
sensitivity” (p. 97).
Given this background, it is difficult to hypothesize whether press secretaries, 
who share some common ground with public relations professionals, will differ 
in their rhetorical strategies on account of their gender. On one hand, given the 
masculine nature of the White House, Sanders could employ so-called mascu-
line rhetoric in order to appear tough and in control, but on the other hand, she 
could adopt so-called feminine rhetorical strategies in order to ensure amica-
ble relations with the press, especially given that the White House press corps is 
made up of reporters from various partisan, regional, international, and national 
mainstream publications. The section that follows delves into the gendered as-
pect of journalism and examines how women and men reporters in the White 
House press corps differ from each other.
GENDER AND THE NEWS
Traditional gender roles and socialization act as factors in influencing men and 
women reporters to bring “different values, interests, and priorities to the news-
room” (Rodgers & Thorson, 2003, pp. 659–660). As a result of gender social-
ization, men and women reporters tend to highlight different news stories or 
frame stories in particular ways. Gender roles are derived from the traditional 
roles that men and women play in society — men as breadwinners and women 
as caretakers. As a result of these traditional roles, men and women are associ-
ated with specific issues and traits (Kahn, 1991). Men are considered naturally 
suited to handling so-called masculine issues such as foreign policy, the econ-
omy, and defense, while women are perceived as natural fits for handling issues 
such as childcare, the environment, and health. With reference to traits, men are 
considered naturally tough and decisive, while women are perceived as more 
emotional and warm.
In the newsroom, these gendered expectations historically formed the basis 
on which editors assigned stories to men and women reporters. While men were 
considered capable of covering politics and economics — issues that were con-
sidered prestigious and usually got front-page coverage — women were mostly 
tasked with covering soft news “from the realm of the domestic, the emotional, 
the personal” (Chambers et al., 2004, p. 36). These differences are evident in 
modern newsrooms. The Status of Women in U.S. Media report (Women’s Media 
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Center, 2019) found that women make up only 41.7% of the workforce in news-
rooms. They are overwhelmingly absent from sports desks and online news sites, 
as well as upper-level management positions.
Men and women reporters also differ in the ways in which they report and 
write their stories. Women reporters are more likely to use women sources (Hardin 
et al., 2007) and more ethnic sources, and they assign more space and prom-
inent positions (such as the first paragraph of the story) to women sources 
(Armstrong, 2004).
Extant research on presidential press conferences, however, indicates that 
women reporters tend to be more aggressive in their line of questioning than men 
(Clayman, 2004). Men and women reporters in the White House press corps also 
differ in the substance of their questions. While men reporters are more likely 
to ask questions about issues considered traditionally masculine such as defense 
and foreign trade, as well as issues considered more feminine such as environ-
ment and health, women reporters are more likely to discuss masculine issues 
such as macroeconomics and immigration (Meeks, 2018). Women reporters are 
also unlikely to question presidential candidates on issues of interest to women 
(Turcotte & Paul, 2015).
Researchers attribute this gender-incongruent behavior to newsroom norms 
and routines, which are overwhelmingly masculine and favor male-oriented be-
haviors and styles of reporting. Since men sources and masculine topics are con-
sidered inherently superior and are rewarded in the newsroom, women reporters 
unconsciously tend to follow the patterns set by their men colleagues. Thus, they 
are unlikely to erase stereotypes in their coverage of women candidates (Meeks, 
2013), are likely to quote more men than women on social media (Artwick, 2014), 
and depend more on men as sources even when the newsroom management is 
overwhelmingly women (Everbach, 2005). Given these incongruent expecta-
tions, it is essential to examine whether the gender of a reporter has an impact 
on the tone and style of questioning the press secretary, and whether this differs 
depending on the gender of the press secretary. It is also important to examine 
whether gender determines how a press secretary reacts to reporters’ questions.
From the discussion above, I propose the following research questions:
1. Do men and women reporters differ in their tone and style of questions?
2. Do men and women reporters differ in the issue topics of their questions?
3. Is the tone of questions affected by the gender of the press secretary and 
the gender of the reporter?
4. Do men and women press secretaries differ in their rhetorical strategy?
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METHOD
Sample
I started by randomly selecting 10 press conferences from the C-SPAN Video 
Library covering the first 6 months of Spicer’s and Huckabee Sanders’s terms as 
White House press secretary. The Video Library provided video recordings of 
the press conferences, along with transcripts of the press secretaries’ opening 
remarks, the questions asked by reporters, and the responses given by the press 
secretaries. Only those videos that had transcripts were chosen for analysis. Once 
I had shortlisted the press conferences, I compiled a dataset using each question 
as a unit of analysis. When a reporter got the opportunity to ask a question, they 
could choose to ask a single question or a series of questions in one turn. Fol-
lowing the transcript available through the Video Library, I counted a reporter’s 
turn to ask a question as one single question regardless of the number of ques-
tions this turn had. For example, a reporter asked Spicer the following question 
at the press conference on February 21, 2017:
The comments that the President made today about anti-Semitism. In terms 
of the timing, obviously he was asked about it, but they also came after his 
daughter, Ivanka, sent out that tweet. Has she counseled him? Was she one of 
the people saying it’s important for you to forcefully denounce this? Why to-
day? (C-SPAN, 2017)
Though this turn includes multiple questions, they were all asked in a single 
turn and were therefore coded as one question. Follow-up questions tended to 
vary in terms of the topics they brought up and were therefore coded as sepa-
rate questions. Using this method, the final dataset had a total of 833 questions 
gathered from 20 press conferences.
Independent Variables
As shown in Table 6.1, the two independent variables were reporter gender and 
gender of the press secretary. These variables were both coded dichotomously. 
Since the press conference covered by C-SPAN included shots of the reporters 
asking questions, I was able to note the gender of the reporter visually. In some 
instances where the press secretaries called out the reporters by name, I was able 
to double-check gender identification against the reporter’s biographical infor-
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variables shown in Table 6.1 were derived from Clayman et al. 
(2012), who analyzed the conditions under which reporters are likely to aggres-
sively question presidents, and Bucy and Grabe (2016), who analyzed candidates’ 
tones in presidential debates in the 2012 election. Following these authors, I used 
a total of eight dependent variables.
The first set of dependent variables relate to question type and included the 
following categories: direct, accountable, adversarial, initiative, and assertive. 
Following Clayman et al. (2007), I coded questions as direct when they were 
blunt in discussing issues. For example, questions that included self-referencing 
phrases such as “I wonder . . . ,” and “Can/Could/May I ask . . .” show that a re-
porter is requesting permission to ask the question and relying on the press sec-
retary’s willingness to answer the question, which indicates a “cautious stance 
toward the question” (p. 29). I coded questions as accountable when the reporters 
explicitly asked the press secretary to “explain and justify” (p. 31) the president’s 
policies. This included questions phrased using words such as “How could he/
Why did he/Why is he . . .” The category adversarial included questions that had 
an “oppositional stance” (p. 31) in the preface of the question or in the question 
as a whole. Following Clayman et al. (2007), questions that invited debate us-
ing phrases such as “How do you respond to that/What is your reaction to that” 
were also coded as adversarial. Questions that were coded as initiative included 
those that built a context in the beginning of the question, combined more than 
one question in one turn, and included a follow-up question. As Clayman et al. 
(2007) explain, these indicate “a more vigorous posture by the journalist” (p. 29). 
Assertive questions were those that invited yes/no responses. Lastly, I added two 
new categories, interruption by reporter and interruption by press secretary, to 
these existing categories to measure whether reporters or press secretaries inter-
rupted each other. Interruptions are commonly interpreted as attempts to stop 
a speaker while they are making a statement and could be interpreted as a ploy 
to assert power (Hordecki & Piontek, 2014).
The second dependent variable is tone of question, which was dichotomously 
coded as positive/neutral and negative. Using Bucy and Grabe’s (2016) guidelines, 
I interpreted negative tone as instances where the speaker’s voice “had a men-
acing or hostile feel” (p. 55), where confrontations or terse back-and-forth ver-
bal exchanges occurred between a reporter and the press secretary, and “where 
the overall tone of a segment could be characterized as enraged, feisty, or ag-
gressive” (p. 55). Positive/neutral tone was interpreted as instances where the 
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speaker’s “vocal quality had an optimistic or cheerful feeling” (p. 55), or where 
“the tone suggested an attempt at bonding or reinforcing a sense of goodwill” 
(p. 55) with reporters.
Control Variables
The control variables shown in Table 6.1 were the issue topics covered in each 
question. While there were upward of 25 issues discussed in the questions, the 
regression model that I fit for the third research question controlled for the top 7 
that appeared most frequently. If a question addressed two issues, the issue that 
had the greatest number of words in the question or the issue that was reflected 
in the answer was used as a deciding factor.
The primary researcher and a graduate research assistant coded 10% of the 
sample in order to establish intercoder reliability for the variables (Lombard et 
al., 2010). After two rounds of coding, acceptable Krippendorff ’s alpha levels 
ranging from 0.70 to 1 were reached for all variables (Krippendorff, 2004). The 
primary researcher then finished coding the rest of the dataset.
Since this project adopts a mixed-methods approach to the research ques-
tions, I also conducted a qualitative thematic analysis of the responses of Spicer’s 
and Sanders’s responses to reporters’ questions in order to determine the rhetor-
ical strategies used by each. I was particularly interested in determining whether 
Spicer and Sanders differed in terms of the images and metaphors they used in 
their daily briefings and whether these conformed to traditional gender roles. 
As described in Nowell et al. (2017), I started by familiarizing myself with the 
data and taking extensive notes on my thoughts about potential themes. I then 
generated initial coding schemes and went back and forth refining these themes. 
Finally, I documented each theme with detailed descriptions of the context. One 
caveat must be addressed here with reference to the coding of rhetorical themes. 
Following existing qualitative research practices (see, e.g., Blank-Libra, 2004; 
Christiansen, 2018; Newton et al., 2004), a single coder assessed the rhetorical 
themes in the press secretaries’ responses.
RESULTS
The first research question examined whether men and women reporters differ 
in their tone with and style of questioning of the press secretary. The results in-
dicated that women reporters (59.41%) are significantly more likely than men 
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reporters (40.59%) to use a negative tone in their questions: χ2 (1, N = 833) = 
19.07, p = 0.000. In terms of the type of questions asked, women and men were 
similar in all measures except three: accountability, initiative, and questions that 
interrupted the press secretary. Men (50.89%) were more likely than women 
(49.1%) to ask accountability-related questions that asked for explanation or jus-
tification: χ2 (1, N = 832) = 8.34, p < 0.01. Men reporters (52.24%) were some-
what more likely to interrupt the press secretary compared to women reporters 
(47.76%): χ2 (1, N = 833) = 4.57, p < 0.05. Lastly, men were also more likely than 
women to ask questions that took an initiative — that is, questions that had con-
text, included more than one question at a single turn, or included a follow-up 
question: χ2 (1, N = 833) = 4.57, p < 0.05.
The second research question examined whether there were issue-related dif-
ferences in the questions asked by men and women reporters. Figure 6.1 shows 
that foreign affairs, immigration, politics, and questions related to the Trump 
administration appointees were among the most asked about topics during these 
news briefings. However, there were no statistically significant differences be-
tween men and women reporters’ likelihood of asking questions that addressed 

































































FIGURE 6.1 Question topics in 20 press conferences organized by Sean Spicer and Sarah Huckabee Sanders between 
2017 and 2018.
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topics, women reporters (65.52%) were significantly more likely to ask such ques-
tions compared to men (34.48%): χ2 (1, N = 833) = 17.66, p = 0.000. Similarly, 
women reporters (78.57%) were more likely to ask questions about voter fraud 
than men reporters (21.43%): χ2 (1, N = 833) = 9.098, p < 0.01. Women (59.38%) 
also asked more questions than men (40.63%) on national security — χ2 (1, N = 
833) = 5.503, p < 0.05 — while men (64.34%) were more likely than women 
(35.66%) to ask about taxes: χ2 (1, N = 833) = 11.66, p = 0.001.
The third research question explored whether the gender of the press secre-
tary and the gender of reporters had an effect on the tone of questions. I con-
ducted a logistic regression to check the interaction effects of reporter gender 
and gender of the press secretary, but none of the interaction effects were signifi-
cant. Thus, women and men reporters did not significantly differentiate between 
men and women press secretaries with respect to the tone of their questions.
The fourth research question examined differences in the rhetorical strategy 
of men and women press secretaries. Specifically, it examined the secretaries’ 
act of interrupting reporters’ questions. Though the press secretaries did not in-
terrupt reporters often — only 9.27% of questions were interrupted — a chi square 
analysis revealed that Spicer (76.62%) was significantly more likely to interrupt 
reporters than Sanders (23.38%): χ2 (1, N = 831) = 25.0523, p = 0.000.
A follow-up qualitative content analysis of the two press secretaries’ responses 
to the press showed a number of interesting patterns. They were similar in their 
use of rhetoric that deflected blame on the Democrats and that they blamed the 
press for wanting to create false narratives about Trump, lied outright, “reinter-
preted” the president’s statements on Twitter, repeated standard talking points, 
and stalled reporters’ attempts to get information by saying they did not have 
sufficient information and would have to check and get back to the reporters. 
Despite these similarities, Sanders and Spicer differed in a few different ways.
Use of Humor
Sanders adopted humor to ease into the press briefing, a strategy that was missing 
from Spicer’s briefings. Sanders would often start off with a joke or comment to 
reporters. For example, during one press briefing she said to a group of report-
ers who did not acknowledge her presence when she walked into the room: “All 
smiles, all the time. Good afternoon.” When one person greeted her back, she 
said, “Somebody is polite out there,” inciting scattered laughter from the report-
ers. In another instance, a reporter said he apologized if a question he was asking 
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had already been answered the day before. Sanders responded saying, “It’s okay, 
everybody here likes to ask the same question many times,” again inciting laugh-
ter from the reporters. When she returned to the briefing room from a vacation, 
she greeted reporters saying, “It’s good to be back. You guys don’t seem nearly as 
excited. I thought for sure there’d be balloons or something. We’ll save that for 
next time, I guess.” Another instance of the use of humor was when a reporter 
asked Sanders whether the president would read Hillary Clinton’s book, and 
Sanders responded: “Whether or not he’s going to read Hillary Clinton’s book, I 
am not sure. But I would think that he’s pretty well-versed on ‘what happened.’ 
And I think it’s pretty clear to all of America.” In contrast to Sanders’s light-
hearted approach, Spicer would set a more formal tone for the press briefing by 
refraining from making comments and instead launching straight into reading 
his prepared remarks. He rarely used humor to deflect difficult questions from 
reporters, choosing instead to confront them.
Use of Parenthood and Family Metaphors
Sanders used parenthood metaphors to humanize the president, defend his 
actions, explain his policies, deflect uncomfortable questions from reporters, 
and to connect with them. For example, when reporters questioned her about 
Don Jr.’s meeting with a Russian lawyer, she responded that the president did 
not dictate anything but simply “weighed in as any father would, based on the 
limited information that he had.” She also used family-based anecdotes to illus-
trate the impact of the president’s policies. For example, in the press briefing on 
August 24, 2017, in which she discussed his VA Choice Act targeted toward vet-
erans’ health, she read aloud an emotional letter that a father had written to his 
son who was on his second tour of duty in Afghanistan. She also had a habit of 
announcing birthdays at the start of the briefing — of people in her own family, 
White House staffers, or reporters — and in a press conference on September 12, 
2017, she announced the birth of Eric and Lara Trump’s son, Eric Luke Trump.
Intertwining the Personal and the Political
Sanders often used personal anecdotes and stories from regular Americans to 
demonstrate the impact of Trump’s policies and to demonstrate his popularity 
among supporters. In the press briefing on September 13, 2017, Sanders informed 
the reporters that Frank, a 10-year-old boy from Virginia who had written to 
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the president offering his services to mow the lawn at the White House, had 
been invited to visit the White House. She followed this announcement by say-
ing, “The President is committed to keeping the American Dream alive for kids 
like Frank, and we’re all looking forward to having him here,” thereby adding a 
concrete name and human element to the concept of the American Dream and 
linking it to the president’s economic and jobs growth initiatives.
Similarly, she started the September 25, 2017, briefing by reading a story about 
the Little Rock Nine — the group of black children who were refused entry into 
Central High School in Arkansas in 1957 because of their race. Sanders said 
that 20 years ago, in 1997, she was a student in the same school and witnessed 
president Clinton and her father, governor Mike Huckabee, opening the doors 
of the school to welcome the nine black students to mark the 40th anniversary 
of the event. This was an ironic opening to the press briefing because the report-
ers’ questions that followed her story were about racial issues and Trump’s crit-
icism of NFL players who took a knee during the national anthem.
Dealing With Conflict
While Spicer appeared to get ruffled when cross-questioned by reporters and 
adopted a stern, scolding tone to berate them, Sanders would avoid getting into 
back-and-forth conversations with reporters. While Spicer would maintain 
eye contact with the reporter while he challenged them and responded to their 
attacks, Sanders chose to give a succinct response to the question, then signal 
that the reporter’s turn was over by turning her body and gaze away and calling 
on another reporter. For example, at a September 25, 2017, briefing, a reporter 
questioned her about Trump’s criticism of NFL players and whether she thought 
his rhetoric was divisive. She responded by explaining that he was simply in fa-
vor of honoring the American flag. To the reporter’s repeated follow-ups about 
whether he went too far by calling the players “SOBs who should be fired,” 
Sanders simply repeated herself. Finally, she cut off the reporter, saying, “I an-
swered your question.” Throughout the exchange she maintained an even tone 
and did not display aggression in her body language. In contrast, Spicer, when 
questioned by a reporter about Trump’s criticisms of a federal judge as incom-
petent for blocking the enforcement of the travel ban on Muslims, struggled to 
answer questions and engaged in a lengthy back-and-forth with the reporter. He 
adopted a more confrontational approach, often doubling down on his claims, 
and raising his voice to make his point.
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DISCUSSION
The White House press corps has become more diverse over the years, with a 
growing number of minority and women reporters. While that is good news, 
this study finds that women reporters ask fewer questions than men reporters, 
which indicates that they are called upon less frequently than men. Out of the 
833 questions analyzed in this study, 60.5% were asked by men while 39.5% were 
asked by women. This finding is similar to that of Meeks (2018), who analyzed 
press briefings conducted by President Obama in 2014 and 2015 and found that 
men reporters still ask the greater number of questions in the briefing room. 
This shows that despite the presence of a woman press secretary, the long-time 
masculine routines of the press briefings are persistent.
Interestingly though, men and women reporters did not hew to gender ste-
reotypes in the issue topics of their questions, and there were no significant dif-
ferences in the frequency of men and women asking questions about the most 
popular topics. For example, both men and women were equally likely to ask 
questions about foreign affairs. However, they differed in their frequency of 
asking questions regarding racial issues, which are traditionally considered a 
feminine area of expertise. Though these questions were less commonly asked, 
women reporters (65.52%) were significantly more likely to ask them. This is a 
valuable addition to the literature on gender and the newsroom and illustrates 
the importance of having a diverse group of reporters at the White House, which 
can ensure that issues pertaining to diverse audience groups are represented in 
political news. If the news focuses overwhelmingly on men’s issues, the press 
agenda will not reflect the audience’s needs.
In terms of the types of questions asked, this study found that men ask ques-
tions about accountability and initiative more frequently and are also more likely 
to interrupt the press secretary, regardless of gender. Accountability-related ques-
tions ask for explanation or justification, and initiative questions include more 
than one question at a single turn. Clayman et al. (2012) consider these questions 
part of the adversarial trend of questioning the president, and while in-depth in-
terviews with reporters would help uncover the reasons behind these disparate 
styles, one possible reason for these differences would be that given the masculine 
norms of the White House press corps, men reporters are more comfortable ask-
ing adversarial questions than women reporters, who might be concerned about 
straying too far from gender-stereotypic behavior. The same reason could explain 
why men were more likely to interrupt the press secretary, regardless of gender.
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This study also finds that women reporters in the White House press corps 
are significantly more likely than men reporters to use a negative tone in their 
questions, but that they did not differ in the tone they adopted toward men 
and women press secretaries. The first finding is in line with existing research 
about women reporters in the White House being more aggressive than men 
(Clayman et al., 2012) and could be attributed to women reporters adopting the 
masculine norms and routines of the White House politics beat in order to as-
sert their competence. The lack of influence of the press secretary’s gender could 
be attributed to reporters’ reactions to the turbulent politics of the White House 
and their desire to perform their function as a watchdog regardless of the gen-
der of the source. It could also signal that though reporters sometimes cover the 
White House briefing in gendered terms, they do not consider gender salient 
when it comes to doing their job and holding politicians accountable.
In terms of gendered behavior associated with the press secretaries, I found 
that Spicer was significantly more likely to interrupt reporters than was Sanders. 
Sanders used a mix of feminine and masculine rhetorical styles, while Spicer 
was more confrontational and more conventionally masculine. The differences 
in rhetorical styles made Sanders appear more in control and professional and 
could be a result of the trust the president demonstrated in her.
From the perspective of reporters, however, the different rhetorical styles 
did not change the nature of the briefing in any way. Reporters asked about 
the same number of questions of each press secretary, and the different rhe-
torical styles did not result in either press secretary’s briefings being longer or 
shorter or more or less informative than the other’s. In the sample analyzed in 
this chapter, Spicer held a couple of hour-long press conferences: one in January 
2017 and the other in February 2017 after returning to the briefing room from 
a weeklong break. But all of his other briefings lasted on an average about 25 to 
30 minutes. Sanders also held short briefings ranging from 25 to 30 minutes. In 
addition, though she used anecdotes and family references to bring emotion into 
the briefing and humanize the president, the reporters almost never maintained 
this tone. Their questions often deviated sharply from the tone and agenda set 
by both press secretaries at the beginning of the briefing.
The findings from this study are interesting and produce insights for politi-
cal journalism as well as communication professionals, especially crisis commu-
nicators, who liaise with the media. The findings also contribute to the broader 
literature on women in politics. Though press secretaries are not elected rep-
resentatives, their position is political because they act as the public face of the 
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person who occupies the highest elected office in the country. Their job involves 
defending the actions of the president and justifying and interpreting the policy 
decisions of the administration. The literature on women in politics shows that 
voters use partisan cues rather than gender stereotypes to evaluate women can-
didates but that gender considerations might be activated during certain con-
ditions, such as when women candidates launch unprovoked attacks against 
men candidates or act unprofessionally. For example, while voters are equally 
likely to penalize men and women candidates who cry or express anger on the 
campaign trail, they are likely to evaluate women more negatively than men for 
expressing anger (Brooks, 2011). This study indicates that in using a mix of fem-
inine and masculine rhetorical strategies, Sanders is attempting to create a fine 
balance where she does not project an overly aggressive and partisan image of 
herself but tries to appear fair and in control of the message. She also avoids get-
ting into verbal arguments with reporters, which could lead people to evaluate 
her negatively. Spicer, on the other hand, is unafraid to express his anger and 
uses so-called masculine rhetoric, but in his case it backfires, with both report-
ers and the president evaluating him negatively.
In November 2018 a widely circulated clip purported to show CNN reporter 
Jim Acosta snatching a microphone from the hands of a woman identified as 
the deputy press secretary. Partisan media and the White House immediately 
attacked Acosta for what they termed his aggressive behavior toward the staffer, 
and Acosta lost his access to the White House briefly as a result of the incident. 
White House staffer Stephanie Grisham tweeted the following message about the 
incident: “President Trump believes in a free press and expects and welcomes 
tough questions of him and his Administration. We will, however, never toler-
ate a reporter placing his hands on a young woman just trying to do her job as 
a White House intern.” She went on to say that the conduct was an example of 
“outrageous disregard for everyone, including young women, who work in this 
Administration” (Press Secretary, 2018).
Though not always at the forefront, gender considerations occupy an im-
portant role in the interactions between the White House press corps and the 
press secretaries, and this study makes an exploratory attempt to parse this dy-
namic. Future studies could address some of the drawbacks of this study, such 
as the examination of a small subsection of data and the lack of inclusion of con-
found variables such as reporters’ experience and the partisan leaning of the me-
dia organizations they work for, which could affect the media–White House 
relationship.
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Looking Forward and 
Looking Back at Analysis 
of Communication Impacts
Rosalee A. Clawson, Discussant
C
-SPAN is a public affairs television network founded by the cable industry. 
Through its gavel-to-gavel coverage of the U.S. Congress and its attention 
to other major political happenings, the network makes politics accessible 
to people across the nation. C-SPAN deepens democracy by fostering transpar-
ency in real time.
The C-SPAN Archives and its Video Library are just as critical to democracy. 
The C-SPAN Video Library provides a digital record of the network’s coverage, 
enabling unprecedented access to a tremendous source of information and cre-
ating a permanent archive of democracy in action. The C-SPAN Video Library 
is quite simply a national treasure. It is an easily searchable public repository 
that provides the authoritative record of events occurring in the legislative body 
and beyond. It is a technological testament to democracy.
Founded in 1986 by Robert X. Browning, a Purdue political science profes-
sor, the C-SPAN Archives and its Video Library are a critical resource for a wide 
variety of stakeholders. Congressional staffers rely on the Video Library to pre-
pare their bosses for political interactions. Fact-checkers and journalists use it 
to do their reporting. Campaigns incorporate favorable video clips into adver-
tisements, and opposition researchers plumb the depths of the archives to iden-
tify just the right video to attack their opponents. And of course citizens and 
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interest groups use the videos to gather information and assess whether mem-
bers of Congress are representing their interests.
Educators are another key group using the C-SPAN Video Library. Since 
the Video Library’s inception, teachers have incorporated video content into 
their lesson plans, first through VHS tapes delivered through the postal system 
and now through instantaneous online access. The C-SPAN Video Library is 
an invaluable resource for teaching a wide range of American government top-
ics. Thanks to Professor Browning’s vision and foresight, individuals ranging 
from the highest level of political elites to average, everyday citizens have ac-
cess to the complete record of C-SPAN — over 260,000 hours to date — to view, 
analyze, clip, and share.
In recent years the C-SPAN Video Library has encouraged scholars to use 
video in their research endeavors. By holding a series of academic conferences 
and working closely with the C-SPAN Center for Scholarship & Engagement at 
Purdue University, the C-SPAN Video Library has stimulated a number of excit-
ing research projects across many disciplines, including political science, com-
munication, history, and African American studies, among others. The annual 
conferences have featured senior scholars and cultivated the participation of 
graduate students and junior faculty, with the goal of training a new generation 
of scholars to incorporate C-SPAN videos into their research agendas.
The 2019 Research Conference provided scholars the opportunity to present 
their innovative research in a focused setting that allowed for significant feed-
back and discussion. The “Looking Forward and Looking Back at Analysis of 
Communication Impacts” panel featured original research by three scholars. 
These scholars used the C-SPAN Video Library to explore enduring questions 
of interest to those who study political communication.
First, historian Caitlin Fendley takes advantage of the C-SPAN Video Library’s 
longevity to examine how a controversial issue — population growth — was por-
trayed on the network in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, in Chapter 7, “Americans 
for Zero Population Growth: Media, Politics, and Public Understandings of 
Overpopulation,” she profiles three C-SPAN video clips that illuminate who was 
discussing overpopulation as a problem and how the issue was discussed. The 
video clips feature interest group leaders from Zero Population Growth (ZPG) 
and the Population Institute, a think tank expert from the American Enterprise 
Institute, and Paul Ehrlich, the author of The Population Bomb. Fendley demon-
strates that several themes emerge from these videos, including the importance 
of individual choice, not coercion, for determining family size; the impact of the 
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United States and other rich nations on population and consumption; and the 
role of individual responsibility in family planning and in taking political ac-
tion to curb the problem. Fendley’s video analysis provides a window into the 
public debate about population growth that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
Next, political scientists Bryce J. Dietrich and Jielu Yao emphasize the pub-
lic service role played by the C-SPAN Video Library. In Chapter 8, “Is There 
Anybody Out There? C-SPAN, Women, and the Distribution of Desirable Speech 
Time,” they analyze which C-SPAN videos are viewed more often to understand 
which Congress members’ videos are accessed most by the public. Dietrich and 
Yao argue that the same factors that predict which members of Congress will re-
ceive more attention in the mainstream media will also explain whose speeches 
are more likely to be viewed online. Therefore, they hypothesize that party lead-
ers, members with greater seniority, and more ideologically extreme members 
will garner more online views of their videos. Analyzing video downloads be-
tween 1980 and 2019, they find evidence to confirm their hypotheses. Indeed, 
party leaders, more senior members, and those at the ideological extremes get 
more views. They also find that women members of Congress receive more views 
than men members of Congress.
Finally, communication scholar Katelyn E. Brooks conducts a rhetorical 
framing analysis of another controversial issue: election access and integrity. 
Specifically, in Chapter 9, “For the People Act of 2019: A Framing Analysis of 
Legislators’ Videos on Twitter,” Brooks identifies and analyzes 89 videos circu-
lated by current members of Congress on Twitter regarding the For the People 
Act of 2019 (H.R.1) between January 3 and July 3, 2019. The shared videos in-
clude news media clips, C-SPAN clips, and member-produced videos. Brooks 
argues that social media posts are now a critical form of congressional commu-
nication with constituents. Her study adds to our understanding of how repre-
sentatives communicate with the public on contested policies. As with so many 
issues these days, H.R.1 is contested along partisan lines, with Democrats in fa-
vor of the legislation and Republicans opposed.
Brooks shows that some H.R.1 frames were used consistently by members of 
both political parties and across different video sources. Representatives often 
shared videos that highlighted their individual positions on the issue, connected 
the bill to local issues in their districts, and explained the impact of H.R.1 on 
money in politics. There were also some partisan differences in the framing of 
H.R.1. Democratic members of Congress tended to frame the legislation as pro-
moting government for the people, whereas Republican members emphasized 
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the bill as an example of federal overreach and encroachment into state author-
ity over elections. Importantly, Brooks argues that sharing C-SPAN footage over 
social media lends credibility to a member’s message. Members are likely tweet-
ing C-SPAN clips to bask in the reflected legitimacy of the public affairs network.
Collectively these three chapters provide insights into how controversial issues 
are portrayed on C-SPAN, how representatives use social media and C-SPAN 
video to communicate with their constituents, and which C-SPAN videos receive 
more viewership. These chapters contribute to scholarship in history, communi-
cation, and political science. It is important to explicitly note that this research 
is possible solely because of the extraordinary video footage made freely avail-
able and easily accessible by the C-SPAN Video Library.
The research in Part 3 of this volume lays the foundation for a wide variety 
of future work on the effects and use of C-SPAN videos. For example, Fendley’s 
analysis of historical themes concerning population growth could be extended 
to assess the impact of these arguments on political activists today. Brooks might 
employ a social media network analysis to examine which constituents are more 
likely to retweet the C-SPAN video clips of H.R.1 compared to the news media 
or member-produced clips. A next step for Dietrich and Yao might be to further 
explore why women members of Congress receive more views than men mem-
bers of Congress and what impact that has on political discourse. The possibil-
ities for future work are many and varied. It is clear the C-SPAN Video Library 
is an unmatched resource catalyzing important academic research.
CHAPTER 7
AMERICANS FOR ZERO POPULATION GROWTH
Media, Politics, and Public Understandings of Overpopulation
Caitlin Fendley
I
n 1991, USA Today asked sci-fi author Isaac Asimov, “What should the na-
tion’s top priorities be in 1991?” Asimov responded:
We are facing so many problems; however, above everything else are the prob-
lems of the environment and population. As long as the population keeps 
increasing in the world, the environment will continue to deteriorate in ev-
ery way. And life will become harder and more miserable for all of us. (“Ask 
Asimov,” 1991, p. 2)
Asimov’s concern was at odds with many political leaders at the time. In fact, 
just 1 year later, President George H. W. Bush actively began pushing for pop-
ulation growth as an “engine of change” and “friend of the environment” (Hoff, 
2012, p. 246). He emphasized the compatibility between economic growth and 
environmental protection and the need for “cleaner growth” (“Excerpts From 
Speech by Bush on ‘Action Plan,’” 1992).
And yet, as Asimov’s remarks revealed, serious concerns about popu-
lation growth never went away. For members of Zero Population Growth 
(ZPG), the largest grassroots population group in the United States, and other 
population-conscious Americans, the 1990s were characterized by deep con-
cerns about an overpopulated Earth. The 1994 Cairo Conference brought to-
gether population experts to discuss new population policy, “giving prominence 
to reproductive health and the empowerment of women,” as well as focusing on 
the “needs of individual women and men, rather than achieving demographic 
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targets” (United Nations Population Fund, 1994). The success and influence of 
the conference was measured by its ability to achieve international consensus on 
population issues, advancing a new definition of population policy and giving 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) “unprecedented involvement in formu-
lating national policy statements and drafting the Program of Action,” which, 
among other things, helped to “chart population policy” for the next couple of 
decades (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995, pp. 223, 224).1
Grassroots activists continued to organize on the issue of overpopulation, 
and many popular works raised awareness about the perceived problem. An 
examination of population concerns during the 1990s demonstrates that the 
“population bomb” narrative that burst onto the scene in the 1960s continued 
successfully despite increased conservative backlash, concerns over the “birth 
dearth,” and pro-family, antiabortion political discourse during the Reagan and 
G. H. W. Bush administrations of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Political conflicts between conservative and liberal ideologies have often cen-
tered on family values. Historian Robert O. Self, for example, demonstrates that 
the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the feminist and gay liber-
ation movements, challenged earlier patriarchal and heterosexual ideas of family 
life, including traditional male breadwinner and female housewife roles, and the 
promotion of parenthood and childbearing, which had previously dominated 
American culture (Self, 2012). Debates between traditional and modern defi-
nitions of family inevitably tie into population anxieties and broader concerns 
related to reproductive rights. Proponents of the zero population growth move-
ment directly challenged these traditional family values by reimagining and en-
couraging small families of two or fewer children as the ideal (Rogers, 1971).2 
Even recently, political commentators and demographers have noted that the 
positive consequences of the feminist and sexual revolutions, such as women 
entering the workforce and accessing birth control and legal abortion, have led 
to continued declining birthrates in the United States, which some believe could 
lead to a “demographic crisis” if significant cultural changes and pronatalist pol-
icies are not implemented (Kurtz, 2005).3 This crisis includes financial and social 
disruption: an increasingly unsupportable aging population, worldwide depres-
sion, and the fear that “religious traditionalists” will outpopulate secular liber-
als (Kurtz, 2005). Thus, gains made by the progressive social movements of the 
1960s and 1970s challenged not only conservative ideas of family but the very 
notion of population growth as a societal good.
Scholars have argued that population concerns are politically charged, which 
prevents serious discussion of overpopulation and “ignores significant global 
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realities and trends” that point to ecological and human concerns about popu-
lation growth (Kopnina & Washington, 2016, pp. 133–134). Although there is 
not always a sharp political division between pro- and zero-growth proponents, 
and there have always been exceptions, many of the social and practical solu-
tions put forth by zero population growth advocates have promoted politically 
and culturally contentious issues — legalizing and promoting abortion, increas-
ing access to contraceptives, and encouraging comprehensive sex education — all 
of which have tapped into the dominant liberal-conservative divides.4 But these 
proponents of zero population growth have also sought deeper societal changes 
by challenging pronatalism, which continues to be a dominating cultural force 
in the United States. Groups like ZPG promoted “pro-family” values as well, but 
with a focus on improving the lives of families and society at large by ensuring 
only wanted children were born, and on a habitable planet. They argued that ac-
cess to abortion and contraceptives, and destigmatizing small or childfree fam-
ilies, would help accomplish this.
The C-SPAN Video Library provides insight into the growing conversation 
around population growth. Advocates of zero population growth emphasized 
individual accountability for population issues, as well as the ways in which 
Americans could take responsibility for national and global consequences of 
unchecked population growth. These activists viewed the population problem 
as one partially caused by and resolvable by Americans, urging the need to con-
front overpopulation concerns in the United States before doing so abroad. The 
C-SPAN Archives provide an opportunity to examine public discourse regard-
ing fears of overpopulation, as well as the extent to which population proponents 
encouraged grassroots activism with the importance of individual responsibil-
ity in mind. Based on this early research, it is clear that the story of the popula-
tion bomb was anything but a cohesive narrative, and the constantly conflicting 
ideas about overpopulation — what to do about it, what or who was causing it, 
and whether it even existed — undermined the very goals of population activ-
ists and allowed room for other groups to manipulate its ideas to darker ends.5
SCHOLARSHIP ON POPULATION CONTROL
When discussing population growth issues during the 20th century, scholars 
usually focus on the late 1960s and the 1970s, a time when the zero popula-
tion growth movement was at its height (Connelly, 2008; Hoff, 2012). Some 
narratives go as far back as the late 1940s and the 1950s to highlight the work 
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of foundational environmentalists in the population movement (Desrochers 
& Hoffbauer, 2009).6 By the mid-1970s and 1980s, the population movement 
seemed to have lost some of its popular momentum. The movement’s predic-
tions of mass famine and death had not come true and, in fact, the fertility rate in 
countries like the United States was slowing (Ehrlich, 1968; World Bank Group, 
n.d.). Into the 1980s, governmental stance on population generally sought to en-
courage growth in developed nations, as for many, fears of stagnation replaced 
ecological concerns (Hoff, 2012, pp. 230, 245).
Further, the forced sterilization campaign in 1970s India and China’s one-child 
policy revealed the coercive side to the population movement. Previous schol-
arship on population control and growth has mainly focused on these coercive 
aspects and misfortunate outcomes. Scholars have also primarily explored over-
population as a global issue and one of developing countries (Connelly, 2008; 
Dowbiggin, 2008). Historian Matthew Connelly (2008), for example, argued that 
“all [population control proponents] looked at human beings not as individuals 
but as populations that could be shaped through the combined force of faith and 
science” (Connelly, 2008, xii). More recently, historians have focused on concerns 
regarding U.S. population growth through the lenses of economics, politics, and 
the media, as well as its role within American environmentalism (Hoff, 2012; 
Olszynko-Gryn and Ellis, 2018; Robertson, 2012). And yet, though a global issue, 
grassroots population organizations like ZPG believed that addressing overpopula-
tion began at home and encouraged individual action and local activism.7 Though 
ZPG would eventually turn its focus toward more global reproductive health ini-
tiatives, from the late 1960s into the 1990s it sought to educate Americans about 
the environmental and human importance of having smaller families.
USING THE C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY
Material in the C-SPAN Video Library sheds light on these conversations and or-
ganizing networks. Individuals devoted to zero population growth in the United 
States in the late 1980s and the 1990s (when the majority of the videos I analyzed 
were from) were concerned not only with global trends and increasing aid and 
access to contraceptives in developing countries but also with the consumption, 
affluence, and birth rate of their own country. My project seeks to better under-
stand how many of these concerned Americans — whether they be a population 
scientist, a politician, or a member of a grassroots organization — understood 
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and conveyed ideas of population growth to wider audiences. Specifically, my 
research explores two broad questions using the C-SPAN Video Library: (1) 
who was discussing overpopulation as a problem and how did they discuss it, 
and (2) what role did they feel Americans had in both contributing to and re-
solving this problem?
In this chapter I will focus on a few key individuals and their role in the pop-
ulation debate as showcased in three C-SPAN videos that capture the issues and 
politics of the population conversation at the end of the 20th century. These 
videos are representative of the common themes I found in other C-SPAN vid-
eos and in my dissertation research more broadly. Four main themes emerged 
in these videos: the importance of (1) choice and voluntarism, not coercion, 
in stabilizing the population; (2) individual responsibility and collective ac-
tion; (3) America’s role in the population problem; and (4) education and re-
sources. While searching through the Video Library, I began with very broad 
and general searches, using keywords like “population” (and variants, such as 
“overpopulation,” “population bomb,” and “population crisis”), relevant indi-
viduals and groups (e.g., Paul Ehrlich, ZPG), and other issues closely related 
to the population debate (e.g., abortion, contraception, immigration, envi-
ronmental policy).
After narrowing down nearly 100 videos that appeared relevant in some sig-
nificant way, I decided to focus on the late 1980s and the 1990s (about 25 videos) 
in order to give the videos proper historical context and provide a structured, 
succinct analysis of the topic. The main reason for this was a practical one: a ma-
jority of the most relevant videos from the C-SPAN Video Library were from the 
1990s or later, and I wanted the ability to appropriately ground my analysis in 
historical and archival research and tie the videos to my larger research project. 
Further, from my research findings so far, the zero population growth movement 
appears to have experienced a shift in emphasis during the late 1980s and 1990s 
from focusing on family planning to tying environmental problems to modern 
quality of life issues. These included addressing the problem of American afflu-
ence and overconsumption as well as urban pollution, traffic, and crowding as 
directly detrimental to the health of urbanites and their children. Focusing on 
these concerns successfully raised awareness about the connections between 
population growth and the problem of cities by demonstrating the immediate, 
visible, and overbearing effects of overpopulation. Therefore, the C-SPAN Video 
Library gave me the opportunity to further explore and confirm these trends 
gleaned from primary and archival materials.
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DEFUSING THE POPULATION BOMB
By the late 1960s, the population bomb ignited. At the time, American citizens 
from across the political spectrum expressed increased concern over the envi-
ronmental effects of unchecked population growth. The most famous declara-
tion of alarm was biologist Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, published in 
1968, which “incited a worldwide fear of overpopulation” by arguing that hav-
ing too many people on Earth would lead to mass starvation and death across 
the globe (Mann, 2018). That same year, Ehrlich formed ZPG, a nationwide 
grassroots group concerned with the effects of population growth on the en-
vironment and quality of life. ZPG mainly sought to challenge the pronatalist 
norms of American society by encouraging people to have smaller families and 
“stop at two.” Members of ZPG took population activism into their own hands 
by educating friends, family, colleagues, and local communities about the need 
to curb population growth. They also supported resources and measures that 
would make this possible, such as fighting for increased access to abortion, birth 
control, and sterilization, and promoting pregnancy prevention and compre-
hensive sex education.8 Twenty years later Ehrlich, members of ZPG, and other 
population activists continued to focus on local and national strategies to de-
fuse the population bomb.
The first video clip I analyzed is part of a talk presented in 1989 by Paul 
Ehrlich (see Figure 7.1) titled “Growth and the Environment: Defusing the 
Population Bomb,” excerpted from a longer seminar titled “Global Environmental 
Problems: The New Energy and Environmental Agenda” sponsored by the Wirth 
Washington Seminar. Through the 1990s, Ehrlich continued to fight for popu-
lation stabilization, noting the harmful impact that America’s population had 
on the rest of the world. In contrast to popular conceptions of overpopulation, 
which posited that the main problem is the rapid population growth in devel-
oping countries, Ehrlich emphasized that “the worst overpopulation . . . is, of 
course, in the rich countries” (C-SPAN, 1989a). His argument focused not just 
on demographics, though, but consumption as well, a reference to the I = PAT 
equation. Developed in 1971 by Paul Ehrlich and environmental scientist John 
Holdren, the I = PAT equation argues that the human impact of ecosystems (I) 
equals population (P) multiplied by affluence or consumption (A) and the tech-
nology (T) that drives consumption (Holdren 2018, p. 69).9 The United States, 
Ehrlich argued, is particularly problematic due to its high consumption and 
“sloppy,” inefficient technology that drives that consumption, even outdoing 
other developed nations (Fendley, 2019c).
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In sum, Ehrlich recognized that the problem of population was not confined 
to developing countries with larger populations but was a global problem in 
which everyone must act. He argued that Americans need to be politically ac-
tive not only to curb population growth but also to recognize the extraordinary 
influence that the United States and other wealthy countries have on the rest of 
the world (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1990, pp. 227, 230, 231).
THE POPULATION GROWTH DEBATE ON C-SPAN
On January 25, 1989, the Close Up Foundation, as part of its Current Issues seg-
ment, invited guests Ben Wattenberg and Susan Weber (see Figure 7.2) to dis-
cuss and debate the issue of population growth. Wattenberg, senior fellow at the 
American Enterprise Institute and author of the 1987 book The Birth Dearth, 
stated that while the global population was growing, it was doing so at a histor-
ically slower rate, turning back the positive trend of nearly 200 years of growth 
in the United States. In response, Weber, executive director of ZPG, argued that 
this very growth contributed to the many ills of the modern world: pollution, 
traffic, crowding, and poverty, to name a few (C-SPAN, 1989b).
The clip chosen from this wider debate, focusing on Weber’s arguments, high-
lights the ways in which organizations like ZPG encouraged Americans to fight 
population growth by having smaller families (Fendley, 2019b). When asked 
FIGURE 7.1 Paul Ehrlich discusses the problem of consumption and affluence in devel-
oped nations as part of the Wirth Washington Seminar, sponsored by politician Timothy 
Wirth (C-SPAN, 1989a).
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what we should do about overpopulation, Weber highlighted the importance 
of “making careful decisions”: of recognizing that not everybody desires to have 
children, and that parents should consider adoption as opposed to conceiving 
more biological children. Her challenge to pronatalism was coupled with the is-
sue of affluent consumption: that the high standard of living of developed coun-
tries has resulted in too much waste being produced. Her solution was to address, 
like the I = PAT equation, both the population and its high degree of consump-
tion. The longer video, spanning a little over an hour, features a back-and-forth 
discussion between Weber and Wattenberg, as well as Q&A, centering on one 
of the central questions of the population debate: is population growth a good 
thing, or not (C-SPAN, 1989b)?
Though Weber and Wattenberg debated whether population growth was a 
problem, they both agreed on one thing: that people should have choices.10 If 
people want to have smaller families or countries want to lower their population, 
the choice should be available to them (C-SPAN, 1989b). This meant not only 
increasing access to contraception, sterilization, and abortion but changing the 
broader views and knowledge Americans held about families. Members of ZPG, 
like Weber, argued that the promotion of smaller families challenged the pres-
sure that many experienced to have children in a largely pronatalist society like 
the United States. Some Americans believed that encouraging couples to have 
only one or two children at most infringed on “the freedom of the individual” 
FIGURE 7.2 Susan Weber and Ben Wattenberg debating population growth in Wash-
ington, D.C., in front of an audience of students from across the U.S. and Germany as 
part of Close Up’s citizenship education program (C-SPAN, 1989b).
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to plan their own families. Thus, population activist groups like ZPG sought to 
both highlight the population problem and attempt to dismantle deep-seated 
pronatalist attitudes that prevented many from having fewer, or no, children 
(Peck & Senderowitz, 1974, p. 1; Sharbutt, 1973).
The Weber and Wattenberg debate also highlights the two opposing theories 
of population growth that had reached a high point in the late 1980s. The first, 
in support of population growth, was the “birth dearth,” an alarming decrease in 
American fertility rates, which Wattenberg (1987) argued was the result of many 
factors, including better education and career opportunities for women, legal-
ized abortion, increased access to contraceptives, urbanization, and environmen-
tal concerns (p. 129). He felt that fear of the “population explosion” was partly 
to blame as well (p. 12). After all, attitudes about the ideal family had changed 
drastically since the early postwar years to be more in line with ZPG’s “Stop at 
Two” mantra. For example, a 1945 Gallup Poll revealed that 47% of Americans 
believed that four or more children was the ideal family size, and in 1959 it was 
nearly the same at 45%, while by 1985 only 11% believed this. By 1985 56% be-
lieved two children were best, while only 16% had felt this way in 1959 (p. 6). 
His fears were also part of larger conservative concerns about population/envi-
ronmental activists and their values (Kaye, 1987, p. 20).
Wattenberg argued that the “birth dearth” would hurt not only Americans but 
the whole “modern, Western world” by leading to economic turbulence, causing 
personal unhappiness and unfulfillment for millions of adults, and damaging 
American and western political power and security on an international scale. He 
argued, for example, that a nation cannot achieve “super-power” status without 
a large population to support it (Wattenberg, 1987, pp. 7, 8, 82). And, although 
Wattenberg himself said he did not support the idea that America should re-
main of mainly “white European ‘stock,’” he speculated increased immigration 
and high fertility rates of non-White people would likely cause “racial and eth-
nic turbulence” in the United States as the percentage of White Americans de-
creases significantly (pp. 112–115).11
In contrast, Weber and other members of ZPG posited that, despite the 
strides the population movement had made toward normalizing the two-child 
family, there was still much work to be done. Publications such as the ZPG 
Reporter frequently cited the need to encourage one-child and childfree fam-
ilies and to make small-family choices acceptable and widespread. For exam-
ple, in 1990 ZPG published Planning the Ideal Family: The Small Family Option, 
which encouraged one- and no-child families, recognizing the “sizeable amount 
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of societal and parental pressure to reproduce” (“Childfree by Choice,” 1989). 
While only children were often viewed as selfish, childfree couples, too, were 
stereotypically labeled selfish and materialistic (and very likely to wind up 
seriously regretting their decision to not procreate) (“Childfree by Choice,” 
1989; Wasserman, 1990; Wattenberg, 1987). ZPG tried to dispel notions that 
it was abnormal to not want children, even inviting childfree women, like 
Leslie Lafayette, to share their positive experiences and lives without children 
(Lafayette & McCarty, 1994, p. 5).12
The final clip described here involves a discussion of population growth by 
Werner Fornos, president of the Population Institute, a nonprofit that seeks 
to increase “access to family planning information, education, and services” 
(Population Institute, n.d.). Like Ehrlich and Weber, Fornos emphasized the 
role of Americans in population growth and the importance of recogniz-
ing that role. He attempted to refute the idea that the population problem was 
one that “others” had to deal with. Unlike Ehrlich, though, he believed that each 
couple should have the number of children they could care for and be respon-
sible for. Give people the education, resources, and opportunity to make family 
planning decisions for themselves, he argued, and they will often choose to have 
smaller families (C-SPAN, 1998a, 1998b). In response to a Q&A session ques-
tion, Fornos emphasized that it was “our [American] prohibitive consumptive 
lifestyles [that] contribute to what’s happening on this planet. . . . We in the in-
dustrialized world make up 20% of the world’s population, and we consume 80% 
of the world’s resources” (Fendley, 2019a). Population growth was slowing, par-
ticularly in developed nations like the United States, but American affluence con-
tinued to be highly problematic. Though Fornos, with publications like Gaining 
People, Losing Ground: A Blueprint for Stabilizing World Population (1987), often 
focused on the role of government in stabilizing the global population, he and 
others helped to remove the “vague vastness of the population problem” that 
had been an issue for concerned Americans at the time (Morain, 1988, p. 29). 
This, coupled with tangible grassroots solutions provided by groups like ZPG, 
gave such people the drive and resources to, they hoped, affect greater change.
As these three C-SPAN video clips demonstrate, population stabilization was 
on the minds of many environmentally conscious individuals, even into the late 
1980s and the 1990s when how to tackle this issue (or whether population growth 
was an issue) was a problem of increased political division. At the turn of the 
21st century, environmentalists and proponents for curbing the population, like 
Democrats Al Gore, Timothy Wirth, and Gaylord Nelson, continued to push for 
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policy, resources, and awareness of the population problem. Rhetoric about the 
importance of assuming more personal responsibility for social issues permeated 
both the Democratic and Republican parties at the time. Many of these individ-
uals noted the continued silence from the government, citing the persistent con-
troversy caused by any discussions of curbing population growth (C-SPAN, 1992, 
1994, 2003). And population advocates of the 1990s were plagued with the task of 
trying to undo the “The More People, the Better” mentality of the Reagan-Bush 
era (Sharpless, 1995, p. 95). Grassroots population activism flourished under the 
Clinton administration, though it was his vice president, Al Gore, who spoke up 
about the population problem (“Grassroots Action,” 1993).13 Despite cultivating 
a movement of increased awareness about population issues over the latter de-
cades of the 20th-century, the population movement failed to create a “national 
dialogue on sustainability” (C-SPAN, 2003). Even so, Americans for zero popu-
lation growth continued to push for policy solutions and political involvement, 
while keeping in mind their own impact on the wider world.
The 1990s proved to be a decade of great debate over the population problem, 
and the C-SPAN Video Library provides insights into these conversations. For 
example, many key figures in the environmentalist movement published signif-
icant works throughout the decade, demonstrating that the fuse on the popu-
lation bomb continued to burn brightly. A steady publication of popular texts, 
studies, and grassroots booklets — from Paul and Anne Ehrlich’s The Population 
Explosion (1990) to Joel E. Cohen’s How Many People Can the Earth Support? 
(1995) and even Al Gore’s Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit 
(1992) — highlighted the dangers that unchecked population growth continued 
to cause for human life and the planet. Many of these voices stressed the impor-
tance of individual responsibility, awareness, and activism, channeling the pop-
ulation movement of the 1970s, which had recognized the “individual sacrifices 
of the everyday citizen” to combat population growth whose “personal decisions 
have massive social implications” (Flippen, 2000, p. 167; Sharbutt, 1973). This 
emphasis on each individual was in part a challenge to the pessimistic, declen-
sion narrative of the environmentalist movement, which obscured individual ef-
forts in the face of large-scale detriment to the Earth (Kirk, 2007, p. 6).
Satisfied that the two-child ideal had come to fruition, ZPG shifted its focus 
to destigmatizing the one-child and childfree family. Others joined in as well. 
For example, in 1998 environmentalist Bill McKibben published Maybe One: 
A Personal and Environmental Argument for Single-Child Families, refuting the 
idea that only children are more selfish or at risk of behavioral problems, all 
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while inviting other families to consider “stopping at one” to curb the popula-
tion (McKibben, 1998). He believed that it was time for Americans to develop 
“some new social norms, through gradual shifts in what’s counted as desirable” 
when it comes to having children (or not) (p. 12).14 After having his first child, 
McKibben sought a vasectomy (McKibben, 1998). Would one surgery solve 
the population problem? Of course not, he likely recognized. But his actions, 
and those of other concerned Americans, highlights the dedication to solving 
overpopulation by taking personal responsibility for it. He, too, contended that 
Americans needed to be having smaller families: not under coercion, or fear, 
but because they recognized their individual stake in a wider, global issue. This 
is one aspect of the history of the population movement that is rarely acknowl-
edged in historical scholarship: the importance of individual responsibility and 
conscious decision-making in family planning that population proponents en-
couraged; the need for every person to take personal or political action to help 
curb the population. Through continuing to research the various ways in which 
Americans have understood population growth, I hope to illuminate the extent 
to which population-conscious Americans have sought dramatic changes by 
thinking globally and acting locally.
NOTES
 1. Barbara Crossette, former United Nations Bureau Chief of The New York 
Times, stated in March 2004 that the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population 
Development was “no less than a revolution” in population awareness at the 
time. See United Nations (2004).
 2. For example, one of ZPG’s former director of operations, Norman L. Rogers, 
argued that “to achieve the goal of Zero Population Growth, American cou-
ples must be convinced that they should have not more than two children” 
(Rogers, 1971).
 3. Pronatalism is defined as “any attitude or policy that is ‘pro-birth,’ that encour-
ages reproduction,” or “that exalts the role of parenthood” (Peck & Senderowitz, 
1974, p. 1).
 4. In the 1970s, for example, liberals and conservatives alike united over a “revi-
talized celebration of population growth” due to concerns over U.S. stagflation. 
Further, Hoff (2012) argues that most economists who analyzed the effects of 
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the “birth dearth” or contemplated the consequences of a no-growth society 
“did not have a political agenda” (p. 231). Even so, support for zero population 
growth has stemmed mainly from liberals and moderates, while concern over 
population decline is largely characterized as conservative.
 5. Unfortunately, the need to curb the population was sometimes used to ratio-
nalize racially charged anti-immigrant rhetoric, which “took off as a grassroots 
issue” during the early part of the decade (Goodman, n.d.). White suprema-
cists like John Tanton used concerns about overpopulation to fuel and rein-
force anti-immigrant, pro-eugenic attitudes and policy, which have not only 
left an ugly enduring legacy but stigmatized serious discussions of population 
issues (Goodman, 2019; Hoff, 2012, p. 247; Kopnina, & Washington, 2016).
 6. For example, Pierre Desrochers and Christine Hoffbauer argue that the “in-
tellectual roots” of Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb lay in the environmentalist 
works of Osborn (1948) and Vogt (1948).
 7. However, some of their efforts were still focused on global family planning. 
When ZPG later changed its name to Population Connection, it shifted its fo-
cus mainly to the global population problem and increasing contraceptive ac-
cess to women in developing countries.
 8. Numerous monographs have discussed ZPG’s role in many of these issues, 
though not at length. For example, see Staggenborg (1994), Kluchin (2011), 
and Connelly (2008).
 9. This is in contrast to, for example, those who believed that increasingly sophis-
ticated technologies will mitigate population and consumption-related prob-
lems. See, for instance, Kirk (2007).
 10. Though, like many on the opposing side of the population debate, he encour-
aged incentives or persuasion to convince Americans to have more children. 
See Cohen (1988).
 11. By contrast, the Reagan-Bush administrations held mixed positions on popula-
tion growth. The Reagan administration viewed the economic consequences as 
“neutral” and focused on promoting pronatalism at home while seeking to end 
funding for population initiatives in developing countries. Much of the contro-
versy involved a growing lobbying influence of conservative, anti-interventionist 
Christian Americans who condemned providing family planning funding 
for abortions. Seeking to undo the United States’ previous financial support 
for population-curbing initiatives abroad, Bush “continued the policies of the 
Reagan administration in opposing any financial assistance,” such as funding for 
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IS THERE ANYBODY OUT THERE?
C-SPAN, Women, and the Distribution of Desirable Speech Time
Bryce J. Dietrich and Jielu Yao
INTRODUCTION
Estimating C-SPAN’s media footprint is difficult since viewership statistics are 
not publicly available. And, rightfully so. Unlike local and national news orga-
nizations, C-SPAN is not meant to generate a profit. Rather it aims to create a 
public and nonpartisan record of what transpires on Capitol Hill. In doing so, 
it provides an important public service, especially to third parties who often 
use C-SPAN video to highlight important policy discussions. To this end, the 
C-SPAN Video Library is the main platform by which this information is found 
and ultimately downloaded, but we know very little about what type of informa-
tion is accessed. This study addresses this noticeable gap in the literature by an-
swering a simple question: what types of videos are viewed on C-SPAN’s website?
Answering this question not only gets at the heart of C-SPAN’s role in the 
broader media cycle, but it also adds considerably to previous literature. First, re-
gardless of whether a study considers local or national coverage, we often do not 
know the extent to which a single news story is viewed. Instead, scholars tend to 
use aggregate viewership statistics to suggest that lots of people watch the net-
work or show and in turn must also view a given story. However, just because a 
news story appears on a popular network or show does not mean the story itself 
was watched by the same number of viewers. By providing the number of times 
a video was viewed online, the C-SPAN Video Library actually provides such 
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a measure, which makes it particularly useful for assessing the overall interest 
viewers have in certain members of Congress (MCs) and legislative activities.
Second, C-SPAN itself is often offered as the primary way by which floor 
speeches reach constituents and colleagues (see, e.g., Maltzman & Sigelman, 
1996). As Kingdon (1989) notes, “it has become common for members or their 
staff to listen to the debate on the set in the office, keeping one ear on the pro-
ceedings while attending to other kinds of work” (p. 103). Although the number 
of online views is not what Kingdon describes, in this study we use this measure 
as a proxy for such interest, which we argue is the most direct measure to date. 
Not only does our approach give some insights into whether some representa-
tives are given more desirable floor time, but it also helps determine whether 
such speaking efforts are valuable from a policy or electoral standpoint.
In the next section of this chapter we review previous work on congressional 
media coverage, which is then placed in the broader context of C-SPAN. Using 
these insights, we generate several testable hypotheses related to various MC 
characteristics. Similar hypotheses will be developed about certain issues, but 
we have not yet conducted these analyses. Ultimately, we find that women are 
actually viewed more than men on C-SPAN’s website, which can be attributed 
to a number of factors, something we discuss in the conclusion of this chapter.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Political communication scholars have long noted the importance of journal-
ism norms when covering Capitol Hill (e.g., Bennett, 2016; Cook, 1998, 2006; 
Sparrow, 1999). Although several factors are predictive of news coverage, vari-
ables like novelty and timeliness have been shown to be the most relevant (Tuch-
man, 1978). This is unsurprising given the corporate side of the news business, 
which often favors more marketable forms of journalism (Hamilton, 2004; Spar-
row, 1999). Congressional news coverage is likely influenced by these same eco-
nomic pressures.
For example, scholars have consistently found that MCs with higher politi-
cal standing are more likely to be covered by national news organizations (e.g., 
Cook, 1986; Johnson & O’Grady, 2013). Over the course of their careers, party 
leaders develop working relationships with news organizations. When they ap-
pear again and again, they create a continuity that is valuable to both journalists 
and viewers. Moreover, unlike the rank and file, Speakers such as Nancy Pelosi 
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(D-CA) or Paul Ryan (R-WI) can actually turn their rhetoric into action, mak-
ing them inherently more newsworthy. This is why institutional standing is “the 
first and clearly most studied variable” (Vos, 2014, p. 2448).
Mixed results have been found for other variables. For example, Fogarty 
(2008) found no significant relationship between seniority and news coverage, 
whereas the inverse is true for Cook (1986), Kuklinski and Sigelman (1992), 
and Sellers and Schaffner (2007). Similarly, Cook (1986) found that more ex-
treme MCs were more likely to be covered by the news, whereas Squire (1988) 
and Arnold (2004) found no such relationship. These inconsistencies also extend 
to demographic characteristics, like gender, where Vos (2014) identified four 
studies in which gender was a significant predictor and eight studies in which it 
was not. Even though only one of these gender studies was based in the United 
States, similar inconsistencies have also been found in the news coverage of leg-
islative activity on Capitol Hill.
For example, Gershon (2012) found that MCs who produced more press re-
leases were more likely to receive press coverage, suggesting that members who 
apply “more effort to communicate with the press” are likely to be rewarded 
(p. 170). Arnold (2004) found a similar result with respect to the amount of effort 
on Capitol Hill. Using counts from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 
he found that MCs who produced more “newsworthy activities” appeared more 
often in local and national newspapers. Unfortunately, outside of these stud-
ies, little evidence has been found to suggest legislative work is positively asso-
ciated with the amount of media coverage. For example, Fogarty (2008) found 
that the number of bills sponsored and the number of press releases had no sig-
nificant effect on the number of newspaper articles they received, leading him 
to conclude that members’ actions “play no role in the amount of coverage they 
receive” (p. 461).
Although many have studied C-SPAN (e.g., see Frantzich, 1996), scholars 
of legislative speech have considered it the most (Maltzman & Sigelman, 1996; 
Morris, 2001). In these studies, C-SPAN is offered as one of the main ways that 
floor speeches reach constituents and colleagues. This study makes a similar ar-
gument, but instead of focusing on instances in which C-SPAN is viewed di-
rectly, we are primarily interested in the redistribution of C-SPAN footage by 
third parties, like media outlets or interested citizens.
Similar to studies that have used social media posts as a way to measure po-
litical interest (Barberá & Rivero, 2015), we use the number of views on the 
C-SPAN Video Library to achieve a similar end. However, instead of focusing 
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on the general public, we focus on C-SPAN viewers who tend to be more polit-
ically sophisticated (Maltzman & Sigelman, 1996). Although we fully acknowl-
edge the limited scope of our study, we also point out the advantage of being able 
to directly measure viewership — at least with respect to the C-SPAN website.
Previous work has operationalized media coverage by counting the number 
of times people and policies are mentioned. Such efforts assume that each news-
paper article is being read at the same rate and each television broadcast is being 
watched by the same number of people. By using the actual number of times a 
video is viewed on C-SPAN’s website, our study does not suffer from this lim-
itation, even though we fully acknowledge that the number of online views is at 
best a useful proxy for the number of people who actually watched.
THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
Our theoretical expectations are derived from previous literature on congres-
sional media coverage. On the one hand, C-SPAN video often appears on na-
tional and local television broadcasts, which means the variables that generally 
predict congressional news coverage should also predict the number of views 
on C-SPAN. However, C-SPAN is also a nonprofit entity, meaning many of the 
motivations of national and local news organizations may not apply to the num-
ber of times videos are viewed on C-SPAN’s website. With this caveat in mind, 
we will now outline our initial hypotheses.
First, we expect that senior MCs will be viewed more often on C-SPAN’s web-
site. News agencies often insist on “relevancy” (see Harcup & O’Neill, 2016, p. 
1482), meaning those who have a greater opportunity to influence the legislative 
process are more likely to be covered (see Harcup & O’Neill, 2016, p. 1471). Thus, 
both seniority (Kuklinski & Sigelman, 1992) and institutional position (Cook, 
1986; Johnson & O’Grady, 2013) should increase the number of C-SPAN views. 
For similar reasons, we also expect party leaders will also receive more views.
Second, the classic workhorse versus show horse hypothesis suggests that 
some MCs are better able to garner media attention while others focus more on 
their effort on legislative duties (Payne, 1980). Although several studies have 
called this hypothesis into question (e.g., Langbein & Sigelman, 1989; Sinclair, 
1986), others have found that congressional “mavericks” are increasingly “re-
warded by considerable media exposure” (Cook, 1986, p. 205). More recently, 
Wagner & Gruszczynski (2018) also found that ideologically extreme MCs 
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received more coverage. These results and previous work on partisan rhetoric 
(Morris, 2001; Proksch & Slapin, 2012) lead us to expect that ideologically ex-
treme MCs will receive more C-SPAN views.
Finally, we are interested in whether women are viewed more often than men, 
but we have no strong expectations given the mixed findings in the literature. 
For example, Niven (2005) finds that female MCs receive less total coverage, but 
Carroll and Schreiber (1997) find that they receive more attention on “women’s 
issues” like abortion and family leave. Conversely, when they address other mat-
ters news outlets are less likely to cover their efforts (Braden, 1996). However, 
since we know female MCs are more likely to speak about “women’s issues” 
(Gerrity et al., 2007; Osborn & Mendez, 2010), they should receive more views 
on C-SPAN’s website, even though the underlying mechanism is still unclear.
DATA AND METHODS
The C-SPAN data used in this study were collected in fall 2019. The study in-
cludes all videos posted on the website, including their descriptive data. Our main 
variable of interest is shown below “View in Congressional Chronicle” in Fig-
ure 8.1. This is the total number of times the video was viewed on the C-SPAN 
Video Library. Although we cannot say who viewed the video, we see this as be-
ing equivalent to the total amount of news coverage used in previous studies. 
Instead of identifying newspaper and television mentions, we directly measure 
the number of times videos are viewed on C-SPAN’s website.
The total number of views was obtained for 7,749 videos beginning in 1980 
and ending in 2019. Of these, 6,010 were videos of “House Sessions,” 1,282 were 
“Morning Hours,” and 457 fit into neither category. For the purpose of our initial 
FIGURE 8.1 Video description from a C-SPAN Video Library web page.
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analysis, we aggregated our data to year-level measures of the total number of 
views for videos in which the MCs appeared.
Speech data was obtained from HouseLive — an online service from the Office 
of the Clerk that provides live and archived video of proceedings in the U.S. 
House. In total, speech data was collected from 863 U.S. House debates begin-
ning on January 6, 2009, and ending on August 4, 2014, representing the total-
ity of debate occurring on the U.S. House floor over those 5 and a half years. 
These data were then restricted to speeches that were at least 50 words, yielding 
the text for 74,158 speeches.
Ideology is measured using DW-Nominate scores obtained from VoteView. 
Seniority and gender were obtained from GovTrack. Party leaders are defined 
as the Speaker of the House, majority/minority leader, and majority/minority 
whip. This is entered into our models as a dummy variable with a 1 indicating 
the MC was a party leader and a 0 otherwise. In addition to our main indepen-
dent variables, we also included whether the MC was a member of the majority 
party as an additional control. The MC’s race was also included as a control, as 
well as fixed-effects for the year in which the video appeared and the state the 
MC represented. The former controls for any temporal trends in C-SPAN on-
line views while the latter accounts for MCs receiving more views simply be-
cause they represent larger constituencies.
RESULTS
Figure 8.2 shows the total number of speeches delivered in a given year for all 
MCs (see histogram A) and the total number of views on C-SPAN’s website (see 
histogram B). These numbers were calculated in the following way. Imagine in 
2019 a MC gave two speeches. Let’s also assume the videos of the debates in which 
the first and second speeches appeared were viewed 10,000 and 15,000 times, re-
spectively. This means the MC would have two total speeches and 25,000 total 
views on the C-SPAN Video Library in 2019. This calculation was repeated for 
all MCs and years in our floor speech data (2009–2014). To make histogram B 
more comparable to histogram A, we divided the total number of speeches by 
10,000, so histogram B should be interpreted as 10s of 1000s of views.
Both histograms are right skewed, meaning most MCs delivered few speeches 
and received little attention on the C-SPAN Video Library, while some MCs gave 
many speeches and had a large number of online views. Given the skewed nature 
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of the distribution outlined in histogram B, the total number of views was di-
vided by the total number of days the MC spoke in a given year, which gives the 
expected number of views for a given speech. This assumes the speech was ob-
served when someone watched the video on C-SPAN’s website, which we un-
derstand is a strong assumption but is necessary nonetheless.
To understand our main dependent variable, imagine that the MC outlined 
above delivered their two speeches on two separate days. The standardized mea-
sure would be 12,500, which is the expected number of views for the videos in 
which the MC appeared in 2019. Since this variable is also right skewed, we ul-
timately took the log yielding the following measure:
The range of the standardized variable is 4.91 to 11.95, which is a much more 
reasonable distribution.
Table 8.1 reports the results from an initial ordinary least squares model. 
Consistent with previous literature, we find party leaders tend to receive more 
views on C-SPAN’s Video Library. More specifically, when all other variables 
are held at their mean and modal values, party leaders and the rank and file are 





















FIGURE 8.2 Histograms of speech and C-SPAN view data.
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predicted to receive 8.91 and 8.50 views every time they appear (logged). This 
suggests that party leaders are viewed 4.82% more than the rank and file, which 
is consistent with our first hypothesis. Similar results are found for seniority, 
suggesting that MCs who have stronger institutional positions are more likely 
to garner attention on C-SPAN’s website.
A statistically significant relationship is also found for ideological extremity. 
This variable is the absolute value of each MC’s DW-Nominate score — a common 
measure produced by VoteView to quantify MC ideology — with larger values 
implying they are more toward the tails of the liberal and conservative spectrum. 
Here, when all other variables are held at their mean and modes, MCs who are 


























State fixed effects ✓
Year fixed effects ✓
N 2133
Adjusted R2 0.532
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
log ( Total Number of Views )Total Number of Appearances 
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at the median of the absolute DW-Nominate scale are predicted to receive 8.52 
views every time they appear on C-SPAN (logged), whereas those who are at 
the third quartile of ideological extremity are predicted to receive 8.69 views for 
every appearance (logged). This 2% difference suggests that as MCs move fur-
ther out on the ideological spectrum, they are increasingly likely to be viewed 
on the C-SPAN Video Library.
Finally, we find that female MCs receive 1.12% more views than male MCs. 
More specifically, when all other variables are set to their mean and modes, fe-
male MCs are predicted to receive 8.62 views every time they appear on C-SPAN 
(logged), whereas male MCs are predicted to receive 8.52 views (logged). This 
result is consistent with our initial expectation and suggests that female MCs 
may have an advantage over their male colleagues with respect to the level of 
the attention they receive on C-SPAN’s website.
We next considered the degree to which issues traditionally advanced by fe-
male MCs are viewed by those watching on C-SPAN’s website. Here, there is lit-
tle guidance in the literature. In fact, we know of no study that has considered 
viewership levels for individual issues, let alone those that appear on C-SPAN. 
Based on the timeframe of our data (2009–2014), we expect health care will likely 
be covered heavily due to the Affordable Care Act, but beyond that we have lit-
tle a priori expectations.
Given that we have no strong prior expectations, we decided to use an unsu-
pervised topic model developed by Roberts et al. (2014) to determine what top-
ics tend to generate the most views on C-SPAN. This model allows researchers to 
“structure” the underlying Dirichlet distribution with other covariates. Although 
one could use any number of covariates to fit this model, in this chapter we only 
used two: the date of the speech and the speaker’s ideology. The first covariate 
attempts to account for the fact that only a handful of topics are discussed on a 
given legislative day. Similarly, liberals are more likely to discuss similar issues 
as compared to their conservative counterparts, and vice versa. Thus, including 
the member’s ideology — as measured by DW-Nominate scores — should help 
create more sensical topics.
The results of our topic model are found in Table 8.2. Here, the column on 
the far right is the average proportion of speeches dedicated to that topic, mean-
ing a score of 0.10 implies one should expect to find that topic in 10% of the av-
erage speech. The labels (second column from right) are not provided by the 
model but are added post hoc. These are meant merely to help with the exposi-
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columns are the top 5 words that appear within the topic and should give the 
reader a general sense of what the topic is capturing.
To determine the topics that generate the most views on C-SPAN’s website, 
we estimated 30 individual negative binomial regressions in which the depen-
dent variable is the number of views a MC received in a given year and the inde-
pendent variable is the proportion of their speeches dedicated to a given topic in 
that same year. A speech was considered dedicated to a given topic if that topic 
was one of the top five topics discussed in the speech, according to the propor-
tions returned by our model (see far-right column in Table 8.2). Again, since 
we do not have views by speech we must rely on such levels of aggregation, so 
our results should be interpreted as suggestive rather than definitive. Figure 8.3 
plots predicted values from these regressions where the number of speeches on 
a given topic is set to the mean. We then sorted the results such that the topic 
with the most views appears on the left end of the x-axis.
The topic that generated the most C-SPAN views was Party which includes 
words like “Republican” and “Democrat.” When this topic is set to its mean, the 
predicted number of C-SPAN views is currently (as of this writing) 62,309, which 
is 4.10% higher than the topic that generated the least amount of views. This 
topic is labeled Land and includes words like “water” and “land.” When this topic 
is set to its mean, the current predicted number of views is 59,855, which sug-










































































































































FIGURE 8.3 What topics are predicted to receive the most C-SPAN views?
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in terms of C-SPAN online viewership but that these differences should not be 
overstated. With that said, we are sure most MCs would prefer to have a larger 
audience than a smaller one, so — although somewhat slight — the differences we 
uncovered could be substantively important, depending on the circumstances.
For us, the more interesting question is whether topics typically advanced by 
female MCs generally garner fewer views. Although in the literature there is con-
siderable debate over what constitutes women’s issues (Volden et al., 2018), most 
would agree that health care, education, and issues related to the family are typi-
cally associated with female MCs. When one looks at the ranking found in Figure 
8.3, it is readily apparent that for the most part, these issues seem to receive less 
attention on C-SPAN’s website. The one noticeable exception is the topic we la-
beled Health Care, which includes words like “health” and “insurance.” This is 
the 6th most viewed topic, whereas the topics Children and Education appear 
in the bottom half. The topic Children includes words like “children” and “fam-
ily” and also is the only topic to include “women” in its top five words. Children 
is the 16th most viewed topic, while the topic Education, which includes words 
like “school” and “college,” is the 21st most viewed.
Of the 30 negative binomial regressions we estimated, we found the propor-
tion of speeches dedicated to a given topic was a statistically significant predictor 
(p < 0.05) of the number of online C-SPAN views in 20 models. In the 10 mod-
els where no such relationship was found, the topics were Party, Energy, Health 
Care, Middle East 2, Jobs, Financial, Discursive 2, Taxes, Administration, and 
Welfare 2. While the top words associated with these topics can be found in Table 
8.1, we would like to note that all of these topics are in the top 10 in terms of 
predicted online C-SPAN viewership. This suggests that these topics may — on 
their face — generate more views than others, but it may be difficult to distin-
guish one speech from another, at least in terms of online C-SPAN viewership.
Finally, we wanted to know how gender influenced the viewership of cer-
tain topics, especially those typically associated with women. Given previous 
work emphasizing the importance of women talking about women (Gerrity, et 
al., 2007; Osborn & Mendez, 2010), one would expect that female MCs would 
receive more views when they talk about women, as compared to other issues. 
We test this hypothesis using the topic Children from the topic model outlined 
in Table 8.2. Recall that this is the only topic containing a direct reference to 
women, so we think it is the most useful for answering this particular question.
Table 8.3 reports the results from a negative binomial regression in which the 
dependent variable is the total number of views and the independent variable is 
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TABLE 8.3 Do Female MCs Receive More C-SPAN Views?
Dependent variable:  



















“Children” speeches × Female -0.751**
(0.374)
State fixed effects ✓





Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
the interaction between a dummy variable that indicates whether the MC was 
female and the proportion of their speeches dedicated to the topic Children in a 
given year. Again, a dedicated speech is one in which the topic Children was in 
the top 5 according to our model. The significant negative interaction suggests 
that as women talk more about women they are viewed less on C-SPAN’s website.
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At first this may seem counterintuitive, but we think this is potential evi-
dence of tokenism, which has been discussed at length in previous literature 
(e.g., Kanthak & Krause, 2010; Kathlene, 1994). To make this point, Figure 8.4 
shows the predicted values from this model, holding all other variables as their 
mean and mode. On the x-axis we allow the proportion of total speeches dedi-
cated to the topic Children topic to vary from the first quartile (0.000) to third 
quartile (0.148). The y-axis is not the raw predicted values but instead is stan-
dardized to a percentage increase or decrease over the predicted value when the 
x-axis is set to zero. This was done because female MCs are predicted to receive 
considerably more views than their male counterparts.
More specifically, when the proportion of total speeches dedicated to the 
topic Children is set to zero and all other variables are held constant at their 
mean and mode, female MCs are currently predicted to receive 140,416 views 
on C-SPAN’s website. Conversely, when the same prediction is made for male 
MCs, they are only predicted to receive 85,637 views. Undoubtedly, a MC can-
not receive C-SPAN views when they do not give a speech on C-SPAN, but 































FIGURE 8.4 Do female MCs receive more C-SPAN views when they speak about “women’s issues”?
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put, female MCs are more likely to receive views on C-SPAN’s website as com-
pared to male MCs.
Figure 8.4 shows that this viewership begins to wane as female MCs increas-
ingly talk about women. This suggests that women are more likely to be viewed 
on C-SPAN’s website, but they lose this advantage when they choose to talk 
about women. Such a pattern is consistent with tokenism since it suggests that 
female MCs are good enough to be viewed on C-SPAN’s website, but this does 
not necessarily translate to more viewers hearing about issues that are import-
ant to women as a group.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that both the characteristics of MCs and the topics they dis-
cuss influence the chance that they are viewed on C-SPAN. This is consistent 
with previous literature on congressional news coverage, which suggests that 
C-SPAN viewership may be driven by a similar incentive structure as local and 
national news organizations, but more work needs to be done in order to better 
understand this relationship. However, this study is an important first step since 
it is the first to empirically assess C-SPAN Video Library viewership patterns.
We also think a potentially compelling story could be told about the number 
of times female MCs are viewed on C-SPAN’s website. Unlike previous litera-
ture, which has suggested that female MCs are covered less than male MCs on 
local and national news broadcasts, we find that they are actually viewed more 
often on the C-SPAN Video Library. However, this viewership advantage wanes 
as they increasingly talk about women.
Although it is difficult to state definitively why this relationship exists, we 
think it is telling that male MCs are essentially always viewed — all else being 
equal — when they speak, regardless of topic. The fact that female MCs may be 
forced to pick and choose what topics they discuss in order to be viewed on 
C-SPAN perhaps underlines the difficult barriers female MCs still face. We hope 
this chapter will encourage scholars to expand upon these results with both ex-
perimental and observational designs that will hopefully shed light on this im-
portant question.
Ultimately, we see this chapter as making two important contributions. First, 
we are the first researchers to directly measure what is viewed the most on 
the C-SPAN Video Library. Although our measure does not encompass all of 
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C-SPAN’s viewership, it is still an important step, especially to scholars of legisla-
tive speech who consistently suggest that C-SPAN is the main way floor speeches 
reach colleagues and constituents. Second, we conducted a “story-level” measure, 
which is distinctly different from counting the number of times a MC appeared 
in a newspaper article or television broadcast. The latter would be equivalent 
to counting the number of times a MC appeared on C-SPAN, but we are actu-
ally able to get some sense of the extent to which those appearances are being 
viewed. We think this opens up potentially new research opportunities, espe-
cially for those who are interested in congressional news coverage.
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FOR THE PEOPLE ACT OF 2019
A Framing Analysis of Legislators’ Videos on Twitter
Katelyn E. Brooks
INTRODUCTION
To be politically successful, representatives must communicate effectively with 
their constituency. Home styles, theorized by Richard Fenno (1978), describe 
the strategies that representatives employ when communicating with their con-
stituents; three major components are allocation of resources, presentation of 
self, and explanation of Washington activity. Of the three prominent areas of 
home styles, explanations of Washington activity have received less scholarly at-
tention (Grose et al., 2015). Washington explanations, though, are an important 
area of constituent communication, particularly involving communicating poli-
cies. Furthermore, contested, or polarized, policies are relatively undertheorized 
(Bechtel et al., 2015), especially involving strategies used to communicate and 
debate them. One such strategy includes utilizing media. Media, such as images 
and videos, are incredibly persuasive tools, yet their presence on social media 
is relatively understudied (Kharroub & Bas, 2016). Scholarship on multimodal 
argumentation (Dove, 2012; Kjeldsen, 2015; Kress, 2010; O’Keefe, 1977; Tsero-
nis, 2018) suggests a productive relationship for understanding how media can 
influence ways of understanding and communicating contested policies. Multi-
modal argumentation is a relatively underutilized perspective within constitu-
ent communication of policy; it suggests that the visual and verbal dimensions 
of an argument function together. This perspective is particularly productive 
when examining types of media apart from images, such as videos.
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This study conducts a rhetorical framing analysis of videos posted to Twitter 
about the For the People Act of 2019 (H.R.1) to investigate how media are uti-
lized in representatives’ communication to constituents about contested polices. 
Framing analyses can take many forms across different paradigms (D’Angelo, 
2002; D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010; Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974). A framing 
analysis from a rhetorical perspective is among the best-suited methods for ex-
ploring how media can influence audiences’ interpretations of a representative’s 
communication strategies involving contested policies. A rhetorical perspective 
in a framing analysis is typically concerned with making interpretive and evalu-
ative observations using qualitative and rhetorical methods as opposed to pre-
dominately empirical observations (Kuypers, 2005, 2010). This framing analysis 
reviews 89 videos circulated by current members of Congress through Twitter 
between January 3 and July 3, 2019.
H.R.1 serves as a productive contemporary example of a contested policy 
(Bechtel et al., 2015). H.R.1 is a bill currently going through the congressional 
procedure to become law. It was introduced in the House of Representatives on 
January 3, 2019, where it later passed in March 2019 along party lines. Currently, 
it is on the Senate’s legislative calendar (see For the People Act of 2019, 2019, 
for official updates). H.R.1 is significantly polarized; Democratic members of 
Congress praise its potential and progressivism, while Republican members con-
demn H.R.1 as a violation of the Constitution. This study analyzes frames pro-
duced along partisan lines and sources for the videos used to promote or refute 
H.R.1. The sources include clips from news media and C-SPAN, as well as videos 
produced or edited by a representative’s office. Frames observed along partisan 
lines are best equipped to contribute to the scholarship of constituent framing 
strategies because of current academic and social attention toward polarization. 
Meanwhile, frames observed between sources make meaningful contributions 
to research integrating multimodal argumentation into constituent communi-
cation of policy as such analysis is concerned with the media source and uses.
CONSTITUENT COMMUNICATION OF POLICY
Constituent communication refers to the strategies that elected representa-
tives use to communicate with their potential voter base, their constituents, and 
the public (Evans & Hayden, 2018; Fenno, 1978; Grimmer, 2013). Constituent 
communication is a major area of political communication and political pro-
cesses in the United States. Richard Fenno’s (1978) home styles are an early and 
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foundational contribution to constituent communication scholarship. Home 
styles are various strategies that elected representatives use when communicat-
ing with their constituency. The three major areas are the allocation of resources, 
presentation of self, and explanation of Washington activity (Fenno, 1978, p. 33). 
A representative’s allocation of resources includes not just justifying government 
spending but also their office’s resources, such as the staff ’s time and efforts (Ad-
ler et al., 1998; Fenno, 1978). A representative’s presentation of self refers to the 
ways they conduct themselves in a public setting. There is a surge in scholarship 
of representatives’ self-presentation strategies, particularly in mediated contexts 
(e.g., Enli & Rosenberg, 2018; Evans et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2017) and con-
cerning (performed) authenticity (Neblo et al., 2018). Lastly, a representative’s 
explanation of Washington activity often includes issues such as policy positions 
and ways of benefiting their district (Fenno, 1978; Parker & Goodman, 2009). 
Explanations of Washington activity, however, have received less scholarly atten-
tion than the other two major components of home styles, according to Grose et 
al. (2015). Importantly, these components are not mutually exclusive; for exam-
ple, a representative’s policy position (explanation of Washington activity) can 
include questions of political spending (allocation of resources). Though policy 
communication expands beyond constituent communication, policy commu-
nication is also firmly within constituent communication and, especially, a rep-
resentative’s explanation of Washington activity (Fenno, 1978; Grimmer, 2013; 
Parker & Goodman, 2009). According to Grimmer (2013), a representative’s pre-
sentation style directly influences their constituents’ knowledge and perception 
of the representative’s actions in Congress.
Political polarization is a prominent issue in both constituent and policy 
communication (Bechtel et al., 2015; Butler & Dynes, 2016; Evans & Hayden, 
2018; Mendez & Grose, 2018; San Miguel, 2004). Contested policies, specifi-
cally, are policies that are highly politically polarized (Bechtel et al., 2015; San 
Miguel, 2004). In other words, contested policies have minimal, if any, bi- or 
multi-partisan agreement for the policy. Policies characterized as contentious of-
ten “raise significant questions about national identity, federalism, power, ethnic-
ity, . . . and relations between federal, state, and local governments (San Miguel, 
2004, p. 1). Though the United States continues to receive significant scholarly 
attention involving polarization and contested policies (e.g., Barberá et al., 2015; 
Hong & Kim, 2016), contested policies are also studied in international contexts 
(e.g., Bechtel et al., 2015).
Following social media’s explosion in popularity, political communication 
research on how the public and representatives use social media for political 
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purposes grew exponentially (Boulianne, 2018; Jungherr, 2016; Kümpel et al., 
2015). Currently, Twitter is the most ubiquitous social media platform used by 
members of Congress (Golbeck et al., 2010; King, 2018). Golbeck et al. (2010) 
found that members of Congress use Twitter, among other platforms, to share 
official information such as news articles and press releases and to announce 
upcoming events and activities that involve the representative. Since Golbeck 
et al.’s (2010) study was conducted, members of Congress face a growing ex-
pectation to maintain Twitter use, with all members having at least one Twitter 
account (King, 2018), though some have multiple accounts to designate cam-
paign use (as implicitly recommended by the House Ethics Manual [House of 
Representatives, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 2008], Chapter 4) 
and staff-authored messaging. Further, Twitter has become a new form of of-
ficial statement by representatives, including the presidency, as argued by the 
Department of Justice in James Madison Project v. Department of Justice (2018). 
Political candidates also frequently rely on Twitter for campaign messaging, 
which is a prominent area of research (e.g., Bossetta, 2018; Evans et al., 2014; 
Jungherr, 2016; King, 2018). Additionally, representatives often use social media 
platforms to personalize themselves using various strategies (Evans et al., 2014; 
Fenno, 1978; Golbeck et al., 2010; McGregor et al., 2017).
Twitter is one of the most frequently studied platforms in political commu-
nication, though not uncritically (e.g., Bossetta, 2018). Twitter is a predomi-
nately politically oriented social media platform because of its infrastructure and 
common usage by prominent political figures for political engagement (Bode 
& Dalrymple, 2016; Bossetta, 2018; Golbeck, Grimes, & King, 2018; Lassen & 
Brown, 2011; Rogers, 2010; Shearer & Grieco, 2019). Further, studying Twitter can 
often be a pragmatic choice. Twitter’s data are more easily accessible to scholars 
and industry professionals when compared to other platforms such as Facebook, 
which is more protective of proprietary software and data (Murthy & Bowman, 
2014), and recent scandals like the Cambridge Analytica controversy have made 
Facebook a less utilized platform (see Silverman, 2019, for a summary).
MULTIMODAL ARGUMENTATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS
Policy communication is related to theories and strategies of argumentation. 
For representatives to gain policy support from their constituency or fellow 
representatives, representatives ought to illustrate (argue) why their position is 
the preferable option (Fenno, 1978). As social media platforms become a major 
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source of official communication by representatives, representatives’ messages 
must structurally conform to platform specifications such as character counts 
and media file size limits while advancing their policy positions (Bossetta, 2018). 
These platform characteristics have fostered a move toward more social media 
usage and have created a productive extension of multimodal argumentation.
Multimodal argumentation includes and moves beyond the “visual turn” 
in argumentation. Multimodal argumentation posits that argumentation can 
take place within various modes, or mediums, such as imagery, videos, space 
and place, time, and the body separately and simultaneously (Kjeldsen, 2015; 
Kress, 2010; O’Keefe, 1977; Tseronis, 2018). Multimodal argumentation com-
plicates the assumption that argumentation is an inherently and exclusively ver-
bal phenomenon. Modes of argumentation often behave and are structured in 
different ways. Multimodal arguments consider the roles of both argument and 
evidence (Blair, 2012; Dove, 2012; Roque, 2012). Further, images lack a cohe-
sive linear structure (Fleming, 1996). Videos do have such a linear structure — a 
video progresses from the beginning to the end.
Though much of the current multimodal argumentation research privileges 
the visual dimensions of argumentation, it does not inherently require scholars 
to eschew the verbal dimension of argumentation. Instead, multimodal argumen-
tation allows for the two dimensions — visual and verbal — to reach a productive 
intersection of joint arguments (Roque, 2012; Tseronis, 2018). A joint argument 
occurs when “the visual and the verbal combine in order to construct the argu-
ment” (Tseronis, 2018, p. 47). Political communication research commonly in-
cludes videos, particularly within political advertising (Kjeldsen, 2015). Political 
advertising scholars such as Gronbeck (1993), Collins and Schmid (1999), and 
Geer (2006) have been most concerned with the nuances of campaign adver-
tising. Political videos on social media, though, have been left relatively unad-
dressed (Kharroub & Bas, 2016).
The distinction between videos on television, such as news broadcasts, and 
videos on social media platforms are important for scholars to explore further. 
Social media platforms are increasingly becoming either a source or media-
tor for news and political information (Geiger, 2019; Shearer & Grieco, 2019). 
Additionally, representatives are commonly on social media platforms, especially 
at the federal level (King, 2018). Remediated videos on social media platforms 
function and present differently than videos “native” to social media. A major 
difference is the fragmentation of the audience. While specialized television net-
works contribute to television’s audience fragmentation (Webster, 2005), social 
media audiences are uniquely fragmented though overlapped with television 
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audiences (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012). Whereas tele-
vision networks can expect a relatively stable audience accessing the station for 
similar purposes, social media platforms are not guaranteed that same audience 
stability nor cohesion. This difference is significant because it requires content 
creators to employ different creative strategies to maintain audience attention 
(Fletcher & Nielson, 2017; Webster, 2005, 2014; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012).
METHOD
This study employs a framing analysis (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010; Entman, 
1993; Goffman, 1974) to explore the different frames politicians construct uti-
lizing video clips on Twitter in articulating their support or opposition of H.R.1, 
the For the People Act of 2019. For representatives to successfully communi-
cate complex, contested policies like H.R.1 through social media platforms, they 
inherently must rely on framing strategies. Frames are “principles of organiza-
tion which govern events . . . and our subjective involvement in them” (Goff-
man, 1974, p. 10) and can be identified “by the presence or absence of certain 
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sen-
tences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements” (En-
tman, 1993, p. 52). As one of the most studied media effects, there is a vast body 
of research concluding that frames and their manipulations are persuasive with 
audiences (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010; Entman, 1993). Furthermore, framing 
analyses have been conducted for similar research in political communication, 
such studies focused on mainstream news (Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 
2008), public opinion (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012), and social media (Qin, 2015).
This framing analysis uses a rhetorical perspective (Kuypers, 2005, 2010). A 
framing analysis with a rhetorical perspective is a qualitative endeavor rather 
than a quantitative one. Thus, rhetorical framing analyses are often conducted 
inductively from a text (Kuypers, 2010). A common distinction between rhetor-
ical framing analysis and other qualitative framing analyses is an emphasis on 
interpretation rather than empirical description. Similar to other rhetorical crit-
icism, a critic conducting a rhetorical framing analysis “will not present [their] 
claims as being the truth about reality, but rather as one way of describing the 
data” (Kuypers, 2010, p. 294; emphasis added). Additionally, rhetorical framing 
analyses fall within a critical paradigm in part because they interrogate struc-
tures of power and language (D’Angelo, 2002; Entman, 2007; Kuypers, 2010). A 
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rhetorical approach to framing analysis recognizes that frames and their anal-
ysis are important areas of rhetoric, analogous to Kenneth Burke’s terministic 
screens (Ott & Aoki, 2002). In this respect, such an analysis acknowledges that 
frames act rhetorically “to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judg-
ments, and suggest remedies” (Kuypers, 2010, p. 301).
Videos that are posted (remediated or otherwise) to social media platforms 
include framing strategies (Tseronis, 2018, p. 44). Videos must conform to plat-
form standards (Bossetta, 2018; Bucher & Helmond, 2018), which require that 
file sizes be within a specific size. When remediating videos from television, such 
as news or C-SPAN telecasts, representatives (or rather representatives’ commu-
nication staff) must trim videos to meet the appropriate file size. This trimming, 
or framing, can influence audiences’ interpretation of the recorded argumen-
tative situation (Grabe & Bucy, 2009). Additionally, representatives must select 
the source of the video clip. As identified by Entman (1993), sources of informa-
tion often produce identifiable frames. Sources-as-frames can be studied further 
through remediated videos on Twitter. Using remediated video clips from par-
tisan news sources can imply a partisan frame, whereas using remediated video 
clips from C-SPAN can imply a more objective frame. Frames, though, are of-
ten political and strategic (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010; Entman, 1993; Gamson, 
1989; Goffman, 1974; Kuypers, 2005). By focusing on videos shared by members 
of Congress through Twitter, this study makes valuable theoretical and meth-
odological contributions. Studies involving political communication on Twitter 
consistently privilege Twitter’s textual messages (Kharroub & Bas, 2016), missing 
the rich argumentative abilities of additional media such as videos within tweets 
(e.g., Davis, 2012; Tseronis, 2018). This oversight is not unexpected, though, 
as paralleled by Grabe and Bucy’s (2009) critique of earlier scholars prioritiz-
ing candidates’ visual and verbal appearance despite television news’s move to-
ward image bites.
The For the People Act of 2019 (H.R.1) is a productive context to explore 
framing and multimodal argumentation strategies surrounding contested poli-
cies. H.R.1 is highly contested and polarized in Congress, passing in the House 
of Representatives along stark partisan lines (For the People Act of 2019, 2019). 
Prominent representatives also voiced their support and opposition, such as 
Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell (2019) referring to the bill as a “power 
grab” and the “Democrat Politician Protection Act” in a Washington Post opin-
ion piece. Additionally, H.R.1 addresses a broad range of issues, including vot-
ing accessibility, election integrity and security, political spending, and ethics 
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standards for all branches of the federal government. Some of the high-profile 
and contentious components of H.R.1 include lowering the voting age to 16,1 
enfranchising formerly incarcerated citizens, making Election Day a federal hol-
iday, instituting a federal matching program for small-dollar donations for qual-
ified candidates, and codifying that presidential and vice presidential candidates 
must release 10 years of tax documents.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
How members of Congress communicate federal policies to constituents is an 
important area of research across multiple disciplines (Brick et al., 2018; Druck-
man, 2015; Dunn, 2015). Communication of policy involving election processes, 
including voting access, is particularly crucial to investigate as elections are a 
necessary component to a democratic governing system. However, ways of com-
municating policies are shifting (Nulty et al., 2016). Previously, the most effective 
ways for members of Congress to communicate policies to their constituents and 
the public writ large were through personal appearances, such as town halls or 
traditional news media. More recently they have added social media platforms 
to their arsenal of communication tools.
While none of these sources are mutually exclusive, social media platforms 
have facilitated multimodal sharing of the same content to broader audiences. 
For example, a member of Congress’s newspaper interview can be linked on 
Facebook, or C-SPAN footage can be edited for length through the C-SPAN 
Video Library and shared to Twitter. The change of medium and platform po-
tentially impacts the meaning of messages that are circulated by officeholders 
(Berger & Iyengar, 2013; McLuhan, 1964). Moreover, perceptions of the con-
tent’s source complicate this shift in the platform in ways that implicate cred-
ibility and authority, as well as potentially reveal insights about differences in 
strategies along party lines. To begin to consider these consequences for how 
social media continues to transform the business of policymaking, I consider 
the following research questions:
RQ1: What frames did members of Congress employ about H.R.1, the For 
the People Act of 2019, through video footage on Twitter?
RQ2: How do these frames differ by the political party or content source?
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Additionally, because H.R.1 addresses a wide range of issues in American pol-
itics, from campaign finance to government ethics, employing a framing analysis 
is a productive way of investigating what parts are most contested and priori-
tized. Members of Congress emphasize the parts of H.R.1 by selecting certain 
aspects of the bill to support or oppose. Identifying what components mem-
bers of Congress emphasize could facilitate future research investigating the ef-
fects of these varying emphases.
RQ3: What components of H.R.1, the For the People Act of 2019, are 
emphasized by members of Congress?
To address these questions, the analysis section will be organized by first ex-
amining frames consistent across political parties and sources. Then, frames will 
be contrasted along partisan lines to create more nuanced observations involving 
polarization. Within this section, I will also address what specific components of 
H.R.1 are emphasized by members of Congress. Lastly, I will compare the pres-
ence of various frames found in the different content sources: news media clips, 
C-SPAN clips, and office-produced videos. Rather than identifying frames ex-
clusively within individual videos shared through Twitter, this analysis will iden-
tify frames that span multiple videos and categorizations of partisan affiliation 
and the original sources of the videos’ content. However, individual videos will 
be referenced in order to illustrate various articulations of a frame. Analyzing 
frames at these broader levels allows for more generalizable observations.
DATA COLLECTION
A broad goal of this study is to understand how members of Congress com-
municate contested policy within a networked platform’s infrastructural con-
straints. A framing analysis will be conducted using a sample of available tweets 
published by members of Congress that (a) contain a video and (b) are related 
to H.R.1, the For the People Act of 2019. Tweets were collected through Twit-
ter’s search function using various search parameters associated with the leg-
islation to ensure that the tweets and videos were related to the For the People 
Act of 2019. These search parameters included hashtags and key terms, such as 
#HR1, #ForThePeople, #DemocratProtectionAct, H.R.1. Only tweets circulated 
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by current members of Congress were included; simple retweets were excluded. 
Because H.R.1 is still progressing through Congress, tweets were collected within 
a 6-month timeframe of January 3, 2019, when the bill was introduced in the 
House of Representatives, to July 3, 2019. Eighty-nine videos were collected, 
most (63) of which were from Democratic members of Congress. This imbal-
ance is to be expected, though, since Democratic representatives are typically 
more active on social media platforms than Republican representatives accord-
ing to a yearlong study from Quora (King, 2018).
ANALYSIS
There were multiple unique frames presented in the sample of videos tweeted by 
members of Congress. The frames are organized by consistent presence regard-
less of partisanship or video source, partisan sources, and original video source. 
Within these areas, I address the frames that were present within those categories 
to answer RQ1 (frames by members of Congress, partisan and overall) and RQ2 
(frames by video source). Because RQ3 is only concerned with how members 
of Congress emphasized elements of H.R.1, it is addressed in the sections that 
concern members of Congress: consistently present frames and partisan frames. 
This analysis cannot address every single frame presented within the videos, nor 
does it attempt to. Instead, the frames and elements discussed in this analysis 
were those that were prominently manifested, even if articulated slightly differ-
ently. Thus, these frames, across their various unique articulations, appeared in 
at least half of the videos of a given area for comparison. In line with a rhetorical 
perspective, the analysis focuses heavily on potential interpretations (Kuypers, 
2005, 2010). Despite the careful attention devoted to identifying frames, there 
could be other interpretations not identified or discussed in this analysis that 
future research with different methodological approaches could better address.
CONSISTENTLY PRESENT FRAMES
When examining the videos shared by members of Congress about H.R.1, the 
For the People Act of 2019, there were a few frames that were consistent across 
the two major parties and different content sources. In framing discussion of 
H.R.1, representatives often used an individual-centric approach to highlight 
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their individual position or specific contributions to support or oppose the pol-
icy. Additionally, representatives often framed H.R.1 and constituent bodies as 
a state-level phenomenon as opposed to a national level. Lastly, the most consis-
tently referenced part of H.R.1’s potential impact by both parties’ members in-
volved money in politics. Both groups referenced a specific provision of H.R.1, 
the proposed federal matching system for campaign finance, though Repub-
lican members emphasized it more heavily than their Democratic colleagues.
A consistent frame within the videos was the articulation of policy position 
at both the individual and party levels. An individual-level policy position is 
when the member of Congress prioritizes their position concerning the pol-
icy, regardless of being aligned or contrary to their respective party’s position. 
However, all individual-level positions were unsurprisingly within the overar-
ching party’s position regarding H.R.1. Meanwhile, members of Congress also 
explicitly aligned themselves with their party’s position through strategies such 
as using “we” statements to reference the party. Members of Congress also ex-
pressed concern for government and political processes across party lines de-
spite divergences in specific articulations. One common articulation of both 
parties, though, was accusing and criticizing the other party of refusing to engage 
in bipartisan discussions for policymaking. Republican members of Congress 
accused their Democratic colleagues of not engaging in bipartisanship when 
creating H.R.1, while Democratic members of Congress referenced past trans-
gressions of forgoing bipartisanship, notably for the change in taxation during 
the previous 115th Congress.
A second consistent and meaningful frame used by members of Congress 
on both sides of the aisle and across all types of video sources was local issues. 
Members of Congress highlighted different aspects of H.R.1 and illustrated ways 
that H.R.1 would affect their community. Republican members of Congress most 
commonly emphasized the changes H.R.1 would make to state-level voting pro-
cesses, such as felon enfranchisement and voter identification laws. Democratic 
members of Congress were less cohesive in what effects H.R.1 would have for 
their respective district, though, opting for local-specific effects, such as Delegate 
Eleanor Holmes Norton arguing that H.R.1 is an avenue for Washington, D.C., 
to achieve statehood. Both parties’ representatives, though, emphasized that “the 
people” were rooted in local and state communities rather than at the broader 
federal or national levels.
The most-referenced component of H.R.1 across both parties and three 
source-types was the bill’s proposed methods of addressing money in politics. 
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H.R.1 would create a federal matching system for small-dollar donations to el-
igible candidates. Democratic members of Congress claimed that the matching 
program would make representatives more accessible to their constituents by 
relying less on donations from special interest groups and political action com-
mittees (PACs) and would make it easier for citizens to enter politics as candi-
dates. Republican members, though, argued that the matching program would 
both increase money in politics and inhibit citizens’ First Amendment rights.
PARTISAN FRAMES
Unsurprisingly, there were multiple frames prioritized by a single party rather 
than both. This section primarily addresses what framing differences exist across 
party lines, beginning with the Democratic members of Congress, followed 
by the Republican members. Rather than belaboring every existing frame and 
its various articulations, this analysis strives to identify the common features 
of party frames, independent of the videos’ sources. Democratic members’ 
most common frames included a government for the people, popular support, 
and historical progressivism. Republican members, meanwhile, most empha-
sized the federal government’s overreach into states’ authority and acting as 
truth-tellers of H.R.1.
Democratic Frames
The first frame from Democratic members of Congress is the government for 
the people. This frame was, predictably, consistent across party members. Some 
members highlighted concerns regarding government ethics, particularly high-
lighting the Trump Administration’s “at best, very awkward relationship with 
ethics,” according to Representative Harley Rouda (D-CA). Thus, the implica-
tion is that the government has fallen from its ideal of being a government “of, 
for, and by the people” (emphasis added), a phrase quoted by several represen-
tatives. Related, representatives also critiqued the presence of money in poli-
tics as inhibiting their ideal democratic government for the people. Multiple 
politicians accused “dark money” and special interest groups’ lobbying efforts 
as the cause of a current governmental reality that, in their estimation, is not for 
the people. When using this articulation of government for the people, members 
of Congress also praised the proposed federal funding matches as incentivizing 
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their (implicitly Republican) colleagues to prioritize meeting with and listening 
to constituents rather than lobbyists. Lastly, multiple Democratic members of 
Congress attempted to reclaim and rearticulate a common attack by their Repub-
lican colleagues of H.R.1 being a “power grab” for the Democrats. For example, 
Representative Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) said in a statement on the House floor 
that Republicans “got [Democrats] again” and that she and her fellow Demo-
cratic representatives were “guilty” of orchestrating a power grab. According to 
Rep. Pressley, though, Democrats “wouldn’t have to grab back the grab for the 
people if through policy [Republican members] weren’t complicit in or perpet-
uating the disenfranchisement and marginalization of the people.” Across its 
various articulations, a call for the restoration of government and democracy 
predicated the government for the people frame.
Unique to Democratic members of Congress was an explicit endorsement 
of a nonpolitician and references to public opinion, characterizing the frame of 
popular support. In an official press conference broadcast through C-SPAN and 
shared by Representative John Sarbanes (D-MD), Chris Shelton, the president 
of Communications Workers of America, expressed his and his union’s strong 
support of H.R.1. Additionally, freshmen Democratic members of Congress, 
or those elected in the 2018 election, featured a unique articulation of popular 
support for H.R.1 by referencing their electoral success, particularly when from 
flipped districts. Their central claim was that because these freshmen members 
not only flipped their districts but also the House of Representatives from a 
Republican majority to the current Democratic majority, people across the coun-
try support them as representatives and, by implication, the policies they create.
Lastly, Democratic members of Congress emphasized a historically progres-
sive frame when communicating through videos on Twitter. Several Democratic 
members of Congress claimed that H.R.1 is the largest policy reform in recent 
history. Some of the progressive components of H.R.1 framed as historically pro-
gressive included voting access, election and campaign policies — especially cam-
paign finance policies — and ethics in government. Interestingly, Democratic 
members of Congress also connected H.R.1 to historical progressive move-
ments and values. For example, Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA) addressed 
H.R.1 with other progressive policies, both contemporary and historical, in the 
Democratic Weekly Address video series, which was shared by both Rep. Lee 
and Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). Rep. Lee related H.R.1 and other policies 
proposed by the current Congress with Black History Month. Additionally, Rep. 
Katie Hill (D-CA) aligned H.R.1 with Women’s History Month by previewing 
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her intention of “highlighting the voices of [her] fellow women freshmen mem-
bers” and reiterating that her class “is a truly historic class on so many levels” 
after explaining H.R.1’s anticipated trajectory. Though neither representative 
claims that H.R.1 is explicitly and necessarily a part of these months dedicated 
to highlighting histories of traditionally marginalized groups, including refer-
ences to these months and H.R.1 implies that H.R.1 is at least congruent with 
the goals of these typically progressive ideals to recognize and promote tradi-
tionally marginalized voices.
Republican Frames
While Democratic members of Congress most consistently emphasized a govern-
ment for the people frame, Republican members most consistently emphasized a 
frame of federal overreach. This frame often returned to the implicit dichotomy 
of states’ rights versus federal authority, noticeably when referencing authority 
over electoral processes. H.R.1 was often described as an encroachment by the 
federal government into state authority. The primary issue used to advance the 
federal overreach frame was electoral processes. Many Republican representatives 
expressed outrage that the federal government would intervene in the electoral 
processes that the Constitution designates as under states’ authority. For exam-
ple, Representative Mark Green (R-TN) exclaimed multiple times, “How dare you 
[the federal government] tell Tennessee” how to conduct various parts of their 
elections. Rep. Green’s comments are more impactful because they were pro-
liferated through video footage rather than through exclusively a textual tweet. 
The video footage allows audiences to infer passionate outrage through his facial 
expressions and intonation. However, knowledge of the Republican Party’s con-
servative ideology could easily anticipate the federal overreach frame given that 
the frame favors a smaller federal government (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2015).
Another interesting frame commonly shared by Republican members of 
Congress was their perceived role of truth-tellers. For example, in a video shared 
multiple times by Republican members of Congress, particularly Senate major-
ity leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the video aimed to correct the “myth” that 
H.R.1 is an election and campaign finance reform bill. Further, Representative 
Mark Walker (R-NC) shared a sort of mock-campaign advertisement to expose 
that “you,” the taxpayer, paid for the advertisement regardless of your level of 
support for him. This frame is particularly interesting when placed in the larger 
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context of polarization and accusations of “fake news.” Partisan Republicans 
are not only more likely to encounter or share false or misleading information 
(Marwick, 2018) but also show stronger hostility toward fact-checkers (Shin & 
Thorson, 2017). Future research of misleading, partisan information ought to 
more thoroughly investigate the contradictions of sharing demonstrably false 
information while promoting an image of truth-tellers (e.g., Marwick, 2018).
SOURCE FRAMES
This section of analysis addresses frames common within specific sources of vid-
eos. The sources of videos are broken into three types: news media clips, C-SPAN 
clips, and office-produced videos. Both news media clips and C-SPAN clips re-
quired an official logo to be within the video’s frame. News media and C-SPAN 
were designated as different types because they are fundamentally different styles 
of reporting about congressional activity. News media clips incorporate a wider 
variety of reporting styles such as interviews and chamber footage. Meanwhile, 
C-SPAN is not concerned with providing commentary; instead, C-SPAN serves 
to provide public access to public policy discussions from public officials and 
other policy influencers. Lastly, office-produced videos are those produced or ed-
ited by the representative themselves or their office. Examples of office-produced 
and edited videos include videos that were filmed in areas such as airports or 
offices, videos that were noticeably edited beyond adjusting for length, and vid-
eos that either did not feature an official news network or C-SPAN logo or did 
feature the representative’s office or campaign logo. The frames that were tied 
to the video’s source are predominately presentational frames. C-SPAN videos, 
for example, were more official and policy-oriented, while videos produced by 
a member of Congress’s office better conveyed the representative’s authenticity.
There are two similar yet distinct frames within official C-SPAN footage: 
congressional function versus congressional procedure. Democratic members of 
Congress highlighted congressional function more often than the congressional 
procedure. As a frame, congressional function refers to the ways that Congress 
either is or ought to function. Democratic members of Congress used H.R.1 to 
illustrate congressional dysfunction. A prominent critique following H.R.1’s 
passage in the House of Representatives was Senator McConnell’s refusal to al-
low a Senate vote on the bill. Meanwhile, Republican members of Congress 
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highlighted congressional procedure or the rules and expectations of policymak-
ing in Congress. For example, Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH), among other 
Republican members of Congress, shared multiple videos criticizing Democratic 
members violating the expected congressional procedure of committee markup 
meetings. It is important to note, though, that neither party monopolized these 
frames through C-SPAN footage. For example, Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA) 
shared a clip of congressional procedure involving floor commentary on H.R.1 
in which he and Rep. Jordan gave speeches both in favor of and in opposition 
to sections of H.R.1. Representative Jared Huffman (D-CA) also explained the 
congressional procedure for introducing and adopting his proposed amendment 
to H.R.1 within the bill text.
When sharing C-SPAN footage to explain policies and policy positions, the 
footage functions as both argument and evidence (Blair, 2012; Dove, 2012; Roque, 
2012). Like with other videos, using C-SPAN footage allows members of Congress 
to take advantage of Twitter’s infrastructural capabilities to condense more of an 
argument’s information, 280 characters plus a video, into a tweet. C-SPAN foot-
age specifically, though, lends an aura of credibility not afforded by other video 
sources. A foundational purpose of C-SPAN is to provide public access to congres-
sional proceedings and other forums involved with public policy “all without ed-
iting, commentary or analysis and with a balanced presentation of points of view” 
(C-SPAN, n.d.). C-SPAN’s reputation is intimately connected to its commitment 
to balanced and objective programming (C-SPAN, 2013, 2017). It is important to 
reiterate: this framing analysis is not concerned with the representative’s intent 
for using C-SPAN footage, but rather potential interpretations of frames within 
representatives’ tweeted videos. Therefore, it is unknowable whether represen-
tatives utilize C-SPAN footage to intentionally align themselves and their policy 
positions with C-SPAN’s reputation or because of its accessibility. Nevertheless, 
C-SPAN, as a source of information and shared by elected representatives, is an 
important influence on how the footage could be interpreted by audiences.
A representative’s presentation of self can influence their explanation of 
Washington activity. A major intersection of these two components of a repre-
sentative’s home style is their cultivated authenticity (Evans et al., 2014; Fenno, 
1978; Golbeck et al., 2010; McGregor, 2018; McGregor et al., 2017). When fos-
tering an authentic presentation, representatives are also building their constit-
uents’ trust in them. While a representative’s presentation of authenticity spans 
all three types of content, it is practiced the most through office-produced and 
edited videos. In office-produced videos, representatives have more control over 
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the final editing and presentation stages. Thus, a prominent frame used predom-
inately by Democratic members of Congress in office-produced videos is authen-
tic. Several Democratic representatives filmed videos in various locations outside 
of a news media set and congressional chambers, such as airports, hallways, and 
offices. Importantly, though, the content of their videos often included accessi-
ble explanations of their policy positions. Representative Katie Porter (D-CA), 
for example, explained different aspects of H.R.1 across multiple videos with-
out using jargon-laden language.
CONCLUSION
Using a framing analysis with a rhetorical perspective (Kuypers, 2005, 2010), this 
study investigated 89 videos shared by members of Congress through Twitter. 
There were numerous frames identified across partisan lines and the different 
types of videos: news media and C-SPAN clips and videos produced by a rep-
resentative’s office. The frames used by members of Congress that were identi-
fied in this study contribute to both constituent communication strategies and 
framing contested policies.
In terms of constituent communication of policy, this analysis found that 
representatives use videos to both expand and illustrate policy positions. 
Representatives such as Katie Porter and Jared Huffman used videos produced 
by their offices to elaborate on policy positions and explanations. Though vid-
eos on Twitter are necessarily brief to conform to the platform’s infrastructure, 
consistent features of such videos, predominately produced by Democratic of-
fices, were conversational tones and easily understandable explanations. This 
finding is significant because it suggests an effect from some politicians that 
makes political processes more accessible to constituents unfamiliar with po-
litical processes and jargon, regardless of the constituent’s partisan orientation. 
This could potentially complicate previously held assumptions, including that 
politicians prioritize constituents that agree with them (Butler & Dynes, 2016). 
Additionally, representatives are likely to address federal issues in more local 
frames. Representatives in this analysis claimed different ways that H.R.1 would 
affect local and state politics as well as conceptualized constituencies, includ-
ing and beyond their own constituencies, at the state and local level rather than 
national. This is a particularly interesting observation given their Twitter pres-
ence is on a national stage.
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In terms of argumentation utilizing social media, and especially remedia-
tion of video, a multimodal argumentation approach helped identify potential 
functions of native- and multi-platform video footage. This study suggests that 
videos on social media highlight the larger, more nuanced role of authenticity 
performances in constituent communication of policy than previously consid-
ered. Representatives in this study referenced their policy position record in 
terms of authenticity, such as Rep. Katie Hill’s claim that the issues addressed 
by H.R.1 have always been important to her since before her 2018 campaign. 
Additionally, videos from other sources, news media, and C-SPAN can function 
as evidence for their authenticity. If a politician campaigns on issues raised by 
H.R.1, then their public statements to news media and on the floor of Congress 
ought to be consistent with their previous positions, implying that those posi-
tions are an authentic reflection of the politician’s values. Within argumentation, 
this raises interesting questions about authenticity’s connection to credibility, a 
prominently studied area of argumentation (Rieke et al., 2013), and how a mul-
timodal and remediated approach complicates it.
In terms of contested policy communication and H.R.1 specifically, my analy-
sis revealed that the main issue within H.R.1 that is consistently addressed by both 
political parties is the influence of money in politics and campaigns. However, 
partisan representatives articulate, or frame, their positions in significantly dif-
ferent terms. Whereas Democratic members of Congress claim that H.R.1 would 
decrease the presence “dark money” and lobbyist influence, Republican mem-
bers claim that H.R.1 would increase money’s influence in politics instead at the 
expense of the taxpayer. Beyond money in politics, there was minimal clash in 
support for and opposition to H.R.1. Republican members of Congress consis-
tently criticized H.R.1 as an overreach of the federal government into states’ af-
fairs regarding electoral processes. Rather than directly responding to Republican 
claims of federal overreach by H.R.1, Democratic members of Congress empha-
sized the policy’s measures to make voter registration and elections more acces-
sible. Indirectly, Democratic members challenged Republican frames of federal 
overreach by claiming that H.R.1 is not a power grab for federal politicians but in-
stead restores political power to the people. These incongruencies between partisan 
frames of H.R.1 raise interesting questions of how politicians communicate infor-
mation and positions of contested policies in a hyperpolarized political context.
In attempting to be thorough, this study could inspire a number of future re-
search programs of questions raised by and unaddressed by this analysis. Future 
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research could strengthen the generalizability of the observations of this study 
by conducting a similar analysis of a different contested policy, either histori-
cal or in the future. Alternatively, a content analysis could be conducted using 
these videos, also strengthening the present study’s validity. Furthermore, a spe-
cific area that would benefit more robust, generative investigations includes au-
thenticity’s role in multimodal argumentation and constituent communication 
of policy. Authenticity is a growing area of interest in political communica-
tion in mediated contexts (Evans et al., 2014; Fenno, 1978; Golbeck et al., 2010; 
McGregor et al., 2017). However, there has been little theorization of its influ-
ence on politicians’ communicative strategies regarding policies (Fenno, 1978; 
Grose et al., 2015) and how different types of videos enhance or inhibit perfor-
mances of authenticity.
Constituent communication is a vast and prominent area of political commu-
nication. Fenno’s (1978) home styles continue to be a lasting and foundational 
area within constituent communication scholarship, included in numerous other 
areas of study such as policy communication. Constituent communication of 
policy is an important segment of political communication. Representatives are 
primary sources of political proceedings (Fenno, 1978). As representatives in-
corporate social media platforms, notably Twitter (King, 2018), into their com-
munication strategies, scholars must revisit and challenge existing assumptions 
of constituent communication. An assumption to problematize is political com-
munication’s text-centric study of Twitter. Though Twitter does not prioritize im-
ages and other types of media on the platform, media are commonly included 
in tweets (Kharroub & Bas, 2016). Multimodal argumentation provides a pro-
ductive theoretical base to understand media’s persuasive attributes (Dove, 2012; 
Kjeldsen, 2015; Kress, 2010; O’Keefe, 1977; Tseronis, 2018). Additionally, multi-
modal argumentation creates constructive and cohesive extension of visual ar-
gumentation to account for situations in which audiences encounter more than 
one type of media (Kjeldsen, 2015; Tseronis, 2018).
NOTE
 1. The amendment to lower the mandatory minimum voting age, introduced by 
Rep. Ayanna Pressley, was not included in the final version of H.R.1, which was 
passed by the House of Representatives.
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